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SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA

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SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA

by

Milton E. Osborne

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PREFACE

During the past year a great many people, with widely varying degrees of knowledgeability, have written about the problems and controversies arising during and subsequent to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. Although the better informed of these writers have all acknowledged the importance of Singapore's internal politics in understanding the process of federation, none has, to my knowledge, undertaken the thorough and searching analysis of this problem that it merits. Yet clearly the central and most decisive factor in understanding the background and process of Malaysia's formation, not to mention the new Federation's emerging internal problems, are the internal politics of Singapore. Covering the period 1959 through May 1964, this study by Mr. Milton Osborne is, I believe, the most thorough and substantial analysis of this subject yet to have appeared. It should be helpful to all those wishing to understand the motivations behind the establishment of the new Federation and the centrifugal forces working within it -- forces which in the long run are likely to be of greater importance than its more immediate external problems.

Milton Osborne received his B.A. degree from the University of Sydney in 1958 with First Class Honours and the University Medal in History. He then entered the Australian Department of External Affairs, remaining there until 1962. During this time he spent over two years as a member of the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh in Cambodia. From 1962-63 he was a temporary lecturer in History at the University of Sydney, and spent three months of this period on research in Singapore and Saigon. He was fortunate to be in Singapore at times when events of marked importance to Malaysia were taking place, in December 1962 during the time of the Brunei rebellion and February of 1963 when large scale detention of opposition elements was carried out. In September of 1963 Mr. Osborne, as a doctoral candidate in Southeast Asian History, entered Cornell where a preliminary draft of this study was written for a Malaysia seminar held during the fall term of 1963. The Cornell Southeast Asia Program is pleased to give this study the wider dissemination which we believe it deserves.

Ithaca, New York
June 10, 1964

G. McT. Kahin
Director

INTRODUCTION -- THE SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE SURVEY

In 1959 the People's Action Party came to power in Singapore with the aim of merger with Malaya as a major plank in its party platform. Five years later, in 1964, with merger achieved within Malaysia, the same party attempted to extend its power beyond Singapore and to achieve parliamentary representation in the Federal Parliament from Malaya, as well as from Singapore. Despite its lack of success in this attempt, the People's Action Party's decision to contest the Malayan elections in April 1964 appears to have been an important turning point in Malaysian politics. It represented the first attempt by an opposition party to achieve pan-Malaysian representation at the Federal level. This survey seeks to describe and analyze the events between the assumption of power by the People's Action Party in Singapore in 1959 and that party's decision to contest the Malayan elections in 1964. In order to place these events in perspective there is also a brief consideration of events in Singapore from the Second World War until 1959. Singapore's external relations during the period under consideration, including those with Malaya, have been important. But in great measure these relations have depended on the development of internal politics. Indeed, the decision to contest the Malayan elections reflected the strong position which the People's Action Party had achieved in Singapore after its victory in the Singapore elections of September 1963. In essence these internal politics have consisted of a battle for survival fought by the People's Action Party against a challenge from the Barisan Socialis, a party which emerged from within the People's Action Party and which pre-empted many of the tactics of its parent.

Two most important limitations faced my study of Singapore politics. The first is a matter of technique. The second, and probably the more important, is a matter of methodology and interpretation. The technical matter involves the use of source material. To be fully equipped for a survey of Singapore politics would require a knowledge of English, Chinese, Malay and Tamil, as well as the obvious desideratum of a greater personal knowledge of the area. I have had to approach this survey with English as my one useful linguistic aid. But in fact, in the context of immediately available material, reliance on English sources becomes less of a handicap than might be imagined. English continues to be an important vehicle for politics in Malaysia and the principal newspaper reporting is in English.

On the second limitation, it seems necessary to outline the difficulties involved in interpreting the true nature of the policies of the Barisan Socialis and the political affiliations of its leaders. These are matters of great importance to the discussion of politics in Singapore which are difficult to resolve. Singapore does not enjoy a fully free press. The powers of the Government are such that it can limit critical comment. The chief newspaper operating within the state has recognized the bounds within which it can operate and keeps to

them.* The result is an unsympathetic presentation of the Barisan Socialist's point of view and a restriction on the amount of printed critical comment concerning the Government. In attempting to analyze such a situation one risks depending on conclusions which stress "success" as opposed to "failure" and of neglecting the content of the opposition party's policies. Again, Lee Kuan Yew's success in internal politics has been achieved at the expense of freedoms which are accepted, at least as goals, in Western democracies. Both in the case of the People's Action Party and the Barisan Socialist, I have attempted to set their actions and policies against the background of Singapore's political development. Where value judgments obtrude, I have done my best to identify them as such. In suggesting that the Barisan Socialist's policies were of such a nature as to benefit the aims of the Communists in Singapore and Malaya, I am relying on the technique of comparison and extension of what are generally assumed to be the aims of Communists in the area, when reviewed by knowledgeable observers. It is not sufficient to note that the Barisan Socialist's policies were impracticable within the limits set by the Federation of Malaya's attitudes. In addition to the negative aspects, there was the positive consideration of the damage which would have been done to relations between Singapore and Malaya through adherence to the Barisan policies. Here, of course, a judgment of both value and practicability is made which probably cannot be avoided. This is that a viable future for Singapore lies in merger with Malaya and not in isolation or in opposition to the Federation of Malaysia. It is difficult to escape this conclusion, or the additional judgment that the terms which Lee Kuan Yew obtained for merger represented the maximum advantage which could be obtained by Singapore.


Milton E. Osborne

Ithaca, New York
May 15, 1964

* This point has been made in annual surveys of government interference in the press throughout the world conducted by the Associated Press. In its latest survey, reported in the New York Times of 5 January 1964, it remarked: "Malaysia has no censorship of outgoing news. Newspapers face a government shutdown if they defy government policy."

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State of Johore

Katong

Serangoon

City

Bukit Panjang

Jurong

Southern Islands

SINGAPORE
ADMINISTRATIVE

UNITS - 1957

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

I. THE BACKGROUND

Two facts are central to any discussion of Singapore: one is the island's proximity to the Malayan mainland; the other is the overwhelmingly Chinese nature of its population.¹ The first fact combined with Singapore's limited natural resources, not least of water, make it impossible to think of the island having any true viability independent of Malaya, whatever precedents may be quoted, as they were by David Marshall in 1956, for independent states of less than one million people. The nature of Singapore's racial composition is of the greatest importance for the political orientation of its politics, the development of its educational policies, and for its position vis-a-vis a conservative Malayan Government dominated by Malays and firmly committed to a policy of Malay paramountcy, despite concessions to the Chinese position in Malaya. Practically and economically merger has seemed desirable and logical, with immediate advantages offering in such fields as a unified public service and in a joint approach to economic problems. Politically, for the greater part of the postwar period merger has seemed impossible. The divergent economic development of Singapore has been a complicating factor. Malaya as a primary producing country depends on export duties and protective tariffs. Singapore from its foundation has been a free port relying heavily for finance, although less and less exclusively since the Second World War, on entrepot trade. This divergent development did in fact offer advantages in merger through complementarity but it posed the problems, as much political as economic, of how to blend the two territories' economies with as little disadvantage as possible to each.

There has been merger at the physical level between Singapore and Malaya for many years through the Johore Causeway, and this has been reinforced by the increasing reliance placed on water supplied from Johore. Indeed, the economic linkage of Johore and Singapore was clearly established in the nineteenth century. In discussion since 1946 political

1. The following population figures are taken from the Singapore Government Monthly Digest of Statistics, Vol. 1, No. 12 (Singapore, 1962). Tables 2.1 and 2.3.

Total population - mid 1962 - 1,732,800
Population by race - mid 1962 - Chinese 1,302,500, Malays 243,400,
Indians 143,700, Other 43,000.

The approximate breakdown of the Chinese population into linguistic groups as of 1958 was Hokkien 432,000, Cantonese 236,000, Teochew 234,000, Hakka 60,000, Hainanese 79,000, Foochow 14,000. These figures were provided by the Singapore Chief Secretary on 3 December 1958 - Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates: Official Report (henceforth Leg. Ass. Debates), 3 December 1958, Cols. 1024-1025.

merger has been pronounced an objective of the majority of parties in Singapore. As an issue, however, it has only come into real prominence with the diminution of British governmental control in Singapore and in conjunction with the swing from restricted political activity, and a restricted franchise, to the participation of the mass of the population in politics and the emergence of parties relying on mass support.

This survey will be chiefly concerned with events from Singapore's attainment of semi-independence in 1959 until the achievement of Malaysia in September 1963, with greatest attention given to the period 1961 to 1963. Some attention will be given at the end of the survey, however, to the events following September 1963, in particular to the decision by the principal Singapore political party to play an active role in Malayan politics. But to obtain a proper perspective the point of departure must be the end of the Second World War. Singapore was not included in either the Malayan Union or the Malayan Federation set up by the British Government after the war. The principal reason for this decision was the fact of Singapore's heavily Chinese population which was seen as likely to create racial difficulties if combined with the Chinese population on the mainland. As a positive aspect of the same issue there was the development of Malay nationalism, which had for the first time rationalized its concern for the results of Chinese economic domination into political action. Other contributing reasons were the differing economic development of Singapore, with neither Singapore nor Malaya ready at that stage to discuss an economic modus vivendi which might overcome the problems of union; and the strategic considerations of the British Government which wished to maintain a strong Far Eastern base. In this final respect British concern was strengthened by the Malayan Emergency and the outbreak of the Korean War.²

The most characteristic feature of Singapore politics in the period immediately after the Second World War was the failure of the population to participate in politics, even giving consideration to the limitations of the franchise. Two threads run through this situation. First, the Japanese occupation had alienated the traditional leaders of the Chinese community -- the towkays or prosperous businessmen -- from participation in politics.³ At the same time, there was resistance from the politically aware Chinese to the limitations placed upon them, and resentment of those limitations was translated into boycott of the electoral registers as well as in the low percentage of votes cast. It has been estimated that in the first two elections held in Singapore in 1948 and 1951 a quarter of a million persons were eligible to vote. In 1948 some twenty-two thousand persons registered to vote and sixty-three percent of these exercised their right, while in 1951 some forty-eight thousand

2. L. A. Mills, Malaya - A Political and Economic Appraisal, (Minneapolis, 1958), p. 117.

3. V. Purcell, The Chinese in Modern Malaya, (Singapore, 1960), p. 39.

registered and fifty-one percent of the registered voters voted.⁴ Along with this reluctance to participate in elections, however, there was by the early fifties increasing activity by left-wing organizers who campaigned against colonialism and presented independence from Britain as their aim. Their policies found ready appeal among the younger Chinese, particularly those attending the Chinese middle schools, many of whom were older than their status as school children would suggest and already vitally aware of the changing role being played by China in world affairs. Calls to action phrased in anti-colonial terms or in terms which stressed Chinese chauvinism had great appeal. No real sense of Malayan nationalism developed because of the China-oriented outlook of those to whom this agitation was directed. But Singapore's economic problems and its position as a British garrison-town insured that there would be continued agitation for greater power for the island's inhabitants. The British response to the situation was to appoint the Rendel Commission, and its Report, issued in 1954, brought the first significant step towards popular participation in politics. Interestingly, the Report, while noting that the question of Singapore's merger with Malaya lay outside its terms of reference, referred to the desirability of merger in the future.⁵

Changes following the Rendel Report, while not bringing manhood suffrage, sufficiently enlarged the electorate to encourage the participation of the radical left-wing politicians; and in the 1955 elections the People's Action Party (P.A.P.), dominated from its foundation in 1954 by Lee Kuan Yew the present Prime Minister of Singapore, won representation in the Singapore Legislative Assembly with three seats.⁶ Of the parties contesting the elections the P.A.P. was clearly the furthest to the left of the political spectrum. Although seeking to appeal to a multi-racial audience the P.A.P., as must be the case with any mass party in Singapore, depends principally on its ability to muster the Chinese vote. Its most active leaders have come from among those Chinese who have been educated in the English-language schools and who have been dissatisfied with the policies offered by more conservative Chinese groups such as the Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.). The participation of a limited number of capable Indians in the leadership has been important also, while the need to give some representation to Malays has not been neglected. This latter aim has been so successfully pursued that in the September 1963 elections the United Malays National Organization (U.M.N.O.) candidates in Singapore were unable to gain one seat against the P.A.P.⁷ From the outset the P.A.P. has proclaimed its aim of union with Malaya. It is a measure of the changed situation in Singapore-Malayan relations that this party, which was seen by many in the Federation as unredeemably associated with communism and Chinese chauvinism, has successfully concluded merger with the Federation of Malaya.

4. L. A. Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

5. Report of the Constitutional Commission, Singapore, (Singapore, 1954), see pp. 137-142.

6. L. A. Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

7. For an analysis of the educational background of the P.A.P. leaders, see Appendix A.

Politics in Singapore from 1955 to semi-independence in 1959 are frequently described in terms of a one-way swing of the political pendulum from right to left. This is correct as a generalization but it requires qualification. First, radical positions taken in election campaigns were not always carried through in practice. Second, in describing Singapore politics weight must be given to the setting in which they take place, which is one of high unemployment, extremely unsatisfactory conditions of social welfare,⁸ and a frustrating dependence on the British presence for much of the employment in Singapore, made doubly frustrating by such statements as that of Lennox Boyd, the British Colonial Secretary, that "people who depend on selling goods should get on with the job and worry less over constitutional niceties."⁹ During this period, with the exception of David Marshall's theatrically unproductive demand for complete independence in 1956, there was general acceptance of the aim of obtaining Singapore's independence through merger with Malaya, although the terms envisaged by different political groups varied greatly.¹⁰ The Federation leaders during this period remained firmly opposed to merger as a practical proposition. The tone in which these Federation views were expressed might vary but the inference was always the same. Thus, although at the time of the foundation of the P.A.P. in 1954, Tengku Abdul Rahman suggested that if the P.A.P.'s stand on merger had wider currency attaining that aim might not be so difficult as observers imagined, this was no more than a political pleasantry.¹¹ In 1956 the Tengku, in a manner provoking Singapore criticism, indicated that the Federation might consider accepting Singapore as a subordinate unit within the Federation of Malaya.¹² Then early in 1957 the Tengku stated that he did not think there was "any possibility of merger."¹³ The strongest view noted here seems, in fact, to have been the basic Federation position. The Malay leaders of the Federation Government were acutely aware of the dangers of Chinese chauvinism and racialism -- there were riots on a racial basis in Penang in early 1957 -- and conscious too of the capacity, revealed during the Emergency, of a limited number of insurgents to disrupt orderly government. The Singapore middle school riots and trade union protests in the second half of 1956 must have convinced them that there was no point in adding to their own troubles by embracing more in Singapore.

Two further developments which took place before 1959 should be noted for their bearing on later policies and events. The first of these was the detention in 1956 of the part of the P.A.P. Trade Union leadership

8. A scholarly account of these problems is presented in Barrington Kaye, Upper Nankin Street, (Singapore, 1960).

9. Times (London), 20 August 1955.

10. The common aim was emphasized in the discussion before Lim Yew Hock went to London in 1957 with an all-party delegation.

11. Quoted in Lee Kuan Kew, Battle for Merger (Singapore, n.d.), p. 23.

12. Straits Times, 24 January 1956.

13. Ibid., 18 January 1957.

which stood well to the left, including Lim Chin Siong, Devan Nair, S. Woodhull, Chia Ek Tiam and James Puthuchearry. Lee Kuan Yew has now stated that these men were acting as pro-Communists, an allegation lent truth by James Puthuchearry's political testament which he wrote in the form of a letter to Lee Kuan Yew while still under detention in September 1957. In this letter, which is extremely revealing for its documentation of the problems facing an intellectual living under colonial conditions and bitterly resentful of them, Puthuchearry wrote:

When I broke with my [Communist] political friends in 1951, the full implications were not clear to me, and so to a large extent hung in mid-air as it were. Though I had rejected some of what were considered basic tenets, and was critical of Communist regimentation I was unable to reject their Weltanschauung. How much of my activities of the five intervening years is explained by this being and non-being I don't know....

My return from Communism was not in a straight line. One is always drawn by the desire to fight colonialism and the urge to join up with those who are fighting hardest is irresistible....

... ..
 But as I was not completely a social democrat when I was outside, the problem of choice never presented itself with any force. The best way to describe my political position at that time, would be probably to say that I was more a social democrat than a Communist or was it the other way round?¹⁴

The lack of documentation concerning the attitudes of the other detainees makes judgment difficult here. In choosing to detain the trade unionists, the Chief Minister at the time, Lim Yew Hock, was acting primarily in association with the British authorities to restore order in the face of riots and strikes. Lim Chin Siong as the most militant trade union leader became a prime target for detention. Possibly no more can be said with certainty than that those arrested were closely associated with the events which had led to serious public disorder and that their statements in addressing rallies were certainly those of the extreme left.¹⁵ Lim Chin Siong has continued to deny that he was or is a Communist.¹⁶ The P.A.P., as it was bound to do, protested against the detentions and made the release of the detainees one of the main planks of its party platform in the 1959 elections. The detainees, as part of the process of release, signed a statement in which they criticized the actions of the Malayan Communist Party.¹⁷

14. Quoted in Lee Kuan Yew, op. cit., p. 132.

15. Accounts of the riots and strikes are contained in Straits Times for September and October 1956. For an example of Lim Chin Siong's speeches see Straits Times 29 September 1956.

16. Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XXXIV, No. 5, 2 November 1961, pp. 264-265 quoting Lim Chin Siong in an interview with Alex Josey.

17. Lee Kuan Yew, op. cit., p. 32.

The other event to be noted was the internal revolt which took place within the P.A.P. as a challenge to Lee's leadership in 1957. In August 1957 Lee and five others refused to take office in the P.A.P. because they had lost control of the central executive to more extreme members of the party. Their position as leaders was saved by the detention of five members of the new executive. This challenge, although dismissed at the time largely in terms of "adventurism", must have given Lee Kuan Yew considerable pause as to the future possibility of maintaining the P.A.P.'s position as a party which was "non-Communist" but not "anti-Communist". But he apparently felt that it was necessary to maintain his party's prospects for power by basing it on as wide a composition as possible.

Although in opposition in the Legislative Assembly from 1955 to 1959, the P.A.P. made its voice heard through the ability of its parliamentary representatives and through its capacity to organize well-attended mass meetings. Its policy on merger, which Lee Kuan Yew presented whenever opportunity offered, was stated in the party's fourth anniversary celebration issue of its journal Petir. Since this policy statement refers to the P.A.P.'s assessment of the Federation Government's attitude as well as to the P.A.P.'s plans, it warrants quotation in detail:

The present Alliance Government [in Malaya] is anti-merger.... The Alliance leaders have put out different reasons at different times but we can summarise them into two: Singapore has about one million Chinese (about 70% of Singapore's population or 18% of the Federation population). The inclusion of this one million will upset the racial balance of power in the Federation.

Second, Singapore has too many 'leftists' who are supported by the one million Chinese in Singapore. The Alliance leaders are not very clear in their distinction between Communists and socialists. They believe all leftists may be Communists of varying degrees.

We must allay these fears and create the condition for merger. This is our immediate task. To achieve freedom is no longer just a simple question of fighting the British. We must also resolve the two fears which make the Malay majority in the Federation not want the Chinese majority in Singapore.¹⁸

As a strong illustration of his party's readiness to co-operate, Lee Kuan Yew took the potentially difficult position of supporting the operation of the Internal Security Council to control security in Singapore, since with merger as the P.A.P.'s aim he argued that it was logical to recognize that ultimate responsibility for security would rest in the hands of the Federation.¹⁹

18. Extracted from an article in the Fourth Anniversary issue of Petir (1958) and quoted in The Socialist Solution, (Singapore, n.d.), p. 18.

19. Speaking in the Singapore Legislative Assembly on 8 October 1958, Lee Kuan Yew said "If we are prepared to accept the Federation and join it as a member state it means we are prepared to allow the Government

(continued)

It was with the background which has been briefly described, that the maneuvering for merger took place following the P.A.P.'s election victory in 1959, and after Tengku Abdul Rahman's Malayan proposal made in May 1961. The details of that period form the basis of the later sections of this essay. Why such importance was attached to the issue of merger by the competing political interests both in Singapore and outside was apparent in outline in the events between 1946 and 1959. In a very real sense these were years when an attempt was made by both the British, and later the emerging Malayan Government, to remove Singapore from the area of immediate concern by fostering its semi-independent development, presumably with the hope that a pragmatic approach to Singapore's problems could meet whatever difficulties occurred. That this could be no more than a stopgap approach was inherent in Singapore's racial composition and in the character of its politics. In order to recognize the reasons for the passion aroused by the struggle for merger, it is sufficient to consider the alternatives to merger. Under any estimation the most likely alternative, in the context of Singapore's situation in 1958, would have included some of the following characteristics. Chinese chauvinism seemed likely to be increasingly difficult to control. Separated from Malaya and resentful of it the Singapore Chinese, and in particular the younger element of the population, could have had many reasons for frustration, both through the impact of economic problems and through the presence -- so long as British bases remained -- of Western, "imperialist" forces. The economic problems of a state with a rapidly increasing population, and the prospects of a declining entrepot trade, had little scope for improvement under conditions of independent development. Above all, the political prospects for Singapore, even with allowance made for the differences between policy and practice, appeared to show only those auguries which would favor the political left, and the extreme left in particular. Merger offered a viable alternative to the highly unattractive possibilities associated with a fully independent Singapore. As will be suggested later, the likely disruptive results of an independent Singapore and the advantage which this would have given to the extreme left appears, in part, an explanation for the bitter opposition from left-wing representatives to merger and Malaysia. In short, with merger there could be a future for Singapore. Without merger there could, at best, only be uncertainty.

representing the eleven states in the Federation to have a decisive voice in the affairs of Singapore." Leg. Ass. Debates, 8 October 1958, col. 804.

The Internal Security Council was the principal British safeguard embodied in the 1958 Singapore Constitution. Under that Constitution the Internal Security Council was composed of two Singapore representatives, two British representatives and one Malayan representative of ministerial rank. This composition ensured that in the case of a British-Singapore deadlock on internal security matters, the Malayan member would have the casting vote.

II. THE CITY STATE FROM 1959

Adult suffrage, sustained criticism of Britain and promises of wide social improvements, plus the accommodation of extreme left-wing politicians within the P.A.P. brought it a sweeping victory in the 1959 Singapore elections. It won forty-three of the fifty-one seats in the Legislative Assembly. In its campaign the P.A.P. developed the argument, which it had consistently advocated since its foundation, of support for Singapore's independence through merger with the Federation of Malaya.¹ As elements in this argument the P.A.P. argued for the conscious development of a Malayan spirit within Singapore by such devices as stressing Malay as the national language of the state² and developing, artificially if necessary, "Malayan Culture":

Yes we are trying to develop a Malayan culture, if you like, by pressure cooking. We are convinced that the longer it takes to develop a Malayan culture, the greater the danger of racial conflict, for, a Malayan culture is the only effective defence against racial conflict.³

While Western newspaper reporting chose to emphasize the anti-colonial nature of much of the P.A.P.'s election campaign and to ridicule the party's concern with "yellow culture", there was another aspect to the campaign which received less publicity. In one of his speeches during the campaign, Lee Kuan Yew made it clear that in his analysis the ultimate contest in Singapore was between the P.A.P. and the Malayan Communist Party, with the P.A.P. for "a democratic, non-communist, socialist Malaya and the Malayan Communist Party for a Soviet Republic of Malaya."⁴

Once in power, the P.A.P. supported its stand on merger vocally with propaganda on its aims of building a truly Malayan spirit within Singapore, and practically by seeking to make itself more acceptable as a possible future partner in merger by cooperating with the Malayan and British Governments in the preservation of security in Singapore. It also sought to make arrangements with the Federation which might ease Singapore's actual and potential economic problems. Singapore has always depended economically on its function as an entrepot for the region, particularly in tropical produce from such areas as Indonesia and the Indo-Chinese states. With the advent of independence for these countries, a search for economic independence developed which was sufficiently effective to diminish the extent to which Singapore could

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1. An example is a speech by S. Rajaratnam -- now Minister for Culture -- on 19 April 1959 quoted in The Tasks Ahead (Singapore, n.d.) Pt. 1, p. 17.
 2. Speech by Yong Nyuk Lin on 12 April 1959 in The Tasks Ahead, Pt.1, p.12.
 3. S. Rajaratnam in speech on 25 July 1960 in Malayan Culture in the Making (Singapore, n.d.), p. 5.
 4. Quoted in Lee Kuan Yew, op. cit., p. 39. See also Straits Times, 30 May 1959.

rely on entrepot trade alone.⁵ At the same time Singapore's population was growing rapidly, with one of the highest birth rates in the world and one of the lowest death rates. It was estimated in 1960 that the population would reach two million by 1967 and double that number by 1982. A sudden increase in births at the end of the Second World War had made Singapore's population an extremely young one, with nearly fifty percent under fifteen years of age.⁶ In economic terms, the P.A.P. had suggested that these were further reasons for aiming at political merger with Malaya but that they could be met immediately by some type of common market arrangement. In the election campaign the future Singapore Finance Minister, Dr. Goh Keng Swee, had spoken in terms of a common market which would permit Singapore to export goods into the Federation without paying duties, while providing as a quid pro quo to the Federation joint control of Singapore port.⁷ Understandably, these proposals did not bring a response from the Federation once the P.A.P. took office, although a series of talks were begun. Singapore, despite its higher per capita income has lower labor costs, and an arrangement such as suggested by Dr. Goh Keng Swee would permit Singapore to import raw materials at a substantially lower cost than those available to Federation manufacturers; then to manufacture goods with cheaper labor; and finally to sell these across the Causeway in unfair competition with the Malayan producers. Federation reservations about Singapore's future were shared to some extent by businessmen operating in Singapore, and in 1959 and 1960 capital, responding more to the tone of the government than to actual discriminatory measures against business, moved to Kuala Lumpur.⁸ At the same time the Federation began to develop its own international port at Port Swettenham, while some major providers of capital reacted as Shell did by establishing facilities in the Federation which tended to duplicate those in Singapore. There was discussion of the possibility of moving the rubber futures market from Singapore to Malaya. Economically Singapore in 1960 presented a great many problems.

Despite the P.A.P.'s attachment to Malayan culture, it retained its image as a Chinese party in Federation eyes, and distrust of this and

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5. Report on the Economic Aspects of Malaysia by a Mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development under the Chairmanship of Mr. Jacques Rueff. (henceforth Rueff Report) (Kuala Lumpur, 1963) p.6.
 6. Singapore Annual Report - 1960, (Singapore) p. 9.
 7. Speech by Goh Keng Swee on 22 March 1959 in The Tasks Ahead, Pt. 1, p. 21.
 8. Rueff Report, p. 2. In referring to the "tone" of the Singapore Government I have in mind its loud denunciations of "yellow culture", threats to appropriate the land used by the Royal Singapore Golf Club and such incidents as the cultural cause celebre of November 1960 -- the Enright affair. Professor Enright, Professor of English at the University of Singapore -- then University of Malaya in Singapore -- in his inaugural lecture suggested that to attempt to create a Malayan culture, was to try and achieve artificially what could only come with time and normal development and that Singapore was risking the creation of "sarong" culture. The philosophical aspects of the case were subordinated to the demands for Enright's retraction and at one stage it seemed that he might have to resign.

its Socialist policies -- no more radical, as one observer has noted, than the policies of the Atlee Labour Government in the United Kingdom⁹ -- gave little hope of merger before the projected Singapore constitutional talks due to be held in 1963, when it was widely accepted that if Singapore had not been absorbed into the Federation it would seek complete independence. The tone and content of Tengku Abdul Rahman's comments on merger varied with each pronouncement but the message was the same -- Singapore was too prone to control by Communists and too Chinese-oriented to be accommodated within the already delicately balanced Federation.¹⁰

The broad basis of the P.A.P. membership which had contributed to its election success in 1959 proved its weakness in the ensuing eighteen months, with a series of defections which complicated the merger and Malaysia issue but possibly proved decisive in bringing the Tengku to accept the necessity of merger. During 1959 and 1960 the Singapore Government found the realities of political and economic life a severe restraint on the achievement of the goals it had set in housing and social welfare programs, and there was a resultant decline in its popularity. The first real challenge came from Ong Eng Guan, one of the P.A.P.'s own ministers. Ong, who had completed his education in Australia, had been elected as P.A.P. Mayor of Singapore in 1957 and attracted attention by discarding the City Council's mace and pictures of Queen Elizabeth as "vestiges of colonialism". As the member for Hong Lim electorate he was returned in the 1959 elections with the largest majority of any candidate contesting the elections and was given the portfolio of National Development. In June 1960 Ong Eng Guan launched an attack against the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew and his supporters within the P.A.P. Why he chose to act at this time must be a matter for speculation, but it seems likely that he was dissatisfied with his ministerial post which brought him less into the public eye than had been the case while he was Mayor of the city, and he probably misjudged the very great support which he had in his own electorate for an indication of wider support throughout Singapore. His challenge took the form of sixteen resolutions introduced by him at a special P.A.P. party conference on 18 and 19 June 1960.¹¹ The resolutions suggested that the P.A.P. should return to its "revolutionary party manifesto of 1954" and reaffirm its strong stand in the anti-colonial struggle. The resolutions criticized the Government's acceptance of the existing Constitution and, by implication, the fact that it had not moved more quickly in its negotiations with the Federation. The resolutions suggested that the P.A.P. Government was not giving sufficient attention to Singapore's poor -- Ong had always stressed his own interest -- and called for an intensification of the fight against "yellow culture". But, most important, Ong criticized the way in which

9. E. Sadka, "Singapore and the Federation: Problems of Merger," in Asian Survey, Vol. 1, No. 11, January 1962.

10. Straits Times, 31 January 1961.

11. The full text of the sixteen resolutions is published in Straits Times, 21 June 1960.

the P.A.P. policy was decided, calling for a wider participation of party members in the determination of policy. This was the central issue, and it was acknowledged as such in the reactions of the P.A.P. leaders.¹² If Ong expected to receive wide support he was disappointed. With his expulsion from the P.A.P. in July 1960 he took only two other assemblymen with him to form the United People's Party (U.P.P.), leaving the Government's strength in the Assembly still at forty in a fifty-one member house. Interestingly, the P.A.P. members who were later to defect to form the Barisan Socialis did not give any indication of their future actions during this period. S. T. Bani, later a key figure in the Barisan and an important trade union leader, criticized Ong and "his stooges" for creating discontent, and called on the party to rally to its existing leadership.¹³

Ong's expulsion set the scene for a series of bitter exchanges between him and the leaders of the P.A.P., which were climaxed in October 1960 by Ong's allegation of nepotism against the Prime Minister and the Minister for Law and Labour, K. M. Byrne. Ong resigned in December 1960 to force a by-election, while the Government, in an attempt to clear its ministers' names and to discredit Ong, instituted a Commission to inquire into his charges. The Commission was presided over by Mr. Justice Chua of the Singapore Supreme Court and held its sittings in January 1961. Lee Kuan Yew appeared on his own behalf and demonstrated the forensic skill which had made him one of Singapore's leading advocates. The Commission found the charges made by Ong to be "groundless and reckless" and dismissed them.¹⁴ This had little, if any, effect on the electors of Hong Lim when the by-election was held at the end of April 1961. The by-election was fought with an intensity and over a longer period than had previously been experienced in Singapore.¹⁵ Ong Eng Guan attacked the Government as a stooge of the British and the United States and criticized the P.A.P. for not achieving its promises on social welfare.¹⁶ The P.A.P. pressed the findings of the Chua Commission and its policy on merger. The Singapore Prime Minister remarked at one rally, in retrospect prophetically, that "We are not playing to a Singapore audience but we have to play to a Pan-Malayan audience."¹⁷ What the audience saw was the crushing defeat of the P.A.P. candidate and Ong's triumphal return with two and half times more votes than any other candidate polled. There can be no doubt that the decisive factor in the contest

12. S. Rajaratnam reported in Straits Times, 21 June 1960.

13. S. T. Bani reported in Straits Times, 21 June 1960.

14. Times (London), 27 February 1961 reports on the findings of the Commission and an account of the tabling of the Chua Report appears in Straits Times, 2 March 1961.

15. Digest of Malay, Chinese and Tamil Press (Singapore) No. 17/61 quotes editorial by Sin Chew Jit Poh of 29 April 1961 on p. 4 and an editorial by Nanyang Siang Pau also on page 4, commenting on the intense activity in the election.

16. There are lengthy reports of the campaign in the Straits Times for March and April 1961.

17. Straits Times, 31 March 1961.

was Ong's great personal popularity, but for observers concerned with a possible drift to the left in Singapore politics, it seemed that the P.A.P. leadership was losing control or at least facing a real challenge from the left. Once again it is interesting to document the support given to the P.A.P. by the future Barisan leaders. Speaking in support of the P.A.P. candidate in February 1961, Lim Chin Siong called for unity of the left and attacked opponents of the P.A.P.¹⁸ Significantly, while calling for left-wing unity Lim Chin Siong did not call for independence through merger. In his first major speech after Hong Lim, Lee Kuan Yew criticized the line of argument embodied in Lim Chin Siong's speeches through the campaign. It was not enough, Lee argued, to call for left-wing unity. He pointed out that the P.A.P. had a clear program and a position on major issues and its members must stand by these.¹⁹

Throughout the period before Tengku Abdul Rahman's Malaysia proposal, the P.A.P. Government in Singapore endeavored to make progress towards merger in discussions with the Federation Government. Visits of Singapore ministers to Kuala Lumpur were frequent, and Lee Kuan Yew had sufficiently improved his relationship with the Tengku to become an acceptable golfing partner. But there was no sign that merger could be negotiated and even discussions for some form of economic merger developed very slowly.

18. Ibid., 25 February 1961.

19. Ibid., 2 May 1961.

III. THE MALAYSIA PROPOSAL

The period from the beginning of January 1961 until Tengku Abdul Rahman's suggestion of some form of political union between Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories on 27 May 1961 is critical to the discussion of Malaysia. Whatever Britain's part was in engineering the project, recognition must be given to the success which Lee Kuan Yew had in "selling" himself and his Government as acceptable partners in the Malaysia scheme and as acceptable negotiators on the details of the scheme. During January and February 1961, there were visits by important figures from the United Kingdom to Malaya and Singapore and informal meetings of Federation and Singapore ministers. The British Minister for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, spent three days in the area from 13 January 1961. During this visit he had discussions with Tengku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew, and he met the High Commissioners of the various Commonwealth countries represented in Malaya. There was the inevitable golf match during the visit. The announced reason for Sandys' visit was to discuss the Laos crisis.¹ In retrospect there seems every reason to believe that the problem of Singapore's relations with Malaya was also on the agenda. Sandys had been preceded a few days earlier by the Minister for War, John Profumo, who was inspecting British military bases in the Far East,² and followed in mid-February by the Chief of the British Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Mountbatten who visited both Singapore and Malaya.³

If, as later events suggest, these visits by British officials and meetings such as that between the Tengku and Lee Kuan Yew on 29 January 1961⁴ were important for discussions on Singapore's future, they brought no immediate result in the form of an encouraging statement from the Federation Prime Minister. Addressing a group of German news correspondents on 30 January 1961 the Tengku spoke of the necessity to put the Federation "house in order" before merger could take place. He stressed that he was not opposed to the Chinese in Singapore but to the China-oriented Chinese there. In summary he spoke of merger as having "to wait some time."⁵ The most interesting P.A.P. comment on future merger possibilities at this stage came from Dr. Toh Chin Chye, the party chairman. At the P.A.P. new year rally on 1 January 1961, Toh spoke of the need for Singapore to strengthen its ties with the Federation and the Borneo territories.⁶ It is difficult to assess whether this particular statement had more than passing significance. The idea of some form of association between the territories in the Malayan area which were, or had been, under British control was not new and certainly not an idea

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1. Straits Times, 11 January 1961 for the program of Sandys' visit and Straits Times, 17 January 1961 for report of Sandys' meeting with the Tengku and Lee Kuan Yew.
 2. Ibid., 11 and 12 January 1961.
 3. Ibid., 14 February 1961.
 4. Ibid., 30 January 1961.
 5. Ibid., 31 January 1961.
 6. Ibid., 2 January 1961.

conceived by the P.A.P. Toh's statement seems more likely to have been an attempt to give a new twist to the old P.A.P. call for merger of Singapore with Malaya at a time when Singapore's politicians were being noticeably unsuccessful in their negotiations with the Federation. It appears that Lee Kuan Yew's statement (which he claims to have made in conversation with the "Plen" on 11 May 1961,) that he did not foresee early merger but perhaps some form of common market, was a more significant indication of P.A.P. thinking and can probably be taken at face value.⁷ Moreover, as late as 4 May 1961 the Tengku stated that Singapore could not be accommodated within the Federation until the people of Singapore were loyal to Malaya as a whole.⁸

If we assume that the concept of Malaysia had been formulated some time before the Tengku's statement of 27 May 1961 and that the visits of senior British representatives in early 1961 indicated increased British concern and even advocacy of the proposal, what can be said of the Tengku's sudden change of position? Here the role of Singapore appears vital. Lee Kuan Yew has spoken frankly on the role which he states he and his ministers played in bringing the Tengku to acceptance of merger. The nub of Lee's argument when discussing merger with the Federation Prime Minister was that any alternative was too dangerous to be entertained. This argument was advanced, Lee has stated, across the poker table, over a meal and on the golf course:

Slowly the unpleasant facts were placed before the Federation Government.

What had been publicly known was that Malaya was vital to Singapore. But what we did not emphasise, lest we offend our friends across the Causeway, was that Singapore was vital to their survival.⁹

Tengku Abdul Rahman has confirmed that this dialogue took place in a

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7. Lee Kuan Yew, *op. cit.*, p. 47. The "Plen" -- short for Plenipotentiary -- was the name given by Lee to a young Chinese who, Lee states, visited him as the representative of the Malayan Communist Party at various times from March 1958 with the aim of gaining a united P.A.P.-Malayan Communist Party front. The meetings are described in Battle for Merger. Lee has now revealed the "Plen's" name as Fang Chuang Pi -- see Straits Times, 16 October 1963. The Barisan Socialist leader Lim Chin Siong has expressed doubts as to the meetings having ever taken place.
 8. Digest of Malay, Chinese and Tamil Press, No. 19/61, p. 9 quoting from Nanyang Siang Pau of 8 May 1961. "Talking again on the question of merger at the mass rally in Alor Gajah, Malacca the other day, Tengku Abdul Rahman reiterated his usual stand that merger is possible only when the people of Singapore are completely loyal to Malaya ... otherwise there is no need to make a request for merger." See also Straits Times, 5 May 1961.
 9. Lee Kuan Yew speaking in the Legislative Assembly -- Leg. Ass. Debates, 30 July 1963, Col. 301.

statement made in the Malayan House of Representatives on 16 October 1961.¹⁰ But even more important than the positive actions of the Singapore ministers must have been the striking illustration which the Hong Lim by-election gave of the validity of Lee's warnings. As has already been indicated, Ong's defeat of the P.A.P. candidate was decisive, and Ong's ebullient personality, his denunciation of the United Kingdom and general demeanor must have made him the epitomy of the Singapore politician most deplored by the Federation leadership. If this analysis is correct, the Hong Lim by-election must have played a key part in convincing the Federation Prime Minister that some positive move had to be made. It would not have been out of character for Lee to have pressed his point on this basis, following Ong's victory.

Acceptance of Singapore as a possible partner in Malaysia and of the P.A.P. leadership as negotiators, opened the lines for a series of political battles in which the fundamental issues were whether Singapore was to merge with Malaya on the compromise basis which alone was acceptable to the larger partner in merger, and concurrently whether Singapore would be controlled by a party which could negotiate with Malaya both before and after merger. Despite their important external ramifications these issues were essentially internal in nature. The most important outside issue was determination of the exact terms under which Singapore would merge, as part of Malaysia, with Malaya. In this discussion the economic issues involved became extremely important. In the negotiations with the Federation Singapore had, and developed, certain advantages both in the skill of its negotiators and in their recognition of the blow to Malayan prestige should Singapore be excluded. As an additional complication, the months immediately after the Tengku's announcement were marked by the emergence of the Barisan Socialis as an extreme left-wing party in opposition to the P.A.P. When he casually dropped his acceptance of a Malaysia concept before the Foreign Correspondents Association on 27 May 1961 Tengku Abdul Rahman could scarcely have envisaged the difficulties which lay ahead.

10. Straits Times, 17 October 1961.

IV. THE LINES OF INTERNAL CONFLICT - 1. The Emergence of the Barisan Socialis

By April 1961 Singapore politics had reached the point where, whatever the hopes of conservative politicians, chances of victory in future elections depended on mass support and policies at least as radical as those advocated by the P.A.P. Criticism of Britain, of colonialism and an attitude of at least hypersensitivity to any impingement by Malayan politicians into Singapore's preserves were the minimum positions which brought results. An additional consideration for politicians in Singapore was the need to avoid any suggestion of interfering too strenuously with the special position of the Chinese education system in Singapore which is given more favored treatment than that received by the "Chinese-stream" education system in the Federation. In the same way, trade unions in Singapore, although kept under close supervision by the Government, had obtained a stronger position through a developed arbitration system than those operating in the Federation. Preservation of Singapore's trade union privileges was essential for the maintenance of mass support. Concern for the Chinese position runs as a constant theme through Singapore politics. It is a temptation which leads politicians to resort to chauvinistic appeals which stress racial issues. Through the size of the Malay community in Singapore, communal Malay parties have a restricted following, while the Malayan Chinese Association suffers through its links with a Federation party in an electorate much more radical than that of the Federation. At the time of the Tengku's announcement of the Malaysia proposal the Singapore People's Alliance was tarred with the brush of business interests, while those splinter groups or individuals such as David Marshall's Workers' Party or Ong Eng Guan's U.P.P., partly through personality defects and partly through a lack of organization, were bound to play a minor role in the ensuing developments.¹ The important opposition to Malaysia, in Singapore terms, came from the new party of the extreme left, the Barisan Socialis (Socialist Front).

The Barisan Socialis has become so closely associated with opposition to merger of Singapore with Malaya, that it is important to recognize that the split developed within the P.A.P. before the announcement of even the general terms under which Malaysia was to be established. The Tengku's announcement was made on 27 May 1961, but Singapore reaction to it came relatively slowly.² Indeed, in his address on Singapore's National Day, 2 June 1961, Lee Kuan Yew, while welcoming the proposal, did not really develop the issue of merger in any detail.³ On the same day the first signs of a real split in the P.A.P. became evident in a

1. See Appendix B for a chart of the party strengths in the Singapore Parliament for the period 1955 to 1963. At least for the present, parties other than the P.A.P. and the Barisan Socialis have been eclipsed and this paper will deal almost exclusively with these two parties.
2. It is apparent from Singapore Press comment at the time, that Malaysia was not seen by many observers as likely to eventuate other than as a long term proposition.
3. Straits Times, 3 June 1961.

statement issued by Lim Chin Siong and five other leading members of the trade union movement. Lee Kuan Yew has stated subsequently, that he was never convinced of Lim Chin Siong's loyalty to the P.A.P., and that by 1960 he was convinced that others of the former detainees had gone over to the Communist side.⁴ He argued, however, that nothing could be done until the internal opposition within the P.A.P. made an overt move.⁵ Those associated with Lim were, Fong Swee Suan, Dominic Puthuchery, S. T. Bani, S. Woodhull and Jamit Singh. These men, who had provided much of the trade union backing for the P.A.P., indicated in their statement that they would support the P.A.P. in the forthcoming Anson by-election on condition that the P.A.P. agreed to seek the abolition of the Internal Security Council in the 1963 constitutional talks.⁶ The first significant statement of the P.A.P.'s attitude to merger came in an address by Dr. Toh Chin Chye on 9 June, in which he emphasized that the P.A.P. would continue to seek independence through merger. Speaking at the same time Lee Kuan Yew noted that Singapore must retain control over education and labor in any arrangement for merger.⁷ These statements did not mention security, but the P.A.P. position on this had consistently been made clear by its view that merger with Malaya presupposed control of security by the central authorities.⁸ From this point on until just after the Anson by-election held on 15 July 1961, there were a series of exchanges between the six trade union leaders, usually with Lim Chin Siong as their spokesman, and the loyal leadership of the P.A.P. The issue of Malaysia in these exchanges initially took second place to demands by the dissident trade unionists for the release of all political detainees, greater freedom for the press and an end to the refusal of citizenship rights to those suspected of Communist affiliations.⁹ The issue of merger became more important in early July, with Lim Chin Siong openly criticizing the Tengku for the way in which he had introduced the idea.¹⁰ The internal aspect of the dispute finally came to a head on 11 July when a senior member of the P.A.P. leadership indicated that the party was prepared to break with the dissidents.¹¹ Two days later eight of the P.A.P. assemblymen announced their support of Lim Chin Siong, and on the same day Lee Kuan Yew called for the resignation of three of the trade union leaders who held positions as P.A.P. political secretaries.¹²

4. Lee Kuan Yew, op. cit., chapters IV and VI.

5. Ibid., p. 44.

6. Straits Times, 3 June 1961. Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan and S. Woodhull, following their release from detention in 1959, had been employed within the P.A.P. ministries as political secretaries and throughout the developing split they continued to hold these positions.

7. Both speeches are reported in Straits Times, 10 June 1961.

8. See footnote 19, page 6 of this paper.

9. Straits Times, 13 June 1961.

10. Ibid., 3 July 1961.

11. Devan Nair addressing a political forum 11 July 1961 reported Straits Times, 12 July 1961.

12. Ibid., 14 July 1961.

The P.A.P. thus faced a crisis on the day before the Anson by-election. In their campaign for the Anson seat the P.A.P. had stressed their record and their aim of merger through Malaysia. The other leading contender for the seat, David Marshall the former Singapore Chief Minister, called for immediate independence and criticized the proposed merger which the Tengku had advanced. By throwing their support behind Marshall in the final stage of the campaign the dissident trade union group brought about his election and the defeat of the P.A.P. candidate.¹³ The break between the P.A.P. and the six trade union leaders and their supporting assemblymen was clearly established in the week following the Anson by-election. The Trade Union Congress split with Lim Ching Siong and his followers,¹⁴ while the defecting Assembly members who had expressed approval of Lim's views were later joined by five others to reduce Lee Kuan Yew's majority over all opposition parties in the Assembly to a margin of two seats.¹⁵ The Barisan Socialis was formed on 26 July 1961 although it did not receive registration as a party until 13 August.

The formation of the new party and the steps leading to its formation reflected, according to the P.A.P., the operations of the Malayan Communist Party for which the Barisan is a front organization.¹⁶ This explanation is far too simplistic, quite apart from the caution with which statements coming from a rival political party must be treated. It seems likely that at least some of the defections were the result of personal antipathies. Lee Kuan Yew had run his party in such a way that strict obedience to his decisions was expected and failure to give this could result in bitter personal attack. Others who defected could have been prompted by fear that, under control from the Federation, security within Singapore would become more stringent. As Lee Kuan Yew has himself commented, the distinction between Socialists and Communists has not always been clear to Alliance leaders in the Federation.¹⁷ Yet, with all these qualifications, it is difficult not to accord some validity to the allegations made by the P.A.P. that the leadership of the Barisan had embarked on a policy most likely to advance Communist aims through bringing a situation in which merger with Malaya would be impossible and, as an aggravant, the British presence would have to remain to ensure that order was kept. A further issue which must remain partly in the area of speculation is the question of why the split between the P.A.P. and the subsequent members of the Barisan Socialis did not develop more rapidly, once the trade unionists had made their open challenge on 2 June 1961. For the P.A.P., the answer is probably that Lee Kuan Yew was prepared to try and ride out the storm with the hope that an open party disagreement would not be translated into a loss of the P.A.P.'s parliamentary majority. The delay between the emergence of their public

13. Marshall defeated his P.A.P. opponent by a majority of 546 votes.

14. Straits Times, 18 July 1961.

15. See Leg. Ass. Debates, 20 and 21 July for the account of the parliamentary defections.

16. Lee Kuan Yew develops this argument at length in Battle for Merger.

17. See page 6 of this paper for Lee's comment.

criticism, and the final formation of the Barisan Socialist as a party, may be explained for the Barisan on the basis that they wished to seize power within the Assembly. Success in this maneuver would have given them control of the Government without the uncertainties of fighting an election which they might not win. If this is a valid explanation it is supported by Lee Kuan Yew's disclosure of what he has called the "British Plot". This refers to a number of visits made by future leaders of the Barisan to the British Commissioner in Singapore, Lord Selkirk. Lee claims that the Singapore Government was not informed about these visits but learned of them itself. According to Lee, their purpose was to discuss with Selkirk the likely British reaction to a parliamentary coup in which the extreme left of the P.A.P. gained control of the island's Parliament. The British authorities, again according to Lee, did not discourage their visitors, since they envisaged that such a development would bring the Communists into the open from where they could be purged effectively; and possibly such a development could strengthen the British position.¹⁸ Members of the Barisan have dismissed the account by Lee of their visits but they have not denied that the meetings took place.¹⁹ The British authorities, as might be expected, have made no comment on Lee's account. The various reasons which led to the formation of the new party show it to have grown out of more than the announcement by Tengku Abdul Rahman of the acceptability of Malaysia. Nevertheless, as the split widened between the P.A.P. and its dissidents, it was the issue of Malaysia which more and more dominated the arguments advanced by both sides.

The formation of the Barisan established a clear political threat to the P.A.P., with the new party from the start ready to use the same techniques which had brought the P.A.P. to power in 1959 -- appeals to anti-colonial feeling, criticism of Britain and the attempt to dominate trade union support in Singapore. With the announcement of tentative plans concerning the nature of merger between Singapore and Malaya, the contest between the P.A.P. and the Barisan entered a more advanced stage. In their communique of 24 August 1961, the Tengku and Lee announced that agreement had been reached in principle for Singapore's attainment of independence through merger with Malaya as part of Malaysia. It was agreed that external affairs, defense and security would be the concern of the Central Government, while Singapore would retain autonomy in education and labor.²⁰ In accepting these terms Lee Kuan Yew had recognized one of the essential concessions which Singapore had to make to ensure merger. This was that control of the security of Singapore had to be placed in the hands of the Federation. When the full terms for merger -- with the exception of the financial arrangements -- were made public, following the joint working party meetings of Malayan and Singapore officials, the other essential concession was

18. Leg. Ass. Debates, 20 July 1961, Cols. 1666 to 1669 and Chapter VII of Battle for Merger. The account given here is an extremely condensed version of Lee's description of events.

19. See a letter by James Puthuchery to the Straits Times of 21 August 1961.

20. Straits Times, 25 August 1961.

revealed as Singapore's acceptance of a more limited number of seats than its population warranted in return for its autonomy in education and labor matters.²¹ With the August announcement the Barisan Socialist developed its earlier criticism of Malaysia into a more concrete form. It argued that what the P.A.P. Government had accepted was "phony merger" and that what should be sought instead was "true merger". Such a "true merger" could be obtained, not under an arrangement whereby Singapore retained some autonomy and the Federation some control, but by a complete merger of Singapore with the Federation on the same basis as Malacca or Penang -- the two non-Malay states incorporated into the 1948 Federation of Malaya.²² This argument has a certain immediate appeal for a Singapore audience. In proposing it the Barisan omitted, however, either to consider or develop one of the major implications involved in its proposal, and the P.A.P. was never to let its opponent forget this. It is perhaps necessary to mention that the issues of argument and counter-argument have become blurred and distorted, since both sides have not hesitated to color or misrepresent the opponent's point of view. In terms of Chinese chauvinism, the Barisan argument had the attraction that the Chinese of Singapore could be united with their racial counterparts on the Malayan mainland to form a much more dominant community than the present circumstances allowed. The flaw in the argument, which the P.A.P. constantly exploited, was that even if Malaya were to agree to such a merger as the Barisan proposed, it was beyond belief that the Malayan authorities would agree to waiving the citizenship regulations which would drastically cut the number of Singapore citizens with voting rights.²³ One instance of the Barisan's failure to present a convincing rebuttal of this P.A.P. criticism was in a forum on merger held on 21 September 1961 and it was then placed in the difficult position of having to advance the argument subsequently that the Federation authorities should amend the Malayan Constitution to permit all Singapore citizens to become Federation citizens immediately on merger.²⁴

This was the argument advanced by the leader of the Barisan in the Singapore Legislative Assembly, Dr. Lee Siew Choh, when he spoke against the Government on 20 November 1961.²⁵ He argued that there should be no

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21. The agreed preliminary terms for merger were printed as Singapore Command Paper 33 of 1961 and published in booklet form by the Singapore Government as The Merger Plan. Singapore was to have fifteen members in the Federal Parliament and its citizens were to be accorded Federal nationality but not citizenship. These matters are discussed in greater detail later in this paper. Command 33 was published on 16 November 1961.
 22. Straits Times, 30 August 1961.
 23. Citizenship was granted on a much more liberal basis under the 1958 Singapore Constitution than had been provided for non-Malays under the Federation Constitution.
 24. Straits Times, 22 September 1961.
 25. The Barisan Socialist moved an amendment to the Government's motion supporting Malaysia on the terms agreed to in Singapore Command Paper 33. The texts of the motion and the amendment were:

(continued)

difficulty for the Malayan Government to amend the Federation's Constitution:

... Our stand is that every Singapore citizen should automatically become a Federal citizen on merger. That is, on merger, all 624,000 Singapore citizens, irrespective of whether they were born in Singapore, India, China or Timbuctoo, will automatically become 624,000 Federal citizens.²⁶

Under this "true" form of merger the Barisan claimed that they would be ready to accept the operations of the Federal Government in control of security.²⁷ Additionally, the Barisan argued, such an arrangement as they proposed would ensure the adequate representation of the state in the Federal Parliament which the P.A.P. had not obtained.²⁸ The most striking feature of the Barisan's argument was that there was no possibility of the Federation Government's accepting the suggestion that they grant all Singapore citizens Federal citizenship and the voting rights which went with it. While the Federation was prepared, as it subsequently showed, to negotiate on financial matters, it showed itself to be inflexible on matters of citizenship (so far as voting rights were concerned), and security. To suggest, as Dr. Lee Siew Choh did, that there was no difficulty involved in amending the Federation Constitution is only correct as a statement of constitutional possibility, and it was not in these terms that he presented the argument. As a practical proposition it had no value. The issue of citizenship was capable, however, of raising communal feelings in Singapore on the basis that failure by the P.A.P. Government to make demands similar to those presented by the Barisan reflected a retreat before the policies of a Malay-dominated Federation Government. The practical possibilities of the Barisan argument aside, it permitted the new party to claim to be the champion of Singapore's citizens -- the Chinese in particular. In assessing the Barisan's position further, it is necessary to contrast the views it expressed on internal security in the Assembly debate in November and December 1961 with the call for the abolition of the Internal Security Council which had been one of the principal issues leading to

Moved by the Minister for Labour, Inche Ahmad bin Ibrahim -- "That, whereas it has always been the avowed objective of all nationalists of Malaya to achieve the re-unification of Singapore with the Federation of Malaya and to remove the artificial division created by the British by their 'divide and rule' policy, this House affirms and declares that the first object of all true patriots of Malaya is to achieve the re-unification of these territories in a merger of Singapore with the Federation of Malaya."

Moved by the leader of the Barisan Socialist in the Assembly, Dr. Lee Siew Choh -- "To leave out from 'a' ... [that is the word occurring ninth from the end of the minister's motion] ... and insert 'genuine merger with the Federation of Malaya with Singapore as the twelfth state and with all its citizens to automatically become Federal citizens on Merger Day'" extracted from Leg. Ass. Debates, 20 November 1961, footnote to Cols. 281 and 282.

26. Leg. Ass. Debates, 20 November, Cols. 327 and 328.

27. Ibid., Col. 315.

28. Ibid., 21 November 1961, Col. 385.

the defection of Lim Chin Siong and his followers from the P.A.P. Moreover, in one of the less-widely publicized statements made by a leading member of the Barisan in early 1962, S. Woodhull, speaking at the Malaysian Socialist Conference held in Kuala Lumpur in January, denied the position expressed by Dr. Lee Siew Choh in the Singapore Assembly and called for "true merger" for Singapore combined /my underlining/ with Singapore control over internal security.²⁹ The same speaker raised the communal issue the next month when he stated that the P.A.P. "was more keen on appeasing the communal prejudice of the Federation Government than of advancing the interests of the people of Singapore."³⁰

These last two incidents anticipate the next section of this paper which deals with events up to the September 1962 Referendum in Singapore. December 1961 not only ended the calendar year but marked a division of some importance in the political developments in Singapore. Those who had been discontented with the political viewpoint of the P.A.P. and had defected from it failed to gain power in the Assembly. The Barisan could not defeat the P.A.P. on the floor of the Assembly since the other parties holding seats -- notably the Singapore People's Alliance and U.M.N.O. -- would not unite with the Barisan. In spite of demands from the Barisan that it should resign, the P.A.P. made it clear that so long as it held a parliamentary majority it would hold power and pursue merger through Malaysia. The P.A.P. utilized all means at its command, including Radio Singapore, to maintain its position.³¹ Refusing to resign, the P.A.P. indicated that it was prepared to submit the issue of merger to referendum and it was this question which dominated the political life of the state for the first eight months of the new year.³²

29. Straits Times, 27 January 1962.

30. Ibid., 14 February 1962.

31. Between 13 September 1961 and 9 October 1961 Lee Kuan Yew made a series of twelve radio talks on merger and the alleged pro-Communist connections of the Barisan. These have been published as The Battle for Merger. For further comment see Bibliography.

32. Offer made by Goh Keng Swee in a forum on 21 September 1961. Straits Times, 22 September 1961.

IV. THE LINES OF INTERNAL CONFLICT - 2. The Singapore Referendum

Much of the political action relating to Malaysia in the eight months preceding the Singapore Referendum -- held on 1 September 1962 -- took place outside the Malaysia area. There were discussions between Tengku Abdul Rahman and the British authorities and visits by Lee Kuan Yew to England and also to several "uncommitted" countries to promote the Malaysia concept. The Singapore Referendum itself was brought into the international sphere with appeal against its terms lodged before the United Nations Committee on Colonialism by opponents of the P.A.P. point of view. During the period before the Referendum it became clear that the P.A.P. was prepared to go to the limits of its parliamentary power to maintain its position, while the Barisan's statements became more and more intense with little effort to disguise the appeal to communal affiliations.

The essential feature of the P.A.P.'s Referendum proposal was that the alternatives to be placed before the voters were not between acceptance or rejection of the policy of merger as negotiated by the P.A.P., but rather a choice between various forms of merger. When the Singapore Legislative Assembly debated the issue in March 1962, Lee Kuan Yew took the attitude that since all parties represented in the Assembly were in favor of merger, the issue to be placed before the voters should be a choice between the terms negotiated by the P.A.P. Government or those called for by the Barisan.¹ The P.A.P.'s interpretation of the Barisan's position was that it sought merger of Singapore with Malaya on the same basis as Penang and Malacca, and hence accepted that the restrictions of the Federation Constitution regarding citizenship should be applied against a large proportion of the Singapore population. Just as controversial was the P.A.P.'s proposal that blank votes cast during the Referendum should be counted as votes in favor of the P.A.P. policy.² It should be noted that despite the political heat engendered by the Referendum debate and discussion outside the Assembly, the Singapore Constitution made no provision for deciding such a matter by Referendum nor could such a decision be regarded as binding on the other principal partner in merger, Malaya. Following the initial debate on the Referendum Bill in the Assembly, it was referred to a select committee and was not debated again in the Assembly until June 1962. In the initial debate in the Assembly, Dr. Lee Siew Choh for the Barisan defined his party's call for a clear-cut choice in the Referendum between accepting or rejecting the terms set down in Singapore Command Paper 33 of 1961.³

The Federation Prime Minister made one notable intervention into the Referendum discussion in March 1962 which may have been important for

1. Leg. Ass. Debates, 16 March 1962, Col. 293.

2. Ibid., Col. 299.

3. Ibid., 15 March 1962, Cols. 77-78. The general terms of Command 33 are noted on p. of this paper.

the result later in the year. In a visit to Singapore to address the Singapore Branch of U.M.N.O. he said with obvious reference to the Barisan Socialis:

... if the extremists and opposition parties want to create trouble and cause bloodshed after merger then it is better that we do not have merger.⁴

In the event of difficulties with Singapore, the Tengku indicated the Federation would not hesitate to close the Causeway. Since acceptance of the P.A.P.'s proposals would not, in the Federation's view, create difficulties, the implications of the speech were clear. The speech brought an angry reaction from the Barisan which claimed it illustrated the unacceptable nature of the constitutional proposals for merger presented by the P.A.P.⁵ Less than one month later the Tengku reiterated his threat of closure of the Causeway in a speech to the Penang Branch of U.M.N.O., and this time he accompanied his threat with an explicit denunciation of the Barisan. It was, he said:

... not a true socialist party. It is more communist in outlook and whatever support it has been getting comes entirely from communist sympathisers.⁶

It may be debated whether the Tengku's statement was more likely to bring acquiescence or resentment of the merger proposal, given the sensitivity present in Singapore to suggestions of interference from Malaya. His intervention certainly intensified the activity of the Barisan Socialis, and there were further references made by leaders of this party appealing to communal attitudes. In a statement of 29 April 1962, S. Woodhull warned against acceptance of the Malaysia proposal as likely to nourish communal feelings.⁷ The same technique of appealing to communal loyalties by criticizing the Federation Government for harboring them was used by Lim Chin Siong in his May Day address to the Singapore Association of Trade Unions -- the rival body to the Trade Union Council set up by Lim and his supporters following their break with the original body in July 1961. Lim condemned the proposal for merger through Malaysia and criticized the arrogance of the Federation Government.⁸ The forceful tone of the Barisan's public statements was continued in May 1962 with a threat to Britain of possible "brutal confrontation" if Lee Kuan Yew succeeded in "selling out our interests."⁹

In its counter arguments the P.A.P. had two main themes. It continued to argue that the Barisan Socialis was a front for Communist activity and it stressed the advantages of its own program. In pursuing the first of these two arguments Lee Kuan Yew suggested that, far

4. Straits Times, 26 March 1962.

5. Ibid., 27 March 1962.

6. Ibid., 16 April 1962.

7. Ibid., 30 April 1962.

8. Ibid., 2 May 1962.

9. Ibid., 18 May 1962 quoting from Plebian -- the Barisan Socialis journal -- of 17 May 1962.

from being really concerned about the citizenship issue, the Barisan's true concern was for the security arrangements which would follow merger and which might limit the activities of its members.¹⁰ As an interesting subsidiary allegation, the P.A.P. asserted that the Barisan was in contact with the Indonesian Communist Party and, since the P.A.P. claimed that the Barisan expected the P.K.I. to gain power in Indonesia, this indicated that the Barisan preferred merger with Indonesia to merger with the Federation.¹¹ The fact that the P.K.I. had announced its opposition to Malaysia was used generally by the P.A.P. to discredit the Barisan. In its positive arguments the P.A.P. stressed that merger on the terms which it had accepted was both a practical aim and a desirable one too. In arranging for Singapore to retain control over education and labor, Lee argued, the P.A.P. had retained control over matters which, if they had passed under Federal control, could have given rise to communal difficulties.¹²

During June and July 1962 the final terms of the Referendum were decided in the Legislative Assembly. Early in the latter month the P.A.P.'s parliamentary majority was reduced to an absolute minimum with the defection of P.A.P. assemblywoman Mrs. Hoe Puay Choo. In a statement explaining her decision, she complained that she was not kept informed of party policy and that the final issue prompting her action was the decision to proceed with Clause 29 of the Referendum Bill which permitted the Singapore Government to count blank votes cast in the Referendum as votes in favor of its proposal.¹³ Mrs. Hoe did not immediately join the Barisan, although she did so later. Without further defections and with the support of the Singapore Alliance members in the Assembly, the P.A.P. had no difficulty in passing a Bill authorizing the Referendum.¹⁴ In its final form the Referendum offered three alternatives to the voters.¹⁵ The first of these alternatives was merger on the terms concluded by the Singapore Government with the Federation of Malaya, as announced in November 1961. The second alternative offered merger with Malaya on the basis of the position occupied by the states of Malacca and Penang, in keeping with what the P.A.P. claimed was the Barisan's proposal. The third alternative, included at the suggestion of the former Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock, offered merger on terms no less favorable than those obtained by the Borneo territories. At this stage there was no firm indication of just what these terms would be.¹⁶

10. Ibid., 20 April 1962.

11. Ibid., 23 May 1962. The P.A.P. claimed and the Barisan denied that Lim Chin Siong had told the editor of Bintang Timor that the Barisan would prefer merger with Indonesia to merger with Malaya.

12. Ibid., 1 June 1962 and 3 June 1962.

13. Ibid., 4 July 1962. The defection took place on 3 July 1962. The reference to Clause 29 of the Referendum Bill was reported in Straits Times, 5 July 1962.

14. Leg. Ass. Debates, 6 July 1962, Col. 1022.

15. Ibid., 10 July 1962, notes and text Cols. 184-186.

16. The essentials of the Referendum proposals offered to voters were:
 A - (Symbol - Singapore Flag) Merger with reserve powers, notable autonomy over labor and education;
 (continued)

With the passage of the Referendum proposals the Barisan Socialist and four of the Singapore splinter parties -- the Workers' Party, the Liberal Socialists, the Party Rakyat and the United Democratic Party -- formed a Council of Joint Action to take the Referendum issue before the United Nations Committee on Colonialism.¹⁷ Both in terms of party membership and political effectiveness there is no doubt that the Barisan alone was important in this action, although the participation of the splinter groups lent the appearance of "socialist unity". Even this appearance of unity was disturbed in the scramble for the right to represent the Council of Joint Action before the United Nations Committee with David Marshall playing a familiarly divisive role.¹⁸ In its memorandum to the Committee the Joint Action Council argued that the proposed constitutional changes which would merge Singapore with Malaya had been devised by the British Government to assure its continued right to bases in Singapore, and to protect its privileged economic position. The Council criticized the terms of the forthcoming Referendum on familiar lines and the citizenship provisions of the November 1961 agreement between the Malayan and Singapore Governments. It suggested that the terms of this agreement placed Singapore in a more or less "trusteeship" position under the Federation of Malaya. Finally, the petitioners sought to "advise the nations of the World ... of the perfidy which is sought to be perpetrated on the subject peoples of Singapore through a dishonest referendum."¹⁹ A supplementary memorandum from the petitioners sent on 13 July 1962 stressed again the lack of choice offered to the electorate when it came to participate in the Referendum.²⁰ The P.A.P. Government's reaction to the activities of the Council for Joint Action was to demand the same right to speak before the United Nations Committee, if such a right was granted to its opponents, and also to send a detailed rebuttal of the arguments contained in the Joint Council's memorandum. The rebuttal, also, was along familiar lines. The Singapore Government denied the charges of British involvement in the determination of the terms for Singapore's merger with Malaya and argued that the terms

citizenship into Malaysian citizenship*; fifteen seats in the central parliament; retention of multi-lingualism.

B - (Symbol - Penang Flag) Merger as a state within the Federation; application of the present Federation labour and education policies; only persons born in Singapore and some citizens by descent will automatically become Federation of Malaysia citizens; parliamentary representation in proportion to the number of citizens eligible under stricter Federation citizenship laws; only English and Malay to be used in the State legislature.

C - (Symbol - Flag with badges of Sarawak and North Borneo) Merger on terms no less favorable than the Borneo territories. *For discussion of this point see p. 27 of this paper.

17. The Committee's full title is: The United Nations Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
18. Straits Times, 18 July 1962 and 19 July 1962.
19. United Nations Document A/AC.109/Pet. 16 of 12 July 1962.
20. United Nations Document A/AC.109/Pet. 16 Add. 1 of 18 July 1962.

negotiated for citizenship were better than any others which could be obtained. Playing on the fact that the Barisan had been unable to defeat the P.A.P. in the Singapore Assembly, the rebuttal pointed out that the Singapore Government was a freely elected one, carrying out its mandate from the electors.²¹ After an initial decision by the Committee on Colonialism not to take note of a petition from the Council of Joint Action,²² representatives of the Council led by Dr. Lee Siew Choh and S. Woodhull of the Barisan Socialis appeared before it on 26 July 1962.²³ Lee Kuan Yew en route for London appeared on the same day and defended the proposed procedures for the Referendum.²⁴ The Committee did not take any action on the protest.

On 14 August 1962, shortly after his return from London, Lee Kuan Yew announced that the date of the proposed Referendum would be 1 September 1962. On the same day he announced an amendment to the Singapore-Malaya merger agreement to provide for Singapore citizens to receive Federal citizenship with merger, instead of nationality as previously provided.²⁵ Under this new proposal Singapore citizens were to receive Federal citizenship and enjoy the privileges which that entailed, but they would only be able to vote in Singapore. The change was basically one of semantics and was fairly obviously a further propaganda weapon in the campaign by the P.A.P. to win the Referendum, since the nationality previously offered conferred the same benefits with the exception of the title of "citizen". While it is difficult to estimate the effect of such an announcement separately from the other aspects of the P.A.P. Referendum campaign, it can probably be included among the items which helped the P.A.P. to gain the result it desired. Other aspects of the campaign which should be noted for their likely effect on the result include the use of Radio Singapore to further the P.A.P. point of view,²⁶ and the general tone of P.A.P. propaganda that failure to accept Alternative A could only lead to merger under less desirable conditions than those already negotiated with the Federation. The Barisan Socialis characterized the announcement on citizenship as a "bluff"²⁷ and called for

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21. United Nations Documents A/AC. 109/Pet. 18 of 18 July 1962 and A/AC. 109/Pet. 18 Add. 1 of 26 July 1962.
 22. Straits Times, 20 July 1962.
 23. Ibid., 27 July 1962.
 24. Ibid.
 25. Straits Times, 15 August 1962. The distinctions involved here between "nationality" and "citizenship" are possibly not so unfamiliar to Singapore citizens as might be the case in a country where citizenship is synonymous with nationality. Before 1958, for instance, citizens of Singapore held passports as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and possessed British nationality.
 26. Leg. Ass. Debates, 14 June 1963, Col. 1216. The Minister for Culture speaking generally on the control exercised by the Government over radio and television said: "We are proud that we have used radio and television for the purpose for which the people elected us and will continue to use it until such time as the cause of democracy has been safeguarded."
 27. Straits Times, 17 August 1962.

its supporters to cast blank votes as an indication of disapproval.²⁸ Despite the provisions of the Referendum Bill which permitted the Government to count blank votes as it pleased -- on the basis that failure to cast a proper ballot indicated that the elector was ready to permit the Government to act in his behalf -- Lim Chin Siong's call could have been a severe embarrassment for the P.A.P. if it had succeeded in bringing anything approaching a majority of voters in opposition to the P.A.P.

In an electorate of approximately 624,000 persons, 561,000 cast ballots in the Referendum. Seventy-one percent of the ballots (397,623) were for Alternative A, the terms negotiated by the P.A.P.. There were 144,077 blank ballots representing twenty-five percent of the total, while the remaining alternatives received less than two percent each of the ballots.²⁹ Lee thus won his victory, and the press reports of his unusual emotional reaction to the news indicate how concerned he was to do this. Comment on the result by political observers was reserved, both through the nature of the choice open to the voters and through the difficulty in assessing just what the blank votes meant. In retrospect, it seems that possibly more weight should be given to the result as reflecting the effectiveness of the P.A.P. propaganda machine than was allowed at the time of the Referendum. One interesting claim by the P.A.P. concerning the results, which is relevant to the voting pattern in the September 1963 elections, was that the heaviest tally of blank votes came from the "rural" areas outside the urban centers such as Jurong.³⁰ Probably the best judgment which can be made is that the majority of people in Singapore preferred that merger should come in the form offered in Alternative A, but that there was a firm bloc of voters who, either from a commitment to the Barisan or through other dissatisfaction with the merger proposals, cast blank votes. The campaign before the Referendum and its result were further illustrations of the extent to which politics in Singapore had polarized around the P.A.P. and the Barisan Socialis.

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28. Straits Times, 20 August 1962 reports Lim Chin Siong as follows:
"We are determined not to be provoked [to violence] and have decided to call upon the people of Singapore to cast blank votes, though we are fully aware that blank votes are to be counted as Government votes.
29. The results as noted in the Straits Times, 3 September 1962 were:
Electorate 624,000; Voted 561,559; Alternative A 397,623; Alternative B 9,422; Alternative C 7,911; Blanks 144,077; Uncertain 2,370; Rejected 153.
30. Straits Times, 14 July 1963. See Appendix C which lists those electorates which are generally classed as "rural" and discusses the significance of the classification.

IV. THE LINES OF INTERNAL CONFLICT - 3. Malaysia and the Singapore Elections

The P.A.P.'s success in the Referendum provided another clear stage in the development of merger and Malaysia as an issue in Singapore politics. With no apparent possibility of upsetting the merger program through such means as a Referendum, the Barisan began to concentrate on gaining power in the Singapore Assembly, and directed its public efforts to this end with the anticipation that elections had to be held no later than April 1964. The Barisan's effectiveness was to be considerably hampered when, in February 1963, much of its leadership was detained by the Internal Security Council, partly as a result of an alleged connection between the Barisan and the forces behind the Brunei Rebellion. Just as the failure to unseat the P.A.P. in the Legislative Assembly in December 1961 had brought something of a pause in overt political activity, so there was a brief respite after the Referendum. The Barisan's public assessment of the result was that the P.A.P. proposal had been accepted because of the Government's "intimidation tactics".¹ In his report to the Barisan Socialist Conference during October 1962, Lim Chin Siong pledged the Barisan to marshal the "left-wing and anti-colonial forces" to gain control of the Assembly by constitutional means. The main enemy of these forces, according to Lim, would be the "British-Alliance" axis.² At the same conference the Barisan stressed its friendship for "the great Indonesian people" in a gesture which possibly provided part of the incentive for the later actions of the Internal Security Council.³ While the interest of the P.A.P. Government in the Borneo territories was chiefly to insure that their problems did not delay the formation of Malaysia, the Barisan called for the right of self-determination for the territories:

As regards the Borneo territories we have time and again said that it is the people in these territories concerned who should decide their own future.

But neither the British nor the Malayan Government has bothered to accord the people of Borneo the right of self-determination. Instead we have a hoax -- a commission to ascertain the views of the people there.⁴

The Barisan again criticized the Federation Prime Minister when it opposed his stance on the Sino-Indian border dispute and called instead for Malayan neutrality on the issue.⁵

1. Straits Times, 3 September 1962.

2. Ibid., 16 October 1962.

3. Ibid.

4. Letter to the editor from Lim Chin Siong, Straits Times, 23 October 1962.

5. Straits Times, 12 November 1962.

In view of its earlier statements on Borneo, the Barisan could have been expected to express strong support for the Brunei rebellion when it came in December 1962. But on the evidence of press reports it was remarkably silent as, indeed, was the P.A.P. which apparently refrained from major comment on the events during December.⁶ Both the P.A.P. and the Barisan referred to the matter in their new year's messages at the beginning of 1963. The P.A.P. indicated its approval of the operations to suppress the rebels, and Lee Kuan Yew contrasted the actions of the Brunei rebels coming from a Malay state with the results of the Singapore Referendum.⁷ In their new year's messages the Barisan leaders continued to denounce the way in which Malaysia was being formed and the means used to achieve it. Lim Chin Siong predicted that developments in Malaya were leading to "the establishment of a Fascist and military dictatorship in the country" and referred to the Brunei revolt as a sign of "the people's will to freedom."⁸ Dr. Lee Siew Choh suggested that the Brunei struggle would continue until the "people have regained their freedom."⁹

Although it was considered possible in Singapore that some action might be taken against the Barisan leaders in view of their public statements and because of the past readiness of authorities in Singapore to detain those who openly supported violence, most observers were surprised at the size of the detention operation which was carried out on 2 February 1963 in both Singapore and Malaya when one hundred and eleven persons were detained. Subsequently a small additional number of persons was detained. The detentions were carried out at the decision of the Internal Security Council. Two aspects of the detention deserve particular attention. The first is the question of the extent to which the Singapore Government was a willing partner in the operations; the second,

6. The lack of comment from the Barisan contrasted strongly with the statements from parties on the left in Malaya, particularly the Socialist Front.

The writer was in Singapore at the time of the Brunei revolt and witnessed one interesting example of a failure to excite anti-British feeling as a result of the developments in Brunei. The executive of the Students' Union at the University of Singapore -- considered by various persons to whom I spoke to include supporters of the Barisan -- called for a protest march to the British Commissioner's Residence and adopted a resolution condemning British action in suppressing the Brunei revolt by force. An announcement to this effect was posted around the university campus on the morning of 12 December 1961. Within three hours 500 students signed a petition rejecting the call for a protest march and the executive's resolution. The march was abandoned and the motion rescinded. The interest in this incident comes not from the numbers involved -- although given the size of the university and the fact that this occurred on a normal lecture day the numbers protesting were significant -- but as an illustration of the extent to which the P.A.P. policy and the Malaysia concept have appeal to the English-educated section of the community. The incident was reported in Straits Times, 13 December 1962.

7. Ibid., 1 January 1963.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

the reasons which were advanced by the Internal Security Council to justify the detentions. The meeting of the Internal Security Council which determined on the detentions was held in Kuala Lumpur. (It may be noted that the operation was carried out extremely efficiently with detentions taking place in the Federation and Singapore concurrently.) On his return to Singapore Lee Kuan Yew was interviewed at the airport by both press and radio. He was reported in the Straits Times as saying that if Singapore had been left alone it would not have contemplated such sweeping action:

I think it would be fair to say that for the Singapore Government it would have been easier to leave this action until after August 31 this year, but as I have said on several occasions, on issues of national importance like merger and Malaysia, defence and the stability of Malaya and Malaysia, we will work with the Federation.

then in answer to a question:

... we would never have contemplated it. It would not be necessary because we could have carried on until August 31.¹⁰

The former Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock seized on this statement as an example of Lee Kuan Yew derogating his duty by failing to stand by the Federation and suggesting that the arrests were not entirely necessary. Lim Yew Hock asked for Radio Singapore to replay the recording made at the airport, but his request was refused although he was offered an opportunity to hear the recording privately. Lee, meanwhile, claimed that he had been misunderstood during the interview and indicated that the Singapore Government did, of course, stand by the Internal Security Council's decision.¹¹ The incident had many implications. With the thought of an election due no later than April 1964, Lee must have been deeply concerned to avoid gaining an image for being more ready than the British or the Lim Yew Hock Government to resort to mass detentions to achieve his aims. It seems clear that he would have much preferred the arrests to have taken place when only the Federation authorities could be blamed for the detention process. His hasty and rather embarrassed retraction suggests swift and critical response by the other members of the Internal Security Council, particularly the Malayan member, to his attempt to shift the blame away from the Singapore Government onto the other members. Lee's concern was later shown to be correct when the Barisan sought to exploit the detentions in attacking the Government.

The detentions operated against the leading Barisan trade unionists,

10. Ibid., 4 February 1963.

11. Ibid., 5 February 1963. The writer heard Lee speaking in an interview from the airport. There was a little difficulty hearing all that was said because of extraneous noise but my impression certainly accorded with the Straits Times account. Lee's subsequent broadcast in which he tried to gloss over the matter was obviously an uncomfortable one in which he lacked his normal fluency.

including Lim Chin Siong, S. Woodhull, Dominic Puthuchearry and his brother James.¹² Lee Kuan Yew on his return from Kuala Lumpur referred to the detentions as being necessary to prevent violent agitations which had been planned to coincide with events outside Singapore.¹³ In the document released by the Internal Security Council to justify the detentions there was no attempt to differentiate between the members of the Barisan and Communists -- they are taken to be synonymous. The Barisan, it was alleged, aimed to develop Singapore as a base from which the security of the whole Malaysian area could be undermined. To do this, the document further alleged, the Barisan wished to frustrate merger and leave Singapore as the Cuba of Malaysia. Lim Chin Siong was accused of having met the leader of the Brunei revolt, Azahari, four days before the revolt broke out, and the Barisan was said to have aimed at mobilizing support for further trouble in North Borneo. Dealing with the apparent incongruity of the aims of the Brunei rebels and the Barisan Socialis the Security Council stated:

In spite of their mutual distrust they are known to have discussed plans for the defeat of Malaysia by action in the five territories of the future Federation.¹⁴

The alleged connection between the Barisan and Azahari, the claim that the Barisan planned to participate in further violent action against the future Malaysian territories, and the past statements of the Barisan, were the essential justifications for the detentions. Since detention under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance does not require that charges be tested in court, the validity of these charges can only be speculated upon and possibly, therefore, the only verdict which can be made with all fairness is the distinctive verdict of the Scottish legal system -- "not proven". Yet, while an observer must remain skeptical in the absence of documentary proof, it would be equally unacceptable to ignore the strong indications in the Barisan's development and in its party program which suggest that there is a connection between its aims and the likely aims of the Communists in Singapore. There were also indications that pursuit of the Barisan's policy in Singapore could have led to severe unrest in Singapore. The Barisan leadership is politically sophisticated with an intimate connection with Singapore's political development. However much it is possible to defend the Barisan's position on merger in terms of past experience of detention and distrust of residual British control in Singapore, it is difficult to see how Lim Chin Siong, Woodhull or the Puthuchearry brothers could really assess that merger could be gained on better terms than those obtained by Lee Kuan Yew and his Government. The Barisan's call for "true merger" can scarcely be seen as a call advanced with honesty, and the suggestion

12. Of the one hundred and eleven persons initially detained, twenty-four were members of the Barisan, three were members of the Party Rakyat, three were members of the U.P.P. and one was a member of the Workers' Party. A further eleven had connections with Nanyang University. Straits Times, 6 February 1963.

13. Ibid., 4 February 1963.

14. Ibid. Lee Kuan Yew later referred to planned demonstrations in Singapore in discussing the detentions in the Assembly on 9 April 1963.

put forward by the P.A.P. that the Barisan's real hope was for merger to be frustrated, with the possibility of subsequent unrest which would give opportunities to extremists, cannot be lightly dismissed. Any assessment of the Barisan must take note, furthermore, of the appeals made to communal feeling and the apparent ambiguity in the attitudes expressed by its members concerning the internal security question. In summary, the Barisan's basic policies were such that to have followed them could have provoked a variety of situations in which disorder and disruption were the most likely result, and those most likely to benefit were the Communists. As a final, but by no means unimportant factor, the fact of Communist operations in both Singapore and Malaya cannot be lightly dismissed in view of the area's recent history. As a personal assessment, the detentions appear quite possibly justified by evidence and Singapore's political situation in some cases, but equally possibly as reflecting the readiness of the British and Malayan authorities to act in a time of general crisis to neutralize an increasingly troublesome internal opposition.

The detention of the Barisan leaders had an obvious effect on the capacity of the party to operate effectively and revealed the parliamentary leader, Dr. Lee Siew Choh, as very much dependent on assistance in the formulation of policy and tactics. If the P.A.P. had been reluctant in the case of the February mass detentions to incur odium through acting against the Barisan, it showed no hesitation on these lines in its treatment of the Barisan detainees or in its arrest of a number of Barisan party members on charges of incitement to riot when they protested against the conditions under which the detainees were kept. Dr. Lee had earlier denounced the conditions before arrests took place.¹⁵ Then on 22 April the Barisan carried its protest against the continued detention, solitary confinement and the prison conditions further by staging a march on the offices of the Prime Minister. Five Barisan Socialist leaders, including Dr. Lee Siew Choh, were arrested and charged with abetment to overawe the Government by force.¹⁶ Later seven other Barisan members were arrested, bringing the total to twelve.¹⁷ Insufficient documentation is again a handicap in assessing whether the actual event was more than an orderly demonstration -- the evidence of the photographs published in the Straits Times for 23 April 1963 is inconclusive. The case was not finally decided until 29 August when eight of those arrested were convicted on a charge of rioting -- Dr. Lee Siew Choh was acquitted. Those charged had not been detained throughout this entire period but they were remanded in custody initially, and this fact along with the various preliminary hearings and the need to spend time preparing a defense must have proved harassing to the Barisan's political effort. In defending his clients

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15. Ibid., 1 April 1963. Fenner Brockway, one of the British Labour Party Members of Parliament who visited Singapore in May 1963 complained about the conditions of detention. Straits Times, 29 May 1963.
16. Ibid., 23 April 1963.
17. Ibid., 8 August 1963 reports the opening day of the trial and details the charges.

the leading British barrister, Elwyn Jones, Q.C., said:

... This is a case which has wholly failed as a criminal proceeding. It is a case which has much to do with politics but very little to do with criminal law.¹⁸

Defense lawyers speak ex parte but it is an estimation which cannot be ignored.

Through 1963, as the date for Malaysia drew nearer interest increasingly focussed away from Singapore towards the international implications of the project. The Prime Minister and senior party members of the P.A.P. embarked on a series of visits to every constituency on the island -- clearly, it is now apparent, with an early election in mind -- and there were increasing threats of industrial action by those unions controlled by the Barisan. Because of the Singapore Alliance's reluctance to vote with the Barisan Socialis in the Assembly, the P.A.P. had no difficulty in gaining a vote of endorsement for its policy on Malaysia and then adjourned the Assembly sine die on 1 August 1963.¹⁹ Arguments during the debate on the P.A.P.'s motion of endorsement added nothing new to the policies already described. The decision to hold a general election was announced on 4 September 1963 and nominations closed on 12 September.²⁰ According to the Straits Times reporting the announcement of a general election, it was expected that the elections would take place during October 1963. In view of the criticism which has been levelled against the P.A.P. for calling an election with the minimum of notice and so placing the other parties at a disadvantage, it should be noted that the P.A.P. had indicated on 25 July 1963 that it would hold elections after Malaysia.²¹ To argue that the Barisan was placed at a disadvantage when it was announced that the elections would be held on 21 September may have some validity, but to carry this argument too far would be to ignore the anticipation which all parties in Singapore must have had of the proximity of elections from the end of July 1963 onwards. Despite confident statements made by Lee Kuan Yew shortly before the polls, there was evidently considerable feeling in Singapore at the time that the P.A.P. could be eclipsed as a political force and expectation that the Singapore electorate would maintain its record of returning a government more sharply to the left at each succeeding election. Neither the local press, nor representatives of overseas newspapers writing from Singapore expressed unqualified confidence in the P.A.P.'s capacity to attract sufficient votes to return it to power. Not only was there the precedent that no government in Singapore had succeeded itself, but there was also the possibility that the Barisan would come to power with the pro-Malaysia vote split between the P.A.P. and the Singapore Alliance. The uncertain mood was expressed in the Straits Times election day editorial when, referring to the possibility of a Barisan Socialis victory,

18. Ibid., 30 August 1963.

19. Ibid., 2 August 1963.

20. Ibid., 4 September 1963.

21. Ibid., 26 July 1963.

the newspaper noted "It certainly could happen and it would be disastrous."²²

The P.A.P. was returned at the election with a clear majority, winning thirty-seven of the Assembly seats to the thirteen won by the Barisan and with the one remaining seat going to the original P.A.P. rebel, Ong Eng Guan. In a clear illustration of the polarization of politics about the P.A.P. and the Barisan already noted in this paper, the Singapore Alliance, formed of the Singapore People's Alliance, the Malayan Chinese Association and U.M.N.O., failed to win a seat and in many cases the candidates for the Alliance lost their deposit.²³ The P.A.P. was opposed by left-wing candidates in thirty-five of the thirty-seven seats which it won. The exceptions were the Southern Islands electorate, a heavily Malay-inhabited area where the sitting U.M.N.O. representative was defeated, and Geylang Serai which had also previously been held by an U.M.N.O. representative. Of the remaining thirty-five electorates, only in seven cases did the P.A.P. win on a split left-wing vote. The P.A.P.'s share of the votes was forty-seven percent and the Barisan's share was thirty-three percent. The Alliance polled eight percent of the votes and the United People's Party polled over seven percent.²⁴

An analysis of the P.A.P. victory in the September 1963 elections must give due weight to the negative factors which assisted the party to its success. The leadership of its chief opponent had been severely restricted by the February detentions and harassed during the trial mentioned above. The P.A.P. had embarked on an intensive drive to recapture the public support which it feared it had lost, and used the facilities of radio and television to do this.²⁵ The Government had also undertaken visits to constituencies to present its case before the election campaign proper got under way, and no other party fighting the election engaged in visits of quite the same nature. By contrast with the other parties too, the P.A.P. was able to prepare for the actual election campaign with a more exact knowledge of just when it would take place. It is tempting in a situation where civil liberties do not operate fully to stress these negative factors to the exclusion of positive aspects of the P.A.P.'s success, which in fact appear to have been considerable. In the dispatches of Western news correspondents Lee Kuan Yew has been customarily reported as an aloof individual of great ability, but tending towards arrogance, and this assessment has had currency among other observers.²⁶

22. Ibid., 21 September 1963. See also Straits Times, 13 September 1963, Observer (London), 15 September 1963 and Daily Telegraph (London), 20 September 1963.

23. Full results taken from the Singapore Government Gazette Extraordinary, Vol V, No. 104, 24 September 1963 are included in Appendix C. The fact of the Alliance candidates --- 31 of the 41 who stood -- losing their deposits was noted in Straits Budget, 20 October 1963.

24. Straits Times, 23 September 1963.

25. See footnote 26 on page 27 of this paper.

26. An interesting example of a highly skeptical account of the P.A.P. Government and its leadership is contained in Singapore -- City State, Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 26, No. 10, Sept. 1960 published by the Department of Tutorial Classes, University of Sydney.

Lee is undoubtedly able and, when faced with opposition, capable of bitter and intense criticism as he showed in the Chua Commission when dealing with Ong Eng Guan. But the image which presents him as aloof and unsympathetic needs re-adjustment. He can talk to his Singapore audiences in four of the main languages used in Singapore -- Mandarin, Hokkien, Malay and English -- and has increasingly gone out among the people to make his points to them. In the period shortly before the September 1963 elections, he gave a striking example of his ability to sway what could well have been an extremely hostile audience. On 19 July 1963 Lee addressed a large meeting -- certainly of several thousands on the basis both of newspaper report and photographs -- of the Singapore Harbour Workers Union which had as an adviser S. T. Bani, a leading member of the Barisan and an assemblyman.²⁷ Lee spoke to the meeting in Hokkien, Malay and English and stated bluntly that his Government could not accept a threatened strike by the union at a particularly sensitive time for both Singapore and Malaya. He claimed that the union was being exploited by Communists, and offered to ensure that their wage demands were given proper consideration provided the strike threat was not carried into action. If it was, he warned, the union's leadership would be "dealt with". The response from the unionists was to give Lee an overwhelming assurance that the strike would not be held and to cheer him at the end of his address. He was similarly cheered three days later when he announced interim wage increases and the cancellation of the union's registration.²⁸ Another instance of Lee gaining the support and sympathy of a large crowd under difficult conditions occurred during his tour of the Toa Payoh constituency on 11 August 1963.²⁹ Additionally in this assessment of the P.A.P.'s election success, recognition must be given to the fact that Lee was able to present the issue of merger in terms which the electorate understood. Moreover, it was shown to be a practical proposition when merger was achieved just before the polls took place.

The Barisan could not present a sufficiently attractive alternative to the P.A.P.'s program although, as the election results reveal, the Barisan's blend of criticism of Malaysia, appeals to Chinese chauvinism and appeal to anti-colonial sympathies was not without success. Of the thirteen seats which the Barisan Socialis won, eleven were in what is commonly described as Singapore's "rural" area. This term is obviously far from exact, but based on the preliminary releases of information following the 1957 Singapore Census, it does have significance for at least four of the electorates won by the Barisan outside the city. These are the electorates of Bukit Panjang, Bukit Timah, Choa Chu Kang and Jurong. The first of these falls approximately within the administrative unit, used in recording census figures in 1957, of Bukit Panjang while the latter three fall approximately within the administrative unit, used in the census of Jurong. Both of these administrative units had, at the time of the census, a significantly lower population density than the rest of the island and, particularly in the case of the Jurong unit, a


27. Straits Times, 20 July 1963.

28. Ibid., 23 July 1963.

29. Ibid., 12 August 1963.


JOHORE

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


SINGAPORE LEG. ASSEMBLY ELECTORAL DIVISIONS

U.P.P.



Barisan Socialis



P.A.P.



SINGAPORE ELECTION RESULTS SEPTEMBER 1963

significantly higher proportion of persons employed in agricultural labor. Against an overall island population density of 6,441 persons to the square mile, the density in Bukit Panjang was 1,728 persons to the square mile and in Jurong the figure was 849 persons to the square mile. The percentage of persons employed in agriculture in both the Bukit Panjang and Jurong administrative areas was higher than for any other of the five units outside the city. In Bukit Panjang 20.5 percent of those employed were engaged in agriculture while in Jurong the percentage was 59.7. The highest figure anywhere else was 13.5 percent. In both of the administrative units the percentage of Chinese is higher than the overall percentage -- 76 percent for Bukit Panjang and 82 percent for Jurong.³⁰ It is not so satisfactory to attempt to establish a relationship between the other "rural" electorates won by the Barisan and the census material, since the administrative units and the seats won do not correspond to the same extent. The implication of the P.A.P.'s comments on the fact that the Barisan won in the rural areas was that these areas were in some way more susceptible to the program put forward by the Barisan. Certainly in Bukit Timah, Choa Chu Kang and Jurong where the Barisan won seats with comfortable majorities, the inference may be made that the Barisan was successful in appealing to Chinese voters living in rural or semi-rural conditions and that many of these voters would be engaged in agricultural operations. The same inference can be made, although with considerably less force, about the Bukit Panjang electorate. If these conclusions are valid, and admitting the difficulty of generalizing for the other Barisan "rural" electorates, the hypothesis can perhaps be advanced with some validity that the Barisan has had most success in promoting its particular type of propaganda outside the more urban constituencies. Certainly the figures indicate that the urban areas contain the bulk of the P.A.P.'s support, although two interesting exceptions to this generalization are the electorates of Sembawang and the Southern Islands. Sembawang is the electorate nearest to the naval dockyard where many of the dockworkers live, while the Southern Islands have a high percentage of Malay inhabitants. Possibly little more can be said on the urban-rural vote split with certainty other than that it exists and that there are some suggestions that the greater degree of sophistication which might be expected in the urban electorates could be influential in bringing the split. The P.A.P. policy appealing for the growth of a "Malayan" spirit and admitting the need for compromise is essentially a more sophisticated policy platform than that on which the Barisan stood. In four of the eleven rural electorates won by the Barisan there are indications that those who responded to the Barisan's campaign were rural Chinese agriculturalists.³¹

30. In the absence of the 1957 Singapore Census the figures quoted here are taken from preliminary releases made by the Census authorities in 1959 and quoted in M. K. Sen, The Geographical Distribution of Population in Singapore 1947-1957, University of Malaya in Singapore, B.A. (Econ.) Thesis, 1959. Wason Microfilm 289, no. 11.

31. On the basis of the information available the writer hesitates to be too definite in developing the hypotheses which may be drawn from the "urban-rural" vote split. As the map of the Singapore electorates -- p. 37 -- the map of the 1957 Census administrative divisions --

(continued)

In brief, then, the P.A.P. led by Lee Kuan Yew won its success in the September 1963 elections, (thus combining control of power in Singapore with the achievement of the type of merger which it advocated) through successfully presenting the issues in terms acceptable to the electorate and at the same time immobilizing much of the Barisan leadership. The P.A.P. was aided too in its campaign by control of the radio and television services. The P.A.P.'s success represented a personal triumph for Lee Kuan Yew, however questionable many of his methods. His defense of these methods -- that they are no worse than those which would be employed by his opponents if they held power -- is difficult to answer. "Western-style" democracy is a function of many factors patently absent in Singapore and departures from its standards should scarcely be greeted with surprise.

frontispiece -- the election results and population density figures -- Appendix C -- show, the "rural" electorates won by the Barisan are in areas of lower population density. A further hypothesis which it would be interesting to test if enough evidence could be assembled is the possibility that there has been less development in most of the rural areas in terms of Government housing and social welfare facilities. The P.A.P. Government's avowed intentions of improving services -- water, roads and electricity -- to these "rural" areas, which have been stressed in the period after the election, tend to support this thought.

V. SINGAPORE AND MALAYA - 1. The Political Issues.

The acceptance of Singapore as a partner in a wider Federation of Malaysia only opened the way for further negotiations between Singapore and Malaya, to establish the terms of that merger. As already stressed in this paper, the Tengku's decision to propose Malaysia in May 1961 seems to have been closely linked with developments in Singapore and the fear that Lee Kuan Yew's P.A.P. Government was losing control of the electorate. In positive terms, as also recounted earlier, the Singapore Government, since assuming office in 1959, had taken strenuous measures to make itself an acceptable partner for merger by emphasizing its aim of bringing a Malayan outlook to Singapore; by seeking to allay the Federation Government's fears on the political complexion of its leaders; and by working towards achieving some form of economic association between Singapore and the Federation. The Tengku's May 1961 announcement was not merely an attempt to restrain further left-wing developments in Singapore. It was also evidence that the P.A.P. arguments had had some effect and, whatever reservations might be retained by conservative Malay politicians in dealing with Singapore Chinese Socialists, that the P.A.P. leaders had become acceptable participants at the bargaining table. The P.A.P.'s chief contribution to this feeling had been its recognition, in political terms, of the point beyond which the Federation would not go.¹

The determination of appropriate political responsibility between the Federation and Singapore was reached with a minimum of delay and does not appear to have resulted in major difficulties. The determination of financial and economic responsibility between Malaya and Singapore, on the other hand, proved to be an extremely difficult issue which was not finally resolved until just before the inauguration of Malaysia in September 1963, and still leaves promises of difficulty for the future. The issues involved are sufficiently complex to be considered in a separate section of this paper, even though the separation of the economic from the political issues in this case is essentially artificial.

In its earliest public comments on Malaysia, the P.A.P. had indicated that it regarded the retention of control over education and labor as an absolute necessity for any agreement.² This position was accepted by the Federation and formally confirmed following the first official Malaysia discussions between Lee and the Tengku in late August 1961. In the communique which was issued following this meeting, the Federation accorded control over Education and Labor to the Singapore Government and reserved control over Defense, External Affairs and Security.³ At the same time a working party of officials was appointed to:

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1. See page 20 of this paper for further discussion of this point.
 2. Straits Times, 10 June 1961.
 3. Ibid., 25 August 1961.

... go into the overall financial and other implications arising out of arrangements whereby local autonomy is retained by Singapore on agreed matters, and to consider the financial contribution Singapore should be required to make to the national government.⁴

Following a further meeting between the Prime Ministers of Malaya and Singapore in September 1961, they announced that Singapore would become the Federation's twelfth state by June 1963⁵ -- a date to be later twice revised. The working party of officials from both sides met, and the terms for merger were published on 16 November 1961.⁶ The Heads of Agreement, as the terms were called, repeated the principal features of the earlier communique in a little more detail as follows:

Singapore will be a state within the Federation but on special conditions and with a larger measure of local autonomy than the other states within the Federation. Defence, External Affairs and Security will be the responsibility of the Federation Government; Education and Labour that of the Singapore Government....⁷

The Heads of Agreement provided that under the new arrangements the special position of the Malays in Singapore would be safeguarded in accordance with the Federation Constitution, with religious provisions for the state to be on the same lines as those applying in Malacca and Penang.⁸ The Singapore Public Service was to be retained as a state public service with facilities available for seconding members of the public service to duty within the Federation.⁹ This provision did not, however, apply to the Singapore police force which, under general responsibility assumed by the Federation for security matters, was slated for Federal control.¹⁰ The two most immediately controversial aspects of the agreement for Singapore's internal politics were those relating to citizenship and the apportionment of representation for Singapore in the Federal House of Representatives. On citizenship, the Heads of Agreement provided that all Singapore citizens should retain their Singapore citizenship while assuming Federal nationality. Citizens of the Federation were to become nationals of the new Federation also and:

... Nationals of the larger Federation whether Singapore citizens or the Federation citizens, will as nationals have equal rights, carry the same passport, enjoy the same protection and be subject to equal responsibilities under the Constitution of the larger Federation.¹¹

4. Ibid.

5. Sunday Telegraph (London), 17 September 1961.

6. The Times (London), 17 November 1961.

7. Singapore Command Paper 33 of 1961. References in this paper from a copy published as The Merger Plan, p. 3.

8. Ibid., p. 4.

9. Ibid., p. 5.

10. Ibid., p. 5.

11. Ibid., p. 6.

The Heads of Agreement provided for Singapore to be represented in the Federal Parliament by 15 members. Some of the factors taken into consideration in determining this number included the autonomy granted to Singapore in education and labor, the fact that all citizens in Singapore should not lose the citizenship rights which they then enjoyed, and the generally larger measure of reserve state powers to be held by Singapore when compared to the other states in the Federation.¹² Singapore was also entitled to two members in the Senate of the Federal Parliament. The number of members was one matter on which there had been compromise, as Lee Kuan Yew later revealed in discussing Malaysia on 6 December 1961, in the Singapore Assembly. The Federation originally proposed that Singapore should accept twelve seats and Singapore sought to gain nineteen.¹³ On financial matters, the Heads of Agreement were fairly general, an indication of the failure of the officials negotiating the agreements to reach detailed accord.¹⁴ The fact of this lack of precision was used to advantage by Singapore in its later negotiations. Singapore had earlier raised the question of a future common market which it regarded as an essential to merger,¹⁵ but this matter was not taken up in the Heads of Agreement.

Compared with the difficulties which developed in 1963 in relations between Singapore and Malaya over finance and other issues, the year 1962 witnessed a general air of genial cooperation. The most notable entry by a Federation politician into the field of Singapore politics has already been described,¹⁶ with the account given of the Tengku's threat to close the Causeway uttered several times during 1962. Even if this had possibilities of embarrassing the P.A.P., it was not uttered in this spirit. Both the Malayan and the Singapore Governments were anxious to accelerate progress towards inaugurating Malaysia, and they cooperated towards this end in pressing Britain to arrange for the transfer of sovereignty over the Borneo territories. With his background of anti-British attitudes and statements Lee Kuan Yew was able to take a stronger line in this than would have been possible for the Tengku, without the latter stepping out of character.¹⁷ In supporting the Tengku at this time, just as in his later ill-concealed dissatisfaction with the Tengku's acceptance of a delay in the inauguration of Malaysia in August 1963, Lee was deeply conscious of the extent to which his own political future -- and his party's as well -- depended on the successful conclusion of the Malaysian project. One comment by the Tengku during 1962, which did relate specifically to Lee's own conduct and which in other times might have brought a considerably stronger riposte, concerned Lee Kuan Yew's visit to Moscow following the London

12. Ibid., p. 7.

13. Leg. Ass. Debates, 6 December 1961, Cols. 1407-1412.

14. The Merger Plan, pp. 8-9 and Lee's comments in the Singapore Assembly Leg. Ass. Debates, 10 June 1963, Cols. 613-620.

15. This had been raised both before and after the Tengku's Malaysia announcement by Singapore representatives. See for example Times (London), 26 July 1961.

16. See page 24 of this paper.

17. See for instance Sunday Times (London), 29 July 1962.

talks on Malaysia held in late July. The Tengku confessed to have been "surprised" to learn of Lee's visit to Moscow, a visit which the Tengku indicated Lee had not discussed with him.¹⁸ Quite out of character, Lee waited a week before replying publicly and assuring the Malayan Prime Minister that he had not been "contaminated" by the visit, and noting that Singapore was prepared to trade with the Soviet Union. His own personal outlook in these matters, Lee asserted, was similar to that of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian Head of State.¹⁹ Although concern to avoid a direct clash between the Tengku and himself marked Lee's actions during 1963 also, the tensions which developed over the finance and common market issues and the Malayan Chinese Association's operations in Singapore could not be hidden.

In any list of difficulties between the ruling parties of Singapore and Malaya during 1963, the most deserving of mention were Lee's comments on the February detentions where he indicated that his Government would not have found it necessary to detain his opponents²⁰ and his conciliatory statements regarding Indonesia during February 1963, at a time when statements from U.M.N.O. headquarters were commencing a campaign to inform the Malayan public of Indonesian "confrontation". As already indicated, Lee's embarrassed retraction concerning the detainees suggests that Malayan pressure was applied to the Singapore Prime Minister. It is unlikely that Lee's statement that he understood Dr. Subandrio of Indonesia was:

... not opposed to a Federation of Malaysia as such as a neighbour which is either on friendly or neutral terms with Indonesia, but opposed to a Malaysia which shares a common land frontier and which is hostile to her.²¹

was viewed with favor in Kuala Lumpur. Disagreements on these matters were minor when compared to the long-term dispute which developed over economic questions and the P.A.P.'s concurrent and interconnected dispute with the Malayan Chinese Association.

The political implications of the financial dispute related to the extent that Singapore, by exercising control over its finances, could determine its independent development in a variety of matters such as industrial development, housing, social welfare and education. The common market issue was chiefly linked with Singapore's future economic development seen in the frame of a likely further diminution of its entrepot trade and the need to establish industries and a market within which it could sell its products. In presenting its case during the lengthy negotiations, the Singapore Government showed a shrewd appreciation of its own goals and of the lengths to which it could go in attaining them. Although the Federation Government indicated on a number of

18. Straits Times, 21 September 1962.

19. Ibid., 29 September 1962.

20. See p. 31 of this paper.

21. Straits Times, 13 February 1963.

occasions that the issue had reached a point beyond which it could not be negotiated,²² the Singapore Government pressed for and obtained its basic goals in the July 1963 discussions. Singapore's expertise²³ and knowledge of its goals helped, but its political assessment that Malaya could not risk the loss of face involved in a real breakdown in relations between the two negotiating parties appears equally important. While there was an element of risk involved for Singapore in such an estimation, it seems reasonable to suggest that the international pressures operating on Malaya plus the knowledge of potential trouble for Malaya if Singapore were isolated, were too great to be ignored. Lee Kuan Yew's attitude is summed up in his own comment at a difficult stage of negotiations during April 1963, in response to a press inquiry as to progress in the financial negotiations -- "Malaysia will survive. Don't worry Chum."²⁴ More formally and at a later stage he said:

Reason and logic tell me that there is so much at stake that neither the Federation nor Singapore, nor indeed the British, whose military commitments in this area are of a very basic nature -- I mean neither one of us -- can afford a collapse.²⁵

The financial negotiations took place at a time when the Malayan Chinese Association was displaying increased interest in extending its political power into Singapore and the Federation Finance Minister occupied the position of President of the Malayan Chinese Association. (Tan Siew Sin is, additionally, a cousin of the Singapore Finance Minister and personal antipathy between these two negotiators was a further complicating factor). In the period before May 1961, political development in Singapore with its stress on left-wing politics, and the apparent impossibility for more conservative parties to gain power had been such as to discourage the operations of the Malayan Chinese Association there. The Malaysia proposal, however, was apparently seen by the M.C.A. as providing a new framework for Singapore politics in which business interests, in particular, would find it attractive to support a party which was a member of the ruling Alliance Government in Kuala Lumpur, and so able to exert influence in such matters as the granting of business licenses. The M.C.A. President, Tan Siew Sin, made an explicit statement on his party's interests in Singapore during May 1963:

... The Malayan Chinese Association has a duty to perform in Singapore. It is Singapore's only hope for future stability and progress.²⁶

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22. As examples of final stands see the statement by the Federation Finance Minister, Mr. Tan Siew Sin of 29 April 1963 reported in Straits Times, 30 April 1963 and the statement by Tengku Abdul Rahman of 19 June 1963 reported in Straits Times, 20 June 1963.
23. The Singapore Finance Minister, Dr. Goh Keng Swee, holds a London University Ph.D. in economics,
24. Straits Times, 17 April 1963.
25. Ibid., 22 June 1963.
26. Ibid., 23 May 1963.

A practical illustration of the M.C.A.'s belief in such a role was the visit to Singapore of two M.C.A. senators, T. H. Tan and Khaw Kai Loh, during May in an attempt to recruit business support. These activities Lee denounced as the "root cause" of the finance problem and an indication that the M.C.A. wanted a collision between the Tengku and himself.²⁷ Senator Tan's response was to threaten to move a motion in the Federal Senate against the entry of Singapore into the Malaysian Federation if it did not stop obstructing the finance talks.²⁸

The clash between the P.A.P. Government and the M.C.A. embarrassed the Tengku, as both sides attempted to invoke his name in support of their positions. While Lee reported that the Tengku had told him to ignore the activities of the M.C.A.²⁹ -- a remark which certainly had the appearance of a calculated indiscretion -- the M.C.A. could point to the Federation Prime Minister's statement that the M.C.A. was a loyal member of the Federation Alliance.³⁰ Tengku Abdul Rahman called for round table talks to try and end the dispute,³¹ but the issues involved are deep ones and recurring clashes between the two parties continued after the outbreak of public hostility in May. The rivalry was an embarrassing one for Tengku Abdul Rahman since he undoubtedly had reservation concerning the M.C.A. as a future vote-gaining member of the Federation Alliance, yet he obviously wished to avoid giving encouragement to a party whose policy on socialism is not in accord with the outlook of the Federation Government, however mild the socialism of the P.A.P. in fact may be.

The principal intangible in the M.C.A.-P.A.P. controversy was not the intentions of the M.C.A., which were stated with clarity, but the role which Lee and the P.A.P. intended to play in the Federation of Malaysia. Before the accomplishment of Malaysia Lee Kuan Yew's comments on this question were restrained.³² In his revelatory broadcasts during September and October 1961 Lee referred to the P.A.P.'s aim of working with Socialists in the Federation:

My colleagues and I have friends amongst our counterparts, the non-Communist socialists in the Labour Party and Party Rakyat. The Communists are extremely agitated that we the non-Communist socialists in the Federation and Singapore would get together and strengthen each other's hands.³³

It is doubtful if the P.A.P. believed it could advance this aim when it attended the Malaysian Socialist Conference in Kuala Lumpur in January 1962. It was expelled from the Conference on a motion from the Party Rakyat of Malaya which was supported by the other parties attending -- the Barisan Socialis, the Malayan Socialist Front, the Party Rakyat of

27. Ibid., 18 May 1963.

28. Ibid., 20 May 1963.

29. Ibid., 18 May 1963.

30. Ibid., 22 May 1963.

31. Ibid., 21 May 1963.

32. Events after Malaysia was inaugurated are discussed briefly in Section IX of this paper.

33. Lee Kuan Yew, op. cit., p. 94.

Singapore, the Party Rakyat of Brunei, and the Singapore Workers' Party.³⁴ The Secretary General of this Conference, Lim Kian Siew, later denounced Malaysia in its proposed form and warned Britain of difficulties if it was pushed through.³⁵ Opposition to Malaysia was decisive in separating the P.A.P. from any of the participants in the Conference.

As progress towards Malaysia became more assured after the July 1962 talks in London, both Tengku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew commented on the future role to be played by the components of the new Federation. On 9 August 1962 the Tengku indicated that when Malaysia came he would include members from Borneo in his Cabinet but not representatives from Singapore. There would be none of the latter since they were already of the "same rank".³⁶ Speaking on the same point a week later, Lee said that since the P.A.P. was not a member of the Malayan Alliance it did not seek seats in the Federal Cabinet. He noted, however, that Singapore members in the Federal Parliament would have the right to seek seats if they could do so on the basis of having the support of a majority of the house.³⁷ There was no further delineation of attitudes until July 1963 when the P.A.P. attempted, but failed, to pass a Bill through the Singapore Assembly which would have permitted elections for Singapore's fifteen Federal seats to have taken place before Malaysia was inaugurated. Speaking at this time Lee suggested that the P.A.P. hoped to join forces with people of a like mind in the Federation. He said that he believed that some of the P.A.P.'s ideas would eventually be accepted in other parts of Malaysia. Nevertheless, he stressed that he did not foresee a P.A.P. Prime Minister of Malaysia in the foreseeable future.³⁸

The attitude just noted was linked with praise for the Tengku as the leader of Malaysia and as a politician devoid of communal feeling. When Lee addressed the Assembly on 30 July 1963, he said, speaking of the Tengku, "as long as he is there he will be the leader of Malaysia."³⁹ In the time between the announcement of the Malaysia concept and the end of July 1963, Lee Kuan Yew made an obvious effort to avoid personal controversy with the Tengku, even though in the period from February to July 1963 there were times when relations between the two Governments were strained. Lee praised the Tengku and claimed that the final Singapore acceptance of the Malaysia terms in the July 1963 talks in London was for the Tengku's sake.⁴⁰ In the final two and a half months before Malaysia came into being, developments took place which Lee evidently judged sufficiently dangerous to his position for him to risk placing his Government and himself in opposition not merely to the Federal Government in general, but in effect in opposition to the personal prestige of the Federation Prime Minister. Lee Kuan Yew did not

34. Straits Times, 29 January 1962.

35. Ibid., 5 April 1962.

36. Ibid., 10 August 1962.

37. Ibid., 16 August 1962.

38. Ibid., 27 July 1963.

39. Leg. Ass. Debates, 30 July 1963, Col. 349.

40. Straits Times, 10 July 1963.

want Malaysia to be postponed since he undoubtedly saw such a development as likely to detract from whatever support he had in Singapore; and when the Tengku submitted to international pressure both for postponement and for a United Nations survey of opinion in Borneo, Lee spoke out against the proposals:

This is the time for Malaysia to stand up and fight for its position. We cannot give in to an international blackmailer (i.e. Sukarno).⁴¹

To speak at this time of considerable pressure on the Tengku may have aided Lee's position in Singapore, but it obviously involved a risk of alienating the Federation Prime Minister. This risk was by no means alleviated by Lee's announcement of his intention to proclaim Singapore independence on 31 August and to hold the powers of defense and external affairs, in trust until merger was accomplished.⁴²

Lee proclaimed Singapore's independence as he promised, and successfully persuaded the leaders in Sabah and Sarawak to do the same.⁴³ Only after this action did it become clear that Singapore was not merely concerned to strike a brave pose for internal consumption, but was also using the minor crisis involved in its proclamation to highlight some final demands which it wished to settle with the British and Federation Governments. It is difficult to see what action Lee could have taken if his demands had failed, but they did not. He demanded and obtained from the Federation settlement of certain arrangements for a common market which although contained in Annex J of the Malaysia Agreement signed in London had been neglected in the Malaysian Tariff Board Bill. He also received an assurance that the right to refuse entry of Singapore citizens into the Federation was to be a reciprocal one, and was granted continuing special powers for the Singapore authorities in the suppression of secret society gangsters.⁴⁴ The price Lee had to pay in obtaining these concessions was criticism from the Tengku, who had been particularly distressed at one reference Lee had made to the necessity to fight for independence in contrast to some countries -- Malaya being understood here -- which had been handed independence on a silver platter; criticism from officials of the Malayan Alliance; and criticism from Dr. Tan Siew Sin of Malayan Chinese Association. When he spoke at Malacca on 7 September 1963 the Tengku criticized Lee's statements on the way in which Malaya won its independence and his actions in declaring Singapore's de facto control of defense and foreign affairs.⁴⁵ In Kuala Lumpur an Alliance leader was reported as saying:

We feel Mr. Lee ... has staged a silent coup d'etat by proclaiming the island to be self governed from August 31....⁴⁶

41. Guardian (London), 9 August 1963.

42. Straits Times, 31 August 1963.

43. Ibid., 22 and 23 August 1963.

44. Ibid., 7 and 12 September 1963.

45. Times (London), 9 September 1963.

46. Ibid., 9 September 1963.

Tan took the opportunity to issue a statement critical of Lee, in which the M.C.A. leader claimed that Lee Kuan Yew had in the past approached the Tengku on the possibility of the P.A.P. joining the Singapore Alliance with Lee as President. At this request, Tan said, the Tengku had advised Lee Kuan Yew to enter into discussions with the members of the Alliance, but these had failed because of Lee's arrogant attitude.⁴⁷

Because it provides a possible future source of friction between the Singapore and Malayan Governments, mention should be made of the status of radio and television in Singapore, and, in particular, what control the Federal Government would exercise over them. As noted elsewhere in this paper, the Singapore Government has left no doubt about its readiness to use these mass media for its political ends. In February 1963 Singapore authorities announced that they would soon acquire some more powerful -- 50 kilowatt -- transmitters which would enable Singapore programs to be heard throughout Malaysia.⁴⁸ Singapore's television transmitters which began functioning in February 1963 can be received across the Causeway in Johore. When Lee Kuan Yew spoke to the Singapore Assembly about Malaysia on 5 April 1963 the issue of control had not been settled.⁴⁹ If there was controversy over this matter from then until the signature of the Malaysia agreement in London in July 1963, it was subordinated to the disagreements over financial controls and the common market. In an annex to the Malaysia agreement, Singapore was granted day-to-day control over the programs to be transmitted by radio and television and the Federal Government was apportioned legislative power and "the right to issue ... any direction necessary to insure the implementation of the overall policy of the Federal Government."⁵⁰ This, too, was an area of controversy into which Tan Siew Sin, the M.C.A. President was prepared to step. In a speech made in Singapore on 4 August 1963 he was reported as hinting that after Malaysia the Federation Government would take over television and broadcasting. Lee Kuan Yew's response on this occasion was to indicate that Singapore would not be cowed.⁵¹

Lee Kuan Yew and his Government were successful, for the main part, in gaining acceptance for their position on matters negotiated during the discussions for Malaysia and successful in achieving their return to continued power in Singapore. But the final months of negotiation had eroded much of the mutual confidence built up during 1961 and 1962 between Singapore and Malaya. Even Lee's apparent intention to avoid criticizing Tengku Abdul Rahman faltered in this final period, so that even if direct criticism was avoided, criticism by implication did take place and counter criticism was provoked. The disagreements on matters of policy and principle were compounded by the personal antipathies between

47. Straits Times, 11 September 1963.

48. Ibid., 14 February 1963.

49. Leg. Ass. Debates, 5 April 1963, Cols. 24 and 25.

50. United Kingdom Command Paper 2094, 1963 - Malaysia: Agreement concluded between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore. (July 1963) Annex K., p. 234.

51. Straits Times, 5 August 1963.

Singapore's chief negotiators and the Federation Finance Minister and through the open conflict which developed between the Singapore-based P.A.P. and the Federation Malayan Chinese Association. Lee Kuan Yew showed an appreciation of both the past and the future when, following his return to power in Singapore in September 1963, he referred to the first task of the new P.A.P. Government as the immediate re-establishment of confidence with the Central Government.⁵²

52. Ibid., 26 September 1963.

V. SINGAPORE AND MALAYA - 2. The Economic Issues

The broad lines of Singapore's economic problems have already been indicated as resulting from a relative decline in the entrepot trade, a rapidly increasing population and an accompanying problem of growing unemployment, with nearly fifty percent more persons coming onto the labor market each year than was the case several years ago.¹ These facts bring immediate economic problems. In addition, Singapore has to plan for a future which will provide work opportunities by insuring industrial development, and by finding sufficient markets for whatever products new industries might produce. After it took office in 1959 the P.A.P. Government, largely on the initiative of Dr. Goh Keng Swee, established the Economic Development Board having as one of its tasks the attraction of overseas capital to invest in Singapore.² To encourage this overseas investment, a large area of previously neglected land at Jurong on the western section of the island was set aside for future development by industry, and various incentives were offered to investors in the form of tax relief -- particularly exemption from corporate tax during the initial period of operation. Dr. Goh has also travelled widely to the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, seeking loans and investments for Singapore. Despite Singapore's record of industrial difficulties during the fifties and an initial reaction by business against the new Government in 1959 which diverted capital to the Federation, the amount of new outside capital investment in Singapore rose in 1960 and 1961.³ This resurgence in investment emphasized the basic problem which Singapore had to overcome in order to make its whole development rationale feasible. Increased industrialization and investment were of little use if an expanding market was not available to receive the goods produced in Singapore. A major means of solving the problem outlined here lay in the creation of a common market which would permit Singapore to sell its goods to the larger population in the Federation of Malaya. Such a solution was made more attractive by the existing use of a common currency and the links which already existed in the two areas in banking and commercial operations.

For a variety of reasons this desired aim had not been achieved in the period before the Malaysia proposal. Malaya's economy, in contrast to Singapore's entrepot economy, is solidly based on the export of primary products, principally rubber and tin.⁴ It levies export duties on

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1. Rueff Report, p. 5.
 2. The Economic Development Board replaced the Industrial Development Board at first set up by the P.A.P. Government which showed few results.
 3. Rueff Report, p. 26.
 4. Some of the facts supplied by the Rueff Report stress Malaya's dependence on rubber. Rubber accounts for 18% of the national product, over 20% of total employment and 35% of Malaya's exports. Rueff Report, p. 6.

these and also operates protective duties to guard its industries. The Malayan economy, through this reliance on primary products, faces the constant threat of world price fluctuations and the uncertainties of possible future competition from synthetic rubber. Malaya has attempted to counter its reliance on a limited base for its economy by offering similar "pioneer" benefits to those given by Singapore. Malaya was, understandably, reluctant to open its tariff walls to competition from Singapore where, despite a higher per capita income, the cost of labor is lower than in the Federation. In particular the Federation was reluctant since Singapore, so long as it preserved its entrepot trade, could obtain material for use in its manufactures at a more favorable rate than was available to Federation manufacturers. Singapore merchants were equally unwilling to abandon their reliance on a free port system for participation in an initially uncertain Federation market. To achieve a fair and reasonable solution a common market offered many advantages. As the Rueff mission stressed in its general assessment of the situation in the Malaysian territories, all the future components of Malaysia were faced with the need to develop their economies. The larger internal market which would be provided by a common market arrangement and the greater diversification possible within such a market could aid future development. Even when a common market was accepted by both Malaya and Singapore as a desirable aim, considerable differences remained on the means for instituting it. At the most fundamental level, while the Singapore Government insisted that a common market agreement had to precede the inauguration of Malaysia,⁵ the Federation Government adopted the viewpoint that agreement in principle was sufficient and that detailed agreement could follow later, after Malaysia.⁶

For the Singapore Government, agreement on common market arrangements was closely linked with agreement on the division of financial powers, which had been determined in only a general way during the joint working party sessions of officials from Singapore and Malaya in 1961. Singapore since the Second World War has not only continued its development along different economic lines, but has stressed development to a greater extent than Malaya, and has concurrently spent larger sums on social services than the Federal Government.⁷ With this in mind, the Singapore Government was anxious to insure that it retained sufficient control over its internal revenues to carry on development along the lines it had already adopted. This raised the basic questions, over which so much discussion took place in the first half of 1963, as to where control of the finance raised within Singapore by income tax, excise and customs should rest, and of how much Singapore should retain in order to carry out its projected programs, after contributing its share

5. This had been indicated by the Singapore Government from the start of its discussion of Malaysia. See, for example, Lee Kuan Yew reported in Straits Times, 26 July 1961.

6. For a statement to this effect by the Federation Minister for Commerce and Industry, see Straits Times, 1 May 1963.

7. Rueff Report, p. 3. Singapore's expenditure on social services in the period between 1958-1962 has run at 40% of public investment while in the Federation for the same period the figure has varied between 25% and 33%.

to the cost of Federal services. While, again, some artificiality is injected by separating the question of financial control from that of the common market, the issues involved become clearer in isolation. At all times, however, it should be remembered that for the Singapore Government the two issues were seen as interrelated.

The Heads of Agreement between Singapore and Malaya regarding merger, which were concluded during 1961, noted that:

In view of the larger measure of local autonomy and the consequent larger expenditure on Singapore services and development, the financial relations between the Federal Government and the states set out in the Federation Constitution will not be applicable in their entirety to Singapore.

The Federation will retain legislative authority over all taxes of a national character ... subject to the maintenance of the free port status of Singapore which will not be changed without the concurrence of both the Federal and Singapore Governments. The present machinery for the collection of taxes in Singapore will be retained.

...

...

...

... The proceeds of national taxes will be used to pay the cost of government and public services in Singapore and the contribution to the Federal Government for Federal services. The details of the apportionment will be worked out by the joint working party.⁸

Hard bargaining to resolve the questions regarding the amount of its revenues Singapore should contribute to the Federal Government and the control it should exercise over determining the amount did not begin until 1963. This probably reflects the need through 1962 to defer such questions until the conclusion of the basic political agreements necessary to Malaysia.⁹ Understanding of the financial issues is aided, to the extent that Lee Kuan Yew's statements are accepted, by a full exposition of the issues involved and the state of negotiations throughout the financial discussions. (This indeed seems to have been a technique of the P.A.P. Government on all matters throughout the negotiations based presumably on the consideration that by revealing the facts of a situation freely a Government gives the impression of frankness and reasonableness.)

The important negotiations between Singapore and Malaya over financial matters opened on 28 February 1963. Lee Kuan Yew offered on

8. The Merger Plan, p. 8.

9. Agreement on such issues as when it would come into being and whether, in the Borneo territories, public opinion was in favor of entry. The entry of the Borneo territories into Malaysia is outside the scope of this paper, but it may be remarked that a case exists for seeing the Cobbold Report as rather less conclusive than the British Government suggests.

behalf of his Government a proposal that Singapore should keep all its revenues, including tax collections, after merger and pay a lump sum to the Federal Government to meet its share of the Federal services.¹⁰ This proposal brought a firm response from the Federation Finance Minister in which Tan Siew Sin stated that it was clearly necessary that the Federal Government should have "at least ultimate control over what is eventually regarded as Federation revenue."¹¹ In subsequent exchanges the differences between the two Governments became further delineated. The Singapore Government insisted that it should hold "more than three-quarters" of its revenues for the discharge of its internal responsibilities,¹² while the Federation Finance Minister continued to affirm the right of the Federation Government to determine what Singapore's contribution to Federal services would be.¹³ With no agreement reached on the financial issue in the meetings begun on 28 February 1963 the matter was referred to further meetings on 21 and 22 March 1963. This session discussed a memorandum put forward by Malaya, outlining the factors to be taken into account in the determination of Singapore's share of Federal Government services. The essentials of the Federation proposal were that the Federal Government should retain all monies in excess of those required for Singapore to run its state services and pay its contribution to Federal services. This latter the Federation assessed at 21.2 percent of common pan-Malaysian services such as Defence and Foreign Affairs.¹⁴ Singapore rejected the figure of 21.2 percent for its contribution to pan-Malaysian services as too high, and proposed that the amount it contributed should be determined by its representation in the Federal Parliament (which was to be smaller proportionally than its population required if a strict mathematical formula was applied) the size of its population, and the extent of its economic growth.¹⁵ This last determinant was often referred to as the "prosperity index" a term which emphasized Singapore's concern that in determining its contribution towards the Federal services due account should be taken of its capacity to pay in the event of some future economic hardship. The Singapore negotiators also objected to the intended Federation appropriation of Singapore's surplus revenues.¹⁶

The disagreements on technical matters were complicated by the increasingly open antipathy between Singapore and Malayan negotiators which is described in the preceding section of this paper. Although the chief critic of the Singapore position was Tan Siew Sin, criticism also came from the Federation Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak.¹⁷ Discussion continued through April 1963 without progress. In mid-April Lee Kuan Yew gave a clear indication that settlement of the common market

10. Straits Times, 2 March 1963.

11. Ibid., 5 March 1963.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., 6 March 1963.

14. Leg. Ass. Debates, 5 April 1963, Cols. 33 and 34 and 10 June 1963, Cols. 613 and 614.

15. Ibid., 10 June 1963, Cols. 615 and 616.

16. Ibid., 10 June 1963, Col. 616.

17. Straits Times, 3 April 1963.

issue would aid settlement of the financial issues, and this "carrot on a stick" technique was pursued through to the final negotiations in London in July 1963.¹⁸ It seems possible that the Federation failed to consider why Singapore was so anxious to conclude the two issues concurrently. Singapore saw the need to have the market agreement within which it would develop the industries it hoped to promote through continued control over much of its revenues. Alternatively Malaya may have believed that its bargaining position as the much larger power was sufficiently strong to force eventual Singapore acceptance of Federation proposals. One or both of these attitudes appear reflected in Tan Siew Sin's statement that financial controls and the common market were separate issues.¹⁹ The Singapore assessment was apparently that the issues could be made inter-dependent and that persistent negotiations could bring results whatever the tenor of public statements. These financial negotiations took place at a time when Indonesian opposition to Malaysia was becoming increasingly vocal. Singapore thus not only went to the discussions with an important background of expertise and a firm knowledge of what it wanted, but also with the awareness that publicized differences between the future components of Malaysia constituted a possible loss of face for Malaya. This knowledge was exploited up to the final signature of the Malaysia agreement and again in the events which followed Lee's proclamation of "independence" on 31 August 1963.

A significant step toward a financial accord was made when, on 29 May 1963, following a meeting between Goh Keng Swee and Lee Kuan Yew for Singapore and Tun Abdul Razak and Tan Siew Sin for the Federation, it was announced that agreement had been reached in principle for the introduction of a common market once Malaysia was established.²⁰ The hopeful statements made by both sides following this decision did not prevent further deadlock on financial issues. The matters which remained unsettled were: 1) the proportion of Singapore's revenue which should go to the Federal Government, and 2) the disposal of Singapore's surplus revenues. Singapore was prepared to offer the Federation 27.3 percent of its total revenues or 39 percent of its total national taxes as payment for its share of pan-Malaysian services, and at the same time sought the conclusion of common market terms in the Malaysian Constitution. In relation to the second major unsettled matter, the Federation displayed an uncoined interest in Singapore's surplus revenue as a result of its undertaking to find development funds for the Borneo territories. Singapore sought to meet this interest by offering to make available a loan of 150 million Malayan dollars to the Borneo territories. The Federation asked for 28 percent of Singapore's total revenue or 40 percent of its national taxes as a contribution to pan-Malaysian services, and wanted the details of the common market arrangements to be determined after Malaysia. Instead of a loan for the Borneo territories, it wished Singapore to make a 50 million Malayan dollars grant to the territories.²¹ The Federation insisted that it would not go further in its efforts to accommodate Singapore, and Tengku Abdul Rahman spoke of forming Malaysia without

18. Ibid., 19 April 1963.

19. Ibid., 1 May 1963.

20. Ibid., 30 May 1963.

21. The issues were summarized in a talk by Lee Kuan Yew reported in the Straits Times, 26 June 1963.

Singapore.²² The Federation had by this time yielded considerable ground to the Singapore position, a fact which cannot have discouraged Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee as they faced the final negotiations.

The resolution of the financial issues was achieved in a series of meetings in London in which the Federation representatives gave credit to Duncan Sandys, the Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, for bringing agreement. Lee Kuan Yew asked that he be quoted as saying that his concessions were made only through regard for the Tengku. If Duncan Sandys had been the only person involved he would "have brought him to his knees."²³ The delegations announced agreement on both the common market and financial matters on 5 July 1963 and released details of them on 6 July 1963. On the financial side, Singapore agreed to pay 40 percent of its national income from taxes -- the equivalent of 27 percent of its total revenue -- to the Federal Government as the Singapore share of pan-Malaysian expenses. This amount is to be reviewed by an "independent body" one year after the establishment of Malaysia and thence every two years. As a compromise, Singapore agreed to grant a fifteen year loan of 150 million Malayan dollars to the Borneo territories on liberal repayment terms. The loan would carry no interest demands on the first 100 million dollars for the first five years and the remaining fifty million dollars would carry normal rates of interest.²⁴ In a rider over which there was some later confusion, Singapore was granted the right to supply 50 percent of the labor for the projects undertaken using loan funds.²⁵

The terms finally obtained by Singapore through the financial discussions are attractive, since they permit Singapore a fair amount of freedom in control of its future development. Provided the projected reviews of the proportion of Singapore's revenue to be paid to the Federal Government do not make any significant changes, Singapore has the opportunity to maintain its individual approach to social services and to continue with such programs as its Government housing scheme. This freedom is one of the series of possible future irritants in Singapore-Malaya relations noted at the conclusion of this paper. In insisting on its right to supply 50 percent of the labor in the projects undertaken in the Borneo territories, Singapore has made a partial step towards solving its unemployment problem, but probably the significance of the agreement is greater as a future lever for the export of labor from Singapore, rather than for its immediate effect on the immense

22. Ibid., 19 June 1963.

23. Tun Abdul Razak's comment was reported in Straits Times, 3 July 1963 and Lee's in Straits Times, 10 July 1963.

24. Ibid., 9 July 1963.

25. In the details announced on 6 July 1963 it appeared that the terms of the loan stipulated that Singapore craftsmen would be employed in Borneo only if it was not possible for the labor to be obtained in Borneo. When the full text was revealed of the agreement signed between Tengku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew -- it was negotiated at the last moment and typed and signed on the back of an envelope -- it showed that the employment of 50 percent of Singapore labor was mandatory. See Straits Times, 24 July 1963.

problem of un- and underemployment within the state.

Singapore Cabinet Ministers had been calling for a common market arrangement with Malaya from the inception of the P.A.P. Government in 1959, but no progress had been made towards the goal before Tengku Abdul Rahman's announcement proposing the Malaysian Federation. The basic reasons for Federation reluctance have been outlined. Whereas a common market arrangement appeared vital for Singapore if it was to have an economic future, the issue did not have the same urgency for Malaya, although as has been noted a common market does offer advantages to all components of the Malaysian Federation. Just as the financial arrangements between Singapore and Malaya were not negotiated until the more strictly political issues were out of the way, so the common market negotiations took place principally in 1963. By comparison with the financial negotiations, a further element was added to the common market discussions by the Federation's decision to seek advice from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on problems of closer economic relationships within Malaysia.²⁶ The leader of the International Bank Mission, Jacques Rueff, made a preliminary visit to the Malaysian territories for ten days in October and November 1962, but the mission's real work was carried out by a team of international experts who were in the Malaysian territories from 7 February until 16 April 1963.²⁷

26. The announcement of the appointment of the International Bank mission was made on 5 October 1962 -- Malaysia in Brief (Kuala Lumpur, 1963) Chronology, p. 133. According to the Political Secretary to the Minister of Culture in Singapore reference to the need for a common market agreement was not included in the Heads of Agreement negotiated in 1961 since the decision had been taken to consult the International Bank. Straits Times, 2 July 1963.

The International Bank Mission had the following terms of reference:

1. To examine and report on the feasibility of, and problems inherent in, closer economic co-ordination among the prospective Malaysian territories with special reference to:
 - (a) the feasibility of common market arrangements among the territories of Malaysia, taking into account the importance of preserving the entrepot trade of Singapore, Penang and Labuan, and the public revenue implications of cash arrangements.
 - (b) the impact of present differences in trade and tariff policies among the territories.
 - (c) other economic areas of possible conflict or overlapping interests.
 2. To recommend concrete steps which should be taken in the fields of economic policy to effect such economic co-ordination as to produce the maximum advantage to all territories.
 3. To recommend administrative arrangements for co-ordinating and integrating development planning including industrial development.
- Rueff Report, pp. vi and vii.

27. Rueff Report, p. vii.

Before the Rueff Mission arrived in the Malaysian area, Dr. Goh Keng Swee, Singapore's Finance Minister, had been meeting with Federation officials to discuss a future common market. Speaking on 6 January 1963, he proposed a common market on much the same terms which he had advocated before the 1959 Singapore elections. He suggested that there should be a common market which would permit goods manufactured in Singapore to move into the Federation without duty, and which would similarly permit Federation goods into Singapore without duty. Under this proposal, goods manufactured outside Singapore and Malaya would be subject to duties but raw materials would continue to enter Singapore free of duty.²⁸ Since this plan would have given a cost advantage to Singapore manufacturers who would receive duty free raw materials from which to manufacture their goods, it did not bring a Malayan response. Throughout the common market negotiations the Federation Government displayed a lack of concern for the need to have a common market within any set time. Singapore forced attention to this issue by making the settlement of the financial negotiations conditional upon the conclusion of a common market agreement. The fact that the Rueff Mission had apparently accepted the feasibility of a common market while in the Malaysian area, resulted in its name being invoked by the Singapore Government as it pressed its position.

There are strong indications that the Rueff Mission's views were not welcomed by the Federation Government. While Singapore representatives referred to the Mission and its "report" in April 1963 and in June 1963 presented a constitutional plan for a common market based on the "report", the Federation Government until late in the negotiations denied the possibility of formulating a common market agreement in the time available.²⁹ The Rueff Report as transmitted to the Federation Government in July 1963 appears to be in the form of conclusions agreeable to the Governments of both Malaya and Singapore, rather than the Mission's independent findings. This is at least implied by the fact that it was not discussed by the executive directors of the Bank or the management of the International Bank and so "represented the views of the Mission rather than the positive recommendations of the Bank."³⁰ It is also implied by the fact that Lee Kuan Yew referred to the Mission's report being in existence in April 1963³¹ and by Lee's referring to Singapore being ready to accept the conclusions of the Rueff Mission, which was reported at least twice in the Straits Times of 22 June 1963 and in another statement in the Straits Times of 24 June 1963. The second time Lee noted that Dr. Goh had prepared a detailed plan for a common market based on the Rueff Mission's views which he had presented to Tan Siew Sin. The published report on the Rueff Mission's visit to Malaysia did not accord completely with the agreements reached in London, and a comparison of some of the differences is made later in this paper.

28. Straits Times, 7 January 1963.

29. Just what form the "report" was in when Lee referred to it in April and June is not clear. That some "report" did exist before the printed copy was transmitted to the Federation Government does seem to be a fact since there was no Federation rebuttal of Lee's statements.

30. Rueff Report, p. ix.

31. Straits Times, 19 April 1963.

Dr. Goh Keng Swee reported on the state of negotiations when he addressed the Singapore Assembly on 7 June 1963.³² There was no difficulty, he said, in gaining the agreement of the Federation Government to an arrangement in which there was a common external tariff for both Singapore and Malaya. The difficulty about such an arrangement was that it would destroy Singapore's entrepot trade which was not, of course, acceptable. Singapore had therefore proposed a modified common market arrangement. This provided that goods manufactured within the Malaysian territories should move freely within those territories, but that protective duties should be instituted to preserve them from foreign competition. Tariffs applied elsewhere in the Malaysian territories on goods not manufactured in the territories should not be applied on goods entering Singapore. The advantage of this proposal, as Goh Keng Swee pointed out, was that the bulk of Singapore's entrepot trade which was in tropical produce would not be affected, and dislocation of the entrepot would be limited. This proposal was an advance on the earlier positions adopted by the P.A.P., since it admitted the possibilities of protective duties operating on goods entering Singapore if the same goods were manufactured within the future Federation, but it did not really take up the question of the treatment of raw materials which might be imported into Singapore for processing and then subsequently exported into the Federation.

Progress towards a solution of the differences between the two governments did not come until the final hard bargaining in London at the end of June and in the first few days of July 1963. Agreement on the common market was notified with agreement on the other financial issues on 5 July 1963, and the terms of the agreement were embodied in Annex J of the Malaysia Agreement. In broad outline the Annex, which incidentally only gives details for Singapore and Malaya's arrangements, provides for a common market to apply progressively throughout Malaysia for "all goods and products produced or manufactured in significant quantities in Malaysia."³³ The exemption from the common market arrangements of goods with their principal terminals outside Malaysia means that in the case of such items as tin and rubber the Federation will continue to levy taxes before the goods cross to Singapore for sale abroad.³⁴ Furthermore, Singapore's position as a possible site for the manufacture of materials imported at a cheaper rate by being free of duty is curtailed in Article 1(3) of Annex J which provides that the common market provisions "shall not be construed to prevent the imposition ... of any special tax on producers in a low-tariff state which would offset the cost inequalities arising from the differential import duties."³⁵ Only where existing protective duties are uniform will there be no trade restrictions on the passage throughout Malaysia of goods imported into one of the territories.³⁶ The scope of the market is thus a limited one, designed to insure the continued collection of revenue

32. Leg. Ass. Debates, 7 June 1963.

33. United Kingdom Command Paper 2094 - 1963. Malaysia Agreement, Annex J.1(1), p. 228.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., 1(3) (a).

36. Ibid., 1(2).

taxes by the Federation of Malaya on its major export items; the continued use of protective duties within the Federation of Malaysia where cost advantages as the result of differential duties result in cost inequalities for manufactured goods; and by a progressive introduction of the market -- over twelve years -- the least possible dislocation of the Singapore entrepot.

To advise the Malaysian Government on the establishment of the common market, the Annex provided for a Tariff Advisory Board which would make recommendations on the establishment and maintenance of a common external tariff for the protection of goods for which there will be a common market.³⁷ Singapore's special position as an entrepot port is safeguarded in the Annex in two principal ways. The Tariff Advisory Board has as its principal staff a chairman and three deputy chairmen. Singapore has to concur in the appointment of the chairman, and one of the deputy chairmen must be nominated by Singapore.³⁸ The other safeguard lies in the progressive introduction of the market over a period of twelve years which should permit Singapore to make adjustments to match the decline of the entrepot trade. Thus article 3(2) of Annex J provides that except where urgent action is considered necessary, the Federal Government shall not impose protective tariffs in Singapore before receiving the advice of the Tariff Board, while for the first five years of the twelve over which the introduction of the market is to be phased Singapore will have the right to delay the application of a protective duty for twelve months if it feels that such a duty will harm its entrepot trade.³⁹ Provision was also made in the Annex to withhold the application of revenue duties -- i.e. duties levied for the purposes of raising revenue only -- for five years, and for the seven succeeding years up to 1975 Singapore may refuse to implement a revenue duty on the grounds that it might endanger the entrepot trade, so long as it reimburses the Federal Government for loss of revenue.⁴⁰

Singapore's insistence on the necessity for a common market agreement successfully brought its inclusion in the Malaysia Agreement. By comparison with the recommendations of the Rueff Mission -- even if, as suggested, they only consist of agreed conclusions acceptable to both parties -- the common market arrangements outlined in Annex J are extremely brief.⁴¹ The provisions of the Annex appear to represent a political compromise. While Singapore has gained Malaya's agreement to a market, its own capacity to compete in that market will certainly not be as unrestrained as it had hoped for and argued for in its earlier proposals. The tasks of the Tariff Advisory Board as set out in the Annex are not so strictly defined as they are under the Rueff Report. While the Rueff Report suggested that the Tariff Board should have responsibility for making recommendations on protective duties only,⁴²

37. Ibid., 2(1).

38. Ibid., 2(2).

39. Ibid., 3(3), p. 229.

40. Ibid., 4(4), p. 230.

41. See Rueff Report, Chapter VI and particularly p. 56 ff.

42. Ibid., p. 49.

the Annex gives the Board responsibility for both revenue and protective duties.⁴³ The Annex does not go into what criteria will be used in deciding upon the application of protective duties, as was done in the Rueff Report.⁴⁴ Overall, the agreements included in Annex J follow the broad lines of the Rueff Report but in a less detailed form. The Annex does not discuss, as the Report does, the way in which Singapore may preserve its entrepot trade.⁴⁵ The measures suggested include the widespread introduction of free zones and bonded stores with special provisions made for tourists who are particularly important for Singapore's economy.

The provisions of the Annex were incorporated in the Tariff Advisory Board Act which was passed by the Malayan Parliament before Malaysia Day. Singapore's extreme sensitivity on the common market question was shown again when the Act did not follow the Annex in one respect, by failing to make clear that harmonization of the revenue duties to be applied in Singapore following the Tariff Board's report due before 1965, did not imply immediate implementation of the revenue duties. The Annex provided here that the Singapore Government could offset application of the revenue duties up to the final establishment of the common market in 1975, if it paid the cost of the revenue which would otherwise be raised. This was one of the issues placed as a demand before the Federation and British Governments in the fortnight immediately before Malaysia, and as with the other matters raised Singapore was successful.

Financial and economic arrangements brought harder bargaining than any other issues discussed between Singapore and Malaya. This primarily reflects the deep concern of the Singapore Government to preserve a reasonably sound economic future for the state, and to see that arrangements for this were incorporated in a formal fashion, which would prevent any subsequent erosion of Singapore's position. This determination must have been strengthened by the stress placed on strong central control by the Federation Ministers throughout the negotiations. The arrangements which have been negotiated do not obviate the possibility of future difficulties. Tariff Boards are notoriously subject to criticism and in the case of the new Federation there will not merely be opportunity for the public or manufacturers to criticize the Board but also the possibility exists that inter-governmental disagreement between Singapore and Malaya could greatly impede the Board's tasks. For instance, the determination of how to limit cost advantages in low-tariff states -- thus Singapore -- provided for in Annex J, could well provoke difficulties. Even though Lee Kuan Yew has referred to the need for Singapore to regain the confidence of the Federation Government, this will have to be achieved in a situation in which there are factors already present and capable of exercising a divisive influence. In a sense the negotiations between Malaya and Singapore over finance have been a classic illustration of the dictum that centralized control is most easily exercised in a situation where the interests of the component parts of a Federation are roughly identical. In political

43. Cmd. 2094 4(4), p. 230 assigns the Board's duties for revenue duties.

44. Rueff Report, p. 57.

45. Ibid., Chapter VIII, p. 74 and ff.

matters, the immediate interests of the two Governments are fairly similar. Neither wishes to see the further growth of extreme left-wing power in Singapore and both were prepared to make concessions to prevent this. While it may be argued theoretically that the economic interests of the two Governments are in the long term very closely linked, their immediate aims are not. Singapore fought hard to obtain both the common market and the preservation of its entrepot trade, as well as a large measure of financial autonomy, and Malaya fought to prevent Singapore retaining too much independence in any of these matters. It will be most surprising if the seeds of dissent sown by the disagreements between the two Governments over financial and economic matters remain dormant now that the new Federation has been established.

VI. SINGAPORE AND BRITAIN

The Singapore Government's chief concern in its relations with Britain, during the negotiations for Malaysia, was to prevent any British delay in moving towards the inauguration of the new Federation. As a result, while Britain and Duncan Sandys as the British Minister chiefly concerned always remained possible targets, so long as British delay was not evident relations between Singapore and British were remarkably harmonious.¹ Lee and his Government accepted the Internal Security Council as one of the necessary but interim examples of continuing British control, despite the potential this offered for criticism from the left. Lee, also, made much of the impossibility of Britain using its Singapore bases for S.E.A.T.O. purposes and of the necessity to formalize Britain's use of the bases by an agreement.² But he, like the Tengku, took advantage of the ambiguity of the British-Malayan Defence Agreement of November 1961 concerning the use of the bases for S.E.A.T.O. purposes to "explain it away" and suggested that the bases in Singapore should be withdrawn within fifteen to twenty years.³ Even the Barisan Socialis has balked at advocating the immediate withdrawal of the British from their bases in Singapore. One estimate of the economic importance of these bases to Singapore shows why it is politically inexpedient for any party to call for their abolition. The British armed forces establishments in Singapore directly employ more than 30,000 persons and, if families working in ancilliary services are taken into account, the numbers affected by a complete closedown are probably between 100,000 and 150,000.⁴ The Barisan Socialis vice-chairman, S. Woodhull, in fact referred to the bases as a "blood transfusion" for Singapore.⁵ But while finding it

1. It seems probable that Lee Kuan Yew's anti-British postures and undoubted distrust of much of British policy and motives have been too readily accepted as evidence of pervading personal anglophobia. Too often reports of Lee's statements have neglected to note the aspect of Lee's personal relations with Britain and the British. Little publicity is given to the fact that Lee visits his former Cambridge College when he is in England and it is interesting to note that Lee has not hesitated on occasions to defend individual Englishmen working as expatriates in the Singapore public service if he is convinced of their loyalty.
2. Sunday Times (London), 1 October 1961 and Times (London), 30 September 1961.
3. The operative and ambiguous phrase which permitted the Agreement to be explained away was that the Government of Malaysia would "afford to the British Government the right to maintain bases at Singapore for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia and for the preservation of peace in South-East Asia." Times (London), 23 November 1961. On a date for withdrawal see Lee reported in Straits Times, 4 August 1962.
4. Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4, 26 October 1961, article "British Bases in Singapore", p. 243.
5. Ibid.

impolitic to call for abolition, the Barisan has used the bases as a focus for industrial discontent, while attacking any suggestion of their use for S.E.A.T.O. purposes or for storage or transportation of nuclear weapons.⁶

Throughout the negotiations for Malaysia, Singapore's leaders reflected a self-interested fear of delays as likely to affect their internal position. The fact that Britain was an almost traditional target for Singapore criticism probably also acted as a safety valve in relations between Singapore and Malaya, since, when there was delay in negotiations, the frustration which this produced could be channelled away from Malaya. At the same time the Federation Government must have welcomed the fact that Lee could play the role of critic to prevent friction developing in Malaya's relations with Britain. Lee's criticisms of Britain's slowness in moving towards public acceptance of the Malaysia concept related particularly to the Borneo territories. Thus during July 1961 Lee was reported as saying that there was concern in Kuala Lumpur over British delay in connection with the Borneo territories.⁷ Lee spoke more strongly when it seemed, following the visit of the Cobbold Commission to Borneo, that there was still some British reticence about drawing up a timetable for the Borneo territories' entry into Malaysia. Asserting that he had "as much right to say as anyone British or Malayan" Lee called for Malaysia by June 1963.⁸ In London during July 1962 when the Tengku was discussing Malaysia, Lee warned that British "dawdling" could lead to the whole of Southeast Asia being lost to communism.⁹ This last remark was not only an example of criticism of the British, but also of Lee's readiness to phrase his remarks to suit his audience -- in this case a British one.

At the level of unofficial relations between Britain and Singapore, there was the visit during May 1963 of a three member investigating team from the British Parliamentary Labour Party. The three parliamentarians were Arthur Bottomley, the Labour Shadow Colonial Secretary, Fenner Brockway and Reginald Sorensen. Both of the latter two men had a long record of interest in colonial affairs.¹⁰ Their visit convinced them that there was overall support in the Malaysian territories for the new Federation, although in Brunei they reported finding widespread support, of varying degree, for the December 1962 rebellion.¹¹ Referring specifically to Singapore, Bottomley as leader of the group said in a television forum on 29 May 1963:

There can be no doubt that there is a powerful expression in Singapore against Malaysia. But I am bound to say .. [consultation]

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6. Straits Times, 1 May 1962.
 7. Times (London), 26 July 1961.
 8. Straits Times, 26 July 1962.
 9. Sunday Times, 29 July 1962.
 10. Their arrival in the area was reported in Straits Times, 18 May 1963.
 11. Ibid., 28 May 1963.

... left us in no doubt that Malaysia is the right thing ... and we are convinced that the majority in Singapore wish for the creation of Malaysia.¹²

This visit and its conclusions were important in bringing the bi-partisan support which the British Parliament accorded the Malaysia proposal.

Both in the final negotiations for Malaysia held in London in 1963, and in the last-minute crisis which developed following Lee's declaration of de facto independence on 31 August 1963, the Singapore Government tried to present the British Government as the obstructionist preventing progress. Duncan Sandys was singled out both times for criticism by Lee Kuan Yew.¹³ Yet in both cases the issues to be determined were in fact ones between Singapore and Malaya which Britain had the unenviable task of reconciling. In the London negotiations it was the financial and economic issues which were at stake, while in early September 1963 there was a residual financial matter, an issue of the mutual right to restrict immigration and the powers to be given to Singapore for the suppression of gangsters.¹⁴ Despite the nature of the problems in September Lee warned Sandys that he had to "sort things out".¹⁵ Compared with these matters, the negotiations between Singapore and Britain regarding payment for the use of land which the British had occupied in Singapore and the return of land previously used by Britain as the administering power were minor matters. Under an agreement concluded at the time of the final talks in London, Britain agreed to hand over 1,330 acres which had been previously used by its civil and military establishments in Singapore and to pay five million Malayan dollars for land occupied without title.¹⁶ The continued presence of British forces in Singapore and the continued reliance on British bases to provide much of the employment on the island means that there will still be opportunities for agitation against Britain and its policies. While there is continuing international opposition to Malaysia, however, the difficulties of explaining the continued British presence to the Singapore electorate will be very much lessened.

12. Ibid., 30 May 1963.

13. See for instance Straits Times, 10 July 1963 and 3 September 1963.

14. This is discussed on pp. 47 and 48 of this paper.

15. Straits Times, 4 September 1963.

16. Ibid., 10 July 1963.

VII. SINGAPORE AND THE BORNEO TERRITORIES

Alleged collusion between the members of the Barisan Socialis and the Brunei rebels, and allegations of intended co-operation between the Barisan and dissidents in North Borneo, formed one of the chief reasons for the actions of the Internal Security Council in February 1963.¹ This alleged association highlights the general lack of close political ties between Singapore and the Borneo territories. Although in early 1961 Dr. Toh Chin Chye spoke of the desirability of forming closer links with Borneo, as well as Malaya, there is no evidence of the P.A.P. making successful inroads into the Borneo political scene before May 1961. The P.A.P. would, of course, have been limited in any such attempt by the territories' status as British Crown Colonies and by their lack of political development. Moreover, the P.A.P. faced such problems in Singapore that it could scarcely weaken its efforts there by attempting to expand its activities into Borneo. The importance of the Borneo territories for the Malaysia concept was, however, clearly appreciated by the P.A.P. leaders in Singapore, and Lee Kuan Yew pressed for the quickest possible decision on their entry immediately after the Tengku's initial Malaysia proposal. As noted in the previous section, this involved criticism of Britain whenever Lee judged that insufficient progress was being made. Rather in contrast, however, to the Tengku's early statements on Borneo, Lee was careful not to offend Borneo susceptibilities.² At the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association meeting held in Singapore during July 1961, Lee was reported expressing concern for the feelings and interests of the Borneo delegates.³ During this meeting Singapore also gave tangible evidence of its readiness to aid the Borneo territories when the Minister for Education, Yong Nyuk Lin, announced the offer of ten Malaysia scholarships, which would be awarded to students from North Borneo wishing to study at Singapore's University and Technical College. Singapore also offered to train Sarawak radio operators and to provide training for civil servants from the Borneo territories within the Singapore civil service.⁴ It was at this meeting that Donald Stephens transferred his support to Malaysia, and it may be speculated whether Lee's solicitude for Borneo feelings was in part instrumental in this decision. Stephens' comment on the scholarship offer may be noted in this respect:

This is something which I will take back to my country with pride and with happiness. My people will appreciate it very much.⁵

1. See pp. 30-32 of this paper.

2. As an example the Tengku was reported in the Straits Times, 24 July 1961 as saying that there was really no difference -- in race and interests -- between the Malays and the Dyaks.

3. Straits Times, 22 July 1961.

4. Ibid., 27 July 1961.

5. Ibid.

When the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee met in Kuching in December 1961, Lee Kuan Yew again appeared in the role of the wise marriage broker, ready to reconcile differences and complimenting the politicians of North Borneo and Sarawak on their political sophistication. Speaking in a meeting he said:

... So long as we accept the necessity and the inevitability of Malaysia, the differences of view which we have as to the form and content of Malaysia can be resolved.⁶

In a later meeting he asked how the idea could possibly have originated that the politicians of Sarawak and North Borneo were not sophisticated, and he spoke in the same tone in a radio broadcast throughout the territories.

These statements need not be regarded as indicating Lee's concern for the propriety of sudden political advance in the territories as it affected the people at large. This was not his main preoccupation whereas the acceptance of Malaysia by the politicians was. The opposition of the Sarawak United People's Party to Malaysia Lee denounced as the result of the party's being penetrated by Communists.⁸ The P.A.P.'s position of support for early Borneo entry and an unreadiness to accept that the territories might pursue some other path to independence were countered by the Barisan Socialis. The Barisan was critical of the manner in which the Cobbold Commission carried out its survey and called for self-determination to permit the territories to decide on their own future.⁹ The outbreak of the Brunei rebellion gave Lee the opportunity to contrast the progress towards merger made by Singapore, a Chinese state, compared with that made in Brunei, a Malay state under a sultan.¹⁰ The later denunciation of the Barisan for its alleged links with the rebels has already been discussed in this paper but it is desirable to stress again the divergence of outlook between the Barisan with its opposition to Malaysia and Azahari with his vision of a new hegemony over the Borneo territories.

Lee's insistence that, in return for Singapore's loan to the Borneo territories, Singapore craftsmen should provide 50 percent of the required labor force, was given Malayan assent without consultation with the Borneo delegations. This was made clear in Donald Stephens' surprised reaction to Lee's announcement of the condition, some time after the final meetings on Malaysia held in London in early July 1963. On 22 July 1963, Stephens stated that he had no knowledge of the condition, and that no provision for the use of Singapore labor, in conjunction with the Singapore loan to the Borneo territories, had been included in the Malaysia Agreement:

6. Sarawak By The Week, No. 51/61, p. 10.

7. Ibid., p. 14 and pp. 17-20.

8. Lee Kuan Yew, op. cit., p. 95.

9. Straits Times, 23 October 1962.

10. Ibid., 1 January 1963.

The first mention of this fifty percent Singapore labour force came from Mr. Lee Kuan Yew alone and it only came after the agreement had been signed.¹¹

This complaint brought the revelation of the agreement signed by Lee Kuan Yew and the Tengku, on the back of an envelope, at the last moment of the negotiations in London, and a placating statement from Lee Kuan Yew. But while he expressed sympathy for Stephens, and regret that he had not been informed earlier, Lee Kuan Yew stressed that "a loan is a loan" and that some form of quid pro quo is a normal part of a loan arrangement.¹² This is an arrangement which may lead to some difficulties between Singapore and the Borneo territories in the future since restriction on the influx of immigrants was one of the concerns most frequently expressed to the Cubbold Commission.¹³ Lee has given his firm undertaking that any laborers sent from Singapore to the Borneo territories will return as soon as they finish the particular project on which they are working.¹⁴ In any event, the terms of the loan arrangement did not prevent Lee gaining the support of the leaders of North Borneo and Sarawak for the premature declaration of independence on 31 August 1963. Lee visited the territories and discussed his intentions with Stephen Ningkan and Donald Stephens. He also urged them to declare their independence at the same time, and was reported as saying in Kuching that the ball "was at the feet of Sabah and Sarawak and it was up to them to kick into the goal."¹⁵ Lee made it clear that he expected the Borneo leaders to kick the ball in "the right direction." When Ningkan and Stephens flew to Kuala Lumpur to tell the Federation Government of their intention of proclaiming independence at the same time as Singapore, Lee accompanied them, noting that "The least Singapore can do at this time is to stand by them."¹⁶ Lee's capacity to gain the Borneo leaders' support during this period probably resulted partly from his earlier concern for their position in discussions on Malaysia, and partly from the local political pressures operating on the Borneo leaders to show that Malaysia would, in fact, become a political reality. If a degree of rapport was established between Lee Kuan Yew and the Borneo leaders, there does not seem to have been any marked attempt by the Singapore leader to capitalize upon it in the post Malaysia Day period. This will be one of the matters discussed in the final section of this paper.

11. Ibid., 23 July 1963.

12. Ibid., 24 July 1963.

13. Report of the Commission of Enquiry -- North Borneo and Sarawak (London, 1962), p. 55.

14. Ibid., ref. 12.

15. Sarawak Tribune, 23 August 1963. See also Straits Times, 22 August 1963.

16. Straits Times, 23 August 1963.

VIII. SINGAPORE AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION

Following the grant of semi-independent status to Singapore in 1959, the island's Government made considerable effort to establish an international image although Britain retained control over its external relations. This has sometimes involved actions which diverged from Malayan foreign policy. Possibly the most notable instances of this divergence have been in the economic field, again reflecting Singapore's absorption with the need to trade to survive. While Tengku Abdul Rahman was a key figure in the efforts to expel South Africa from the Commonwealth and to impose an economic boycott on South African trade, the Singapore Government has adopted the position that however distasteful it finds South Africa's racial policies it has no choice but to trade with it so long as South Africa does not try to interfere in Singapore politics. In contrast to the Federation too, Singapore gave implicit recognition to the Government of the People's Republic of China by permitting the Bank of China to operate in Singapore -- although the line of demarkation here between Britain's responsibility and Singapore's control over economic matters is a difficult one to draw. Malaya recognizes neither the Peking nor the Formosa regime and therefore does not permit the Bank of China to operate. At a less striking level Singapore competed independently of Malaya in international sporting contests. Lee Kuan Yew has spoken of his desire to copy the international policies of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia,¹ a statement which can probably be paraphrased as an indication of Lee's desire to avoid involvement in the international power struggle between the East and West. This is in contrast with the position of the Federation of Malaya. Nominally Malaya pursued an independent foreign policy which involved alignment neither with the East nor the West. In fact, the Malayan position in international affairs has, generally, been one which supports the objectives and actions of the West, at least in broad principles. In contrast with other unaligned countries, the Malaya Government gave firm support to the Indian position in the Sino-Indian border dispute and to the Diem regime in South Vietnam. While not a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Malaya, before Malaysia was achieved, could be used as a staging area for Commonwealth troops for S.E.A.T.O. The Defence Agreement, signed between Malaya and the United Kingdom in November 1961, has left the question of S.E.A.T.O. use of Singapore bases vaguely defined, but it is clear that the United Kingdom regards them as still available for that purpose.

Before Malaysia was proposed Lee had visited Indonesia in an attempt to encourage further trade between Indonesia and Singapore and probably with a concern for the long-stated Indonesian policy of endeavoring to reduce its dependence on the Singapore entrepot. It is doubtful whether much was achieved at the time of the visit but relations were reasonably cordial. Lee said of the visit:

... I would like to repeat ... that we received the utmost

1. Straits Times, 29 September 1962.

courtesy and hospitality during our stay in Indonesia and look forward to the strengthening of trade and cultural relations in the months ahead.²

Singapore's concern to avoid alienating Indonesia's trade, may explain Lee Kuan Yew's restrained approach to Indonesian criticism of Malaysia at the end of 1962 and in early 1963. While politicians in the Federation grew more publicly angry about the Indonesian position, Lee Kuan Yew as late as 12 February 1963 stated that he did not believe the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, to be opposed to Malaysia as such.³ Once Lee had assessed that Indonesian opposition was a threat to the establishment of Malaysia, however, the tone of his statements changed. When the concept of some formal association of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines was mooted in June 1963, following the Manila accord, Lee expressed his reservations. Singapore, Lee indicated, would favor a confederation of the three countries, if what was envisaged was an association based on economic and social ties and social cooperation. But if the agreement meant more than this and included Singapore's political absorption, then his government was opposed to it.⁴ When the concept of Maphilindo became a little more precise, Lee continued in his attitude of reserve, particularly so far as political implications of the idea were concerned.⁵

The Singapore position hardened even further when Indonesian and Philippine opposition was successful in bringing the United Nations survey of opinion in the Borneo territories. Lee stressed that 31 August would continue to be the date for the inauguration of Malaysia in Singapore and was reported as protesting against giving in to President Sukarno whom Lee now described as an "international black-mailer".⁶ During the Singapore election campaign Devan Nair, one of the leading P.A.P. trade unionists, attacked Indonesian "neo-colonialism" as threatening the territorial integrity of Malaysia and, in a rare reported instance of communal appeal by the P.A.P., pointed to the difficult position occupied by the Chinese in Indonesia.⁷ Judged by the amount of space devoted to the rebuttal of Manila's objections to the new Federation, the Philippines' case for claiming North Borneo was scarcely seen as worthy of notice. When the British Embassy was attacked in Djakarta as part of Indonesian opposition to Malaysia, Lee

2. Leg. Ass. Debates, 10 February 1960, Col. 134.

3. Straits Times, 13 February 1963.

4. Ibid., 14 June 1963.

5. J. M. van der Kroef, "Maphilindo: Illusion or Reality" in Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XLI, No. 10, 5 September 1963, p. 642.

6. Guardian (London), 9 August 1963. Lee Kuan Yew subsequently denied using this phrase which, apparently, was first reported by an Australian Broadcasting Commission correspondent after talking with Lee at a reception. While noting this denial, the phrase does not seem out of character. See Straits Times, 10 August 1963.

7. Straits Times, 18 September 1963.

Kuan Yew rejected the possibility of war developing over Malaysia and termed the destruction of the Embassy "a twentieth century ritual of showing disapproval."⁸ Although Lee and the P.A.P. had preserved a correct relationship with the Indonesian Government into 1963, the alleged links between the Barisan and the Indonesian Communist Party provided ammunition for P.A.P. criticism which has already been described in this paper.

The P.A.P.'s concern for projecting an international image of Singapore was subordinated throughout the development of Malaysia to the more pressing problems of internal opposition, and the resolution of disagreements which existed between Singapore and Malaya. It is not clear whether Lee's visits to a series of uncommitted countries, which he undertook in May 1962, were made on his own initiative or at the request of the Federation Government. Whatever was the case, there is no doubt that Lee Kuan Yew is concerned and interested in matters beyond Malaysia's internal politics, and this interest was carried forward in the period following the achievement of Malaysia.

8. Ibid., 19 September 1963.

IX. POST MALAYSIA

The events leading to the inauguration of Malaysia, on 16 September 1963, form part of a time continuum in which the need to establish periodization may have involved a certain amount of artificiality. Indeed, later events stress the inadequacy of regarding Malaysia Day as the terminal point for a study of Singapore and Malaysia. While the events from 1961 to 1964 have left continuing problems and antagonisms, within and outside the new Federation, few internal developments have been so immediately significant as the decision by the People's Action Party to contest the Malayan elections of 25 April 1964, and so to try to extend P.A.P. power beyond Singapore island. This decision appears as the attempted culmination of the consolidation of power, achieved by the P.A.P. in the September 1963 elections in Singapore, and as a clear turning point for future developments in Malaysia. In the concluding section of this study, therefore, the broad pattern of events in and concerning Singapore, up to the announcement of the P.A.P.'s entry into the Malayan elections, will be described, while some general conclusions will also be drawn.

Following September 1963, the P.A.P. Government held power in Singapore with a large parliamentary majority, and an impressive proportion of the popular vote. This position of strength had not, however, eliminated all difficulties from its path. The votes polled by the Barisan Socialis had been substantial, and it was clear that the P.A.P. would continue to be faced by considerable internal opposition in the state, even if its parliamentary position was unassailable. In its relations with the Malayan leaders, the P.A.P. had, through its actions in the final months before Malaysia was achieved, forfeited much of the goodwill which it had worked so hard to develop over the preceding three years. Its attempts to heal relations with the Federal leadership were further complicated by the existing hostility between the P.A.P. and the M.C.A., the Chinese party in the Federal Alliance, and in some ways Lee Kuan Yew's decision that his party should contest the Malayan elections was the outcome of this hostility. A third broad theme in the post-Malaysia Day period was Lee's continued interest in international affairs, which was marked by his leadership of a Malaysian mission to Africa to enlist support for the Malaysian point of view in the dispute with Indonesia.

After his Government was returned to power, Lee announced his new Cabinet. He retained most of the former ministers, with the exception of the two ministers who had been defeated in the elections.¹ One interesting change in portfolios was the appointment of Ong Pang Boon,

1. The members of the new Cabinet were: Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister; Toh Chin Chye, Deputy Prime Minister; Goh Keng Swee, Finance Minister; S. Rajaratnam, Minister for Culture; Ong Pang Boon, Minister for Education; Yong Nyuk Lin, Minister for Health; Lim Kim San, Minister for National Development; Inche Othman Wok, Minister for Home Affairs and Social Welfare; Jek Yen Thong, Minister for Labour. Straits Times, 18 October 1963.

the former Minister for Home Affairs, as the new Minister for Education. Ong, who played an aggressive role in the first P.A.P. Government, particularly in Legislative Assembly discussions, is the product of both English and Chinese education, and so well suited to handle Singapore's educational problems. The detention of a large part of the Barisan Socialis weakened that party, but did not, by any means, eclipse it. One of the first challenges to governmental authority in the post-Malaysia period came from the Barisan-dominated Singapore Association of Trade Unions (S.A.T.U.), which called a strike at the Naval Dockyard to begin on 7 October, and a General Strike to begin on 8 October, as a protest against the Singapore Government's interference in union affairs.² Neither strike appears to have been particularly successful. Action was taken against the S.A.T.U. strike leaders, this time by the Federal Government, which, under the Malaysia Agreement, assumed authority for internal security in Singapore. Included amongst those who were arrested were three Barisan Assembly members, S. T. Bani, Lee Tee Tang and Miss Low Miaw Gong. Two other Barisan members implicated in the strike went into hiding. These arrests had been preceded by the preventive arrests of Nanyang University students, again by the Federal authorities. Early on the morning of 26 September 1963, twenty arrests were made at Nanyang University, of students and of three Nanyang graduates who had stood as candidates for the Barisan in the September 1963 elections. The Singapore Government felt it necessary to comment on these arrests, indicating its support for them, since they were directed at Communists, but stressing that it did not support an attack on Chinese education.³

The Singapore Government, additionally, took independent action against what it described as Communists and Communist activities. It acted, shortly after the elections, to withdraw the citizenship of Tan Lark Sye, a Singapore rubber magnate, member of the Nanyang University Council, and according to the Singapore authorities an important pro-Communist. The P.A.P. Government also showed itself particularly concerned to eradicate Communist influence in the rural areas, already discussed in this paper. This concern was manifested in a number of ways. From the negative point of view, the P.A.P. Government withdrew the registration of two Chinese rural associations which it stated to be Communist controlled, and which operated amongst the Chinese living outside the urban areas. At the same time, it withdrew the registration of a number of hawkers' associations which it claimed were controlled by Communists.⁴ The Government later stated that the Communists, having lost the cover provided by the rural associations, were attempting

2. Straits Times, 8 and 9 October 1963.

3. Ibid., 27 September 1963. The Malaysian Minister for Internal Security in a statement reported in Straits Times, 12 October 1963 made it equally clear that his Government would not be deterred from arresting students who were suspected of Communist affiliations; "Let there be no misunderstanding in this matter. The Government will not tolerate young students either at Nanyang University or in the Chinese middle schools participating in, and actively furthering, the plans of the Communists in Singapore as occurred in 1954-56."

4. Ibid., 4 October 1963.

to further their position by setting up "kindergartens" where rural children could receive Communist indoctrination.⁵ From the positive point of view, the Government embarked on a program of development for the "rural" areas, stressing such matters as improved roads, better public lighting, and improved water supply. In a further attempt to improve his Government's image throughout the island, Lee Kuan Yew announced a plan to establish "citizens' consultative committees" throughout the state. Further efforts to strengthen its internal position include the decision by the P.A.P. to hold courses in politics for the Malay members and supporters of the party, and special attention paid to the interests of the squatters who were being resettled by the Government.⁶

The Barisan has insufficient members in the Singapore Assembly to constitute a parliamentary problem for the Government. This is possibly reflected by Lee Kuan Yew's invitation to the backbench members of this own party to feel free to criticize aspects of policy.⁷ While Lee will wish to keep criticism under control, such a freedom may act to prevent dissatisfaction within the party. Furthermore, the P.A.P.'s position has been aided by the unexpected release of leading members of the Barisan Socialist, who had been detained in the February 1963 mass detention operation. The release of such figures as James and Dominic Puthuchery, S. Woodhull and Lim Shee Ping was accompanied by rather surprising political recantations. In his statement, James Puthuchery denied being a Communist or being sympathetic to communism and indicated his firm support for the Malaysia concept:

I desire the most free and genuinely democratic society it is possible to have. I support Malaysia and would like to see it develop along such lines.⁸

S. Woodhull was less reticent in acknowledging his previous associations. He said in his statement that he had been indifferent to whether or not he was associating with Communists:

... I recognize that this has been helpful to the Communist cause which I have no desire to aid.

... I welcome the opportunity to abandon all political and trade union activity.⁹

5. Ibid., 23 November 1963.

6. Ibid., 25 October 1963 which reports a statement by the Minister for Home Affairs and Social Welfare announcing plans to improve conditions in the "rural" areas. The P.A.P.'s general policy was contained in the Address by the Singapore Head of State in the Legislative Assembly on 29 November 1963 -- Leg. Ass. Debates for that day. See also Lee Kuan Yew in the Debate on the Address in Reply, Leg. Ass. Debates, 9 December 1963, Cols. 145 to 146 and Straits Times, 1 January 1964 for the planned political activity amongst Singapore Malays.

7. Leg. Ass. Debates, 9 December 1963, Col. 190.

8. Straits Times, 29 November 1963.

9. Ibid.

The Barisan reaction was to charge the Federal Government with "brain-washing" the detainees.¹⁰ This charge, together with the charge that the detainees were badly housed during their detention, was rejected by two of those who had been released.¹¹

The fact that a solid core of P.A.P. opponents remains detained, either in Singapore or in Malaya, emphasizes one of the problems which remain for the Singapore authorities. The detention of the Barisan leaders must be accounted one of the reasons for the P.A.P. success in the September 1963 elections. Singapore's population, in general, has shown little reaction to the detentions, but there is the obvious danger that, should the Central Government embark on any further detention program, this could be used in later attacks against the P.A.P. on the basis that the Malay-dominated Central Government was attacking the Chinese of Singapore. Communal loyalties remain strong in Singapore, and as the Singapore electorate grows more politically sophisticated it may become increasingly concerned over the extent to which its representation in the Federal Parliament represents discrimination against a Chinese state. This is the sort of consideration which is likely to have influenced the P.A.P.'s decision to attempt extending its power beyond Singapore. Singapore's internal economic situation will play a large part in determining the future popularity of the P.A.P. Government, and it will obviously strive to carry on its social and housing programs at an increased rate. If industry is not developed and expanded, the already critical labor situation will be exacerbated as the youthful population floods on to the labor market.

Internal economic developments will be of great importance to the Singapore Government as the Malaysian Federation develops. Its most immediate concern, however, is with the problems arising out of Indonesian "Confrontation". The results of the Indonesian trade boycott have been regularly noted by Singapore leaders. When Lee discussed the matter in October 1963, he estimated that the Government might have to find alternative employment for 15,000 persons affected directly by the decline in trade which would accompany a continuing boycott.¹² The most detailed estimate of the effects of "Confrontation" on Singapore's economy was given by Dr. Goh Keng Swee in his budget speech delivered on 28 November 1963. Then, he spoke of the possible loss of income, resulting from "Confrontation", as likely to total as much as 8.2 per cent of national income.¹³ It is this figure which has been given as

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10. The Barisan issued a statement to this effect on 10 February 1964 in which it claimed, inter alia, that the Central Government had used the services of a British ex-Communist Mr. D. Hyde to "brain-wash" the detainees. Straits Times, 11 February 1964.
 11. See Leong Keng Swee's statement on release in Singapore in Straits Times, 5 February 1964, and S. Woodhull's letter to the Straits Times, 26 February 1964.
 12. Lee Kuan Yew in an address to the Foreign Correspondents' Association in Singapore, reported in Straits Times, 11 February 1964.
 13. Leg. Ass. Debates, 28 November 1963, Col. 76. Comment on the actual effects of "Confrontation" on Singapore's economy must await

(continued)

a reference point in later statements, although, at least initially, it appears to be too high. Nevertheless, Singapore has taken steps to counter the effects of "Confrontation" with the passage of the Economic Defence Bill and the Economic Defence (Direction of Employment) Bill.¹⁴ These are designed to insure that workers who lose their jobs through "Confrontation" should receive assistance both from the Government and from employers, and that where possible, alternative employment should be found for them. The economics of "Confrontation" gave Lee an opportunity to comment on Malaysian international policy which he did not ignore. Antagonism should not lead to the absolute exclusion of trade, he argued, any more than it has between India and Pakistan. And in the international field Malaysia could not allow the belief to develop that its attitude was unreasonable:

We must be firm on this [matter]. But at the same time we can be friendly and fair. We must never by word or deed allow ourselves to be presented by the propaganda of our neighbours as obstinate and obdurate people.

It may pay us with Afro-Asia not to return in kind the compliments over Radio Kalimantan.¹⁵

In Lee's analysis, Indonesia's hostile reaction to Malaysia would not have occurred if Malaysia had been formed earlier, when Indonesian attention was wholly concentrated on the West Irian dispute. But since this was not the case, Lee argued, Indonesia's actions towards Malaysia were designed to show that it was a major power. The opposition which Lee Kuan Yew consistently expressed towards the Maphilindo concept was continued in his new year's message. "Confrontation," Lee noted, was not pleasant but in a sense it was to be preferred to Maphilindo which could have eroded Malaysia's distinctive identity.¹⁶ In a statement

the provision of detailed statistics and the elapse of time. It is of interest, however, to note the preliminary comments of Pierre R. Crosson, Chief Economist in the Centre for Development and Planning of the National Planning Association. Speaking at a Seminar of the United States National Student Association held at Stanford University from 3 to 5 April 1964 he said, in part, ... "The actual decline in Singapore's employment and income, however, will probably be substantially less than these figures indicate [the figures referred to are ones which suggested that "Confrontation" could reduce employment directly by 5 percent and indirectly by up to 8 or 9 percent] because of the specific policies adopted by the Singapore Government and because of expanding employment opportunities in sectors of the economy which are independent of the Indonesian trade."

14. Leg. Ass. Debates, 28 November 1963, Col. 64.

15. Straits Times, 1 January 1964.

16. Ibid. In his new year's message, Lee gave his analysis of the motivations behind Indonesian "Confrontation". Dr. Subandrio was, according to Lee, the principal Indonesian advocate of Maphilindo. The P.K.I., in Lee's assessment, wanted "Confrontation". Lee argued that in Subandrio's absence at the United Nations in the latter part of 1963, the P.K.I. was able to press successfully its policy of "Confrontation".

issued on the same day, the Singapore Minister for Culture again raised the allegation that Indonesia's policy was based on anti-Chinese feeling.¹⁷

The most important illustration of Lee Kuan Yew's interest in playing a role in Malaysia's international relations was provided by his leadership of the Malaysia mission to Africa. The mission's aim was to explain their country's case to a number of African nations, some of which had shown themselves to be less than enthusiastic about the new federation.¹⁸ Lee led the mission at his own request, as was revealed when Tengku Abdul Rahman was questioned on the matter by a member of U.M.N.O. in the Federal Parliament.¹⁹ Malaysia has an extremely small diplomatic service and it is not well represented in Africa, so that a mission of the type which Lee led could perform a useful service. Explaining Malaysia's position and countering the Indonesian point of view, the mission visited seventeen African countries during January and February of 1964. In a speech made shortly before his departure, Lee commented on the danger of Malaysia being isolated from the Afro-Asian countries of the world. The tone of his comments suggest a personal assessment of the situation, rather than the viewpoint of the Malaysian leadership. Lee noted that "Confrontation" could continue for a long period. Since this was so, Malaysia needed to work to rally support:

For if our only friends in Afro-Asia are South Korea and South Vietnam, then even Australia and New Zealand may find it difficult to be actively committed to our side.²⁰

The mission was composed of politicians from the various member states of Malaysia and was accompanied by officials from the Malaysian Department of External Affairs. Its visit to Africa appears to have been reasonably successful. Leaders of the various African countries visited by the mission accepted invitations to visit Malaysia at some future, and unspecified, date and Lee Kuan Yew seems to have insured that the

17. Ibid.

18. Algeria joined with the Soviet Union in the Credentials Committee of the United Nations in expressing reservations about Malaysia's status, while there had been newspaper support for Indonesia's position in the United Arab Republic. See Straits Times, 14 December 1963 and Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XLIII, No. 7, 13 February 1964, p. 385.

19. In a reply to a question on the matter from Syed Ja'afar Albar, the Secretary General of U.M.N.O., Tengku Abdul Rahman stated that Lee had asked to lead a Malaysian mission to Africa to put the Malaysian point of view. In Syed Ja'afar Albar's view, Lee "Instead of making Malaysia known to the Africans ... will make himself known to the Africans." Straits Times, 4 January 1964 reporting the proceedings of the Malaysian House of Representatives on 3 January.

20. Straits Times, 20 January 1964 reporting a statement by Lee Kuan Yew on 19 January.

attitude of such important countries as Algeria and the United Arab Republic would be neutral in Malaysia's dispute with Indonesia.²¹ It will, of course, require a test situation such as a United Nations debate before the effectiveness of Lee's mission can be truly assessed. Coincidental with the apparently successful nature of the Malaysian mission to Africa, was the widespread personal publicity which Lee received as its leader.

The P.A.P.'s interest in international affairs was shown in other ways in the months following the achievement of Malaysia. The Singapore Minister for Culture, S. Rajaratnam, was a member of the Malaysian Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations and Dr. Goh Keng Swee, the Minister for Finance, was a member of the Malaysian Delegation to the ministerial talks on Malaysia held in Bangkok in February 1964. Although its participation in the debates of the Federal Parliament was, generally, limited, the P.A.P. through its Chairman, Dr. Toh Chin Chye the Singapore Deputy Prime Minister, did speak on the estimates for the Department of External Affairs in the parliamentary discussion of the budget. He criticized the appointment of "discredited politicians" to fill ambassadorial positions in overseas diplomatic posts, and he suggested that this form of appointment had in part been responsible for the inadequate reports received by the Malayan Government on developments in Djakarta, before Malaysia was formed.²² The remark may also have been directed at the appointment, announced shortly afterwards, of Lim Yew Hock to be Malaysian High Commissioner in Canberra.

But while the internal events in Singapore were of importance, and while the efforts of Lee and his lieutenants in the international field served to promote their image in Malaysia, the most striking and important development involving Singapore in the post-Malaysia Day period was the decision to contest the Malayan elections. Following its return to power in Singapore, the P.A.P.'s bid to reestablish confidence with the Federal leadership was not without difficulties. Tengku Abdul Rahman indicated that he was "shocked" by the defeat of the U.M.N.O. candidates in the Singapore elections, and it was unlikely that he would forget the pressures applied by Lee Kuan Yew to gain concessions for Singapore, particularly in the final stages of the Malaysia negotiations. Shortly after the Singapore elections had been held, the Tengku visited Singapore and criticized what he claimed to see as Lee's inclination to usurp the Federal Government's position. Lee in a conciliatory reply spoke of how his party recognized that a Malay must be Prime Minister of Malaysia for at least the next two decades. At the same time, he noted that the P.A.P. had a role to play in helping the Federal Government

21. See reports on the progress of the Malaysia mission in Straits Times, 28 January, 4 February, 5 February and 27 February 1964. This is not an exhaustive list of references.

22. Straits Times, 4 January 1964 reporting Toh Chin Chye in the Malaysian House of Representatives on 3 January.

to understand the urban Chinese.²³ Some weight must be given to the fact that in criticizing Lee, the Tengku was addressing a branch of his own party which had suffered a severe defeat. The promise which he made to campaign in future Singapore elections, on U.M.N.O.'s behalf, is politically interesting.²⁴ During the same visit to Singapore, the Federation Prime Minister spoke of his concern at finding the Bank of Indonesia and the Bank of China still operating in Singapore, and also that in contrast to Malaya, there was a South African Consul in Singapore.²⁵ Lee Kuan Yew chose to give a soft answer to these expressions of Federal concern. The role of the P.A.P. representatives in the Federal Parliament, Lee described as that of a loyal opposition, unlike the disloyal opposition of the Barisan and the Socialist Front. The P.A.P. representatives, Lee said, would sit as "cross benchers" and act as "friend, loyal opposition and critic."²⁶ A clear step in Lee's program to re-establish confidence lay in his request to the Tengku to select one of the two Singapore senators for the Federal Senate. The Federal Prime Minister selected Inche Ahmad bin Haji, a member of U.M.N.O.'s Singapore branch and a leader of the Singapore Alliance which was so unsuccessful in the 1963 Singapore elections. The other senator nominated by Lee's Government was Ko Teck Kin, the President of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Singapore.²⁷ This latter nomination cannot have been unconnected with the continuing P.A.P. suspicion of the Malayan Chinese Association's interest in Singapore. By appointing Ko Teck Kin, the P.A.P. could point to its concern for the business community, the group towards which the M.C.A. directs much of its attention. Reports of the M.C.A. sending a "team" to Singapore to revitalize its position and of M.C.A. threats to bring discriminatory action against foreign firms which supported the P.A.P., stressed the continuing nature of the P.A.P.-M.C.A. rivalry. In an exchange emphasizing this rivalry, Tan Siew Sin and Rajaratnam clashed in February 1964 over the relative interest in the needs of workers, as reflected in the social insurance plans of the P.A.P. and of the Malaysian Government.²⁸

The P.A.P. decision to enter the Malayan elections was not predictable on the basis of statements made by its leadership concerning the party's political intentions in the wider Malaysian community. There was no attempt by Lee Kuan Yew or his associates to hide their

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23. The exchange is summarized in the Times (London), 30 September 1963 while statements by Lee and the Tengku are reported in Straits Times for 28 and 30 September 1963.
24. Straits Times, 28 September 1963.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 31 October 1963.
27. Ibid., 18 October 1963. Singapore members for the Federal House of Representatives were selected from within the Singapore Assembly on the basis of proportional representation of the parties in that Assembly. Twelve P.A.P. members and three Barisan members were selected on this basis. See Leg. Ass. Debates, 22 October 1963, Cols. 57 and 58.
28. Straits Budget, 5 February 1964 and Straits Times, 8 February 1964.

dislike of the M.C.A. or to pretend that the P.A.P. had no interest in extending its presence across the Causeway.²⁹ But on the basis of a detailed statement made in the Singapore Assembly on 9 December 1963 during the debate on the Address in Reply, it did seem that the P.A.P.'s entry into the pan-Malaysian field would not come until after the Malayan elections. Lee said in the debate:

... Much will depend on what happens in the elections in Malaya next year. Everybody concedes that the U.M.N.O. side of the Alliance can and will win a clear majority. But everybody is waiting to see what happens in the urban areas and in all the main towns in Malaya, for arising out of that vote, some vital decisions will have to be made both by the U.M.N.O. leaders and by us in Singapore.

... if the towns decisively reject all M.C.A. candidates, then there must be a reappraisal by U.M.N.O. leaders. They will have to decide whether they can command the loyalty of the sophisticated urban population -- Chinese, Indians, Eurasians and others -- or govern without the partnership of the leadership of the towns.³⁰

The implication here was clear; if the M.C.A. failed in the urban areas, the P.A.P. would aim to fill that gap. But the implication also was that such a decision would come after the elections. In the new year, a statement by the Singapore Minister for Culture reinforced the views put forward by Lee by arguing that the P.A.P. had to start operating as a pan-Malaysian party.³¹ Again, however, this statement appeared more as an indication of future policy than as a notice that the P.A.P. would in fact seek seats in the elections during 1964.

The P.A.P.'s decision to enter the Malayan elections was announced by the Singapore Deputy Prime Minister, Toh Chin Chye, on 1 March 1964, when at the opening of a new newspaper in Singapore he departed from his prepared text and said that it had been decided that the party, which had played an important role in the establishment of Malaysia should now show itself to be a national party. But in doing so, Toh said, it had no intention of challenging the position of U.M.N.O.

It is our purpose to co-operate with U.M.N.O. and the Central Government.... We will therefore play a token part.³²

Speaking the following day, Toh made a statement which has significance

29. Times (London), 30 September 1963.

30. Leg. Ass. Debates, 9 December 1963, Cols. 141 and 142.

31. Straits Times, 18 January 1964 reporting a statement by Rajaratnam on 17 January. In his statement, the Singapore Minister for Culture stated that the P.A.P. should, by the way it conducted itself, convince the people of Malaysia that the Socialist philosophy of the People's Action Party could help to solve Malaysia's problems in a practical and peaceful way.

32. Straits Times, 2 March 1964.

in any assessment of the reasons behind the P.A.P.'s decision to enter the elections. The P.A.P., he stated, hoped to become "a force to be reckoned with" in Malaysia in five years.³³ This is the period, it may be noted, after which a new election for the Malaysian House of Representatives would have to be held. Viewed in the perspective of the previous three or four years' events, the P.A.P. decision to contest the elections appears almost more important than the results themselves. The P.A.P., when the elections were held, achieved a disappointing result for its supporters, as only one of the nine candidates for Federal seats was elected, and none of the candidates for seats in the state legislatures.³⁴ This result will have importance for the future politics of Malaysia, and the P.A.P.'s failure should not be minimized. But the fact that its leadership should have felt that the hour had arrived for the P.A.P.'s entry on to the Federal stage reflects interesting motivations, and possibly, too, the decision is important as a reflection of likely centrifugal forces acting within Malaysia. Two broad questions require explanation: what changed the apparent P.A.P. decision at the end of 1963 not to enter the Malayan political field until after the 1964 elections, and what role did the P.A.P. see itself as likely to play in this new sphere? While the P.A.P. leaders spoke frequently on the second of these questions in their campaign, no clear public statement emerged on the first point. It seems useful, then, to approach the first question through a review of the second.

In the manifesto issued by the P.A.P. on its election policy two aims were stressed. First, the P.A.P. argued that it had entered the elections to "assist in the building of a united democratic and socialist Malaysia, based on the principles of social justice and non-communalism." Second, it had acted to "insure that the Socialist Front

33. Ibid., 3 March 1964.

34. The P.A.P. entered eleven candidates for the Malayan elections, at the Federal level, and fifteen candidates for state seats. Since it did not wish to contest seats in which there was an U.M.N.O. candidate, it withdrew its candidates from two seats for the House of Representatives who would have stood against U.M.N.O. candidates in Johore. Thus while there were eleven P.A.P. candidates appearing on the ballot sheets, there were only nine effective candidates for the House of Representatives.

The election results appear in full in Straits Times, 27 April 1964. The ruling Alliance captured eighty-nine of the one hundred and four seats contested. In brief the election results were:

Federal Parliament Alliance 89 seats, Pan Malayan Islamic Party 9 seats, Socialist Front 2 seats, People's Progressive Party 2 seats, People's Action Party 1 seat, United Democratic Party 1 seat.

State Assemblies Alliance 241 seats, Pan Malayan Islamic Party 25 seats, Socialist Front 7 seats, People's Progressive Party 5 seats, United Democratic Party 4 seats.

did not benefit from substantial protest votes against the Malayan Chinese Association."³⁵ This was the tone maintained by the P.A.P. throughout the election campaign. The Malay leadership of U.M.N.O. was not attacked, but the M.C.A., despite quite frequent avowals to the contrary, was the clear target of the P.A.P.'s intentions.³⁶ As Lee and his lieutenants had indicated during 1963, the M.C.A. in their view no longer offered effective leadership to the urban dwellers of Malaya and the party's weakness therefore constituted a threat to Malaysia's security. The reasoning behind this allegation was that the urban population, through its disenchantment with the M.C.A., would give their votes to the Socialist Front, the "disloyal opposition." It was to stop this eventuality, the P.A.P. claimed, that it was offering candidates in the urban centers of Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Malacca, Seremban and Kluang.³⁷ But while much of the emphasis of the P.A.P. campaign was directed against the "effete and decadent M.C.A.", criticism of aspects of U.M.N.O. policy and an obvious distrust of the P.A.P.'s motives by many senior U.M.N.O. members placed the Singapore party in a clear "opposition" position in the election campaign. All of Lee Kuan Yew's earlier talk of cooperation was of little importance when the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, could say that it was not certain that the P.A.P. could be trusted, and the Secretary General of U.M.N.O. could accuse the P.A.P. of furthering communal tensions within Malaya.³⁸ Regardless of whether, before the election campaign, the U.M.N.O. leadership had been concerned about the vote-gathering capacity of the M.C.A., this issue became unimportant when the U.M.N.O. continued to stand by its Alliance partner in the election. With that support, the M.C.A. was able to stress the unity of the Alliance parties, and continually remind audiences at election rallies that an attack on it was an attack on the whole Alliance.³⁹ A significant indication of U.M.N.O. concern over the P.A.P.'s actions was the decision by Tengku Abdul Rahman that Lee Kuan Yew should not go to the United States and the United Nations to campaign on Malaysia's behalf,

35. Straits Times, 20 March 1964.

36. The P.A.P. comments on the M.C.A. during the election campaign verged on being contradictory. Thus Rajaratnam, in a statement reported in Straits Times on 16 March 1964 stated that it was never the P.A.P.'s intention to supplant the M.C.A., while two days later, in the same paper, he was reported as saying that the P.A.P. wished to show it could help the Central Government without "the M.C.A. millstone around our neck."

37. Straits Times, 23 March 1964 notes the areas which the P.A.P. was contesting.

38. Tun Razak said in part: "There is a new party. We don't know the sincerity of the party and its leaders. We doubt that sincerity, especially towards the Malays, their interests and their welfare." Straits Times, 24 March 1964.

Syed Ja'afar Albar, Secretary General of U.M.N.O. was reported in Straits Budget, 1 April 1964 as saying that the P.A.P. was encouraging communal feelings and in a statement reported in Straits Budget, 8 April 1964 he said that Lee Kuan Yew was anything but a friend to the Tengku.

39. This line of argument was apparent from the first in M.C.A. comment on the P.A.P. See, for instance, statements in Straits Times for 2 and 3 March 1964.

as he had done in Africa.⁴⁰ Perhaps even more noteworthy, as an indication of concern, was the decision by the Malayan Elections Commission, subsequently overruled, that Singapore citizens could not campaign in Malaya. This announcement was made on 18 March by Dato Haji Mustapha Albakri, the Chairman of the Commission, and it apparently followed a similar statement by the Malaysian Minister for Health, Inche Khir Johari.⁴¹ The decision was revoked the next day by the Attorney General, Inche Abdul Kadir bin Yusef. The fact that the decision was taken by the Chairman, following a statement by a Federal minister along the same lines, does suggest a feeling within the Alliance, and apparently within the U.M.N.O., that the P.A.P. needed to be contained by all available means. The sudden reversal of the ruling was termed the result of a decision that Singapore citizens, being also citizens of Malaysia, had the right to campaign.⁴² The "two-edged" nature of the original ruling is obvious. If the P.A.P. politicians who were Singapore citizens could not campaign in Malaya, an awkward precedent would be established for the mainland based parties whose leaders wished to campaign in Singapore in any future elections.

The P.A.P.'s campaign in the Malayan elections warrants a much more complete study than can be given in this essay. But some aspects of its efforts should be noted. Throughout the speeches of the P.A.P. leaders there was criticism of Indonesia. While no doubt essential in this particular campaign, the theme that Indonesia could not be trusted, especially not in any form of Maphilindo association was given considerable stress. Lee argued that "Confrontation" inevitably emerged from the course followed by Indonesian leaders since 1945.⁴³ On the domestic level, the M.C.A. was pictured as the representative of the "haves" and the P.A.P. as the champion of the "have-nots". These phrases recurred constantly in the speeches. But while the M.C.A. was criticized for its economic outlook, Lee Kuan Yew and his supporters also spoke of the neglect of the urban people of Malaya, in such a manner as to make clear their feeling that this neglect was a result of the U.M.N.O.'s inability to deal with urban problems. This clearly emerged in a speech Lee made on

40. The Tengku issued the following statement:

"In view of the fact that the P.A.P. is contesting the elections against the Alliance it would be inconsistent politically for the P.A.P. to represent the government abroad.

"I have asked Mr. Lee to postpone his trip until after the election.

"Meanwhile we have our agency in the United Nations whose effort to build our case in the U.N. is meeting with great success. Any interference at this time may harm our cause."

Lee replied that "On matters of national policy, like foreign affairs, I take the Tengku's instructions and follow his decision." Both statements are in Straits Times, 14 March 1964.

41. Straits Times, 19 March 1964. When questioned about the decision, the Election Commission Chairman could not indicate why Singapore citizens could not campaign.

42. Ibid., 20 March 1964. The P.A.P. was preparing to challenge the decision of the Commission in the courts when the ruling was reversed.

43. Straits Budget, 1 April 1964.

24 March 1964 in Penang:

A P.A.P. victory in Penang together with Kuala Lumpur, Seremban, Malacca and Johore means that the U.M.N.O. leaders must take stock of the new position and a change of policy in the urban areas is inevitable. The winds of change will start to blow.⁴⁴

It does not seem without interest that the P.A.P. chose its Minister for Culture, S. Rajaratnam, to direct the party's election campaign in Malaya. The P.A.P. cannot have ignored the past indications that the Indian community in Malaya has not taken a particularly active role in politics, as distinct from trade union activities. The fact that the one P.A.P. candidate to be elected, Devan Nair, was of Indian origin, also holds interest for the future.⁴⁵

The P.A.P.'s reasons for entering the elections are only partly revealed in their speeches during the campaign. That the P.A.P. wished to move towards replacing the M.C.A. in the urban centers cannot be doubted nor can its hope of gaining support from voters formerly attached to the Socialist Front or the People's Progressive Party. The Federal Government's decision to hold state elections at the same time as the Federal elections denied the P.A.P. any opportunity of testing opinion in Malaya between 1964 and 1965, and this too could have impelled a decision. But it is probably necessary to probe deeper. The P.A.P.'s decision seems linked with the complicated question of the future role to be played within Malaysia by the energetic, and certainly in Singapore terms, successful P.A.P. leadership. Lee Kuan Yew has indicated his interest in foreign affairs and it has been apparent that his views on some matters have been at variance with those pursued by the Federal leadership. The P.A.P.'s interest in the future of Malaysia is also linked with the hopes for continued opportunities for Singapore's economic development. The perspective gained through time may define the problem more clearly, but there does seem reason to consider that the P.A.P.'s decision was prompted by the desire to reinforce the influence which Singapore could exert at the center of the Federation, in such fields as international affairs and matters of economic concern. As a gamble, the P.A.P.'s decision was scarcely successful. But the stakes were such as to tempt a gambler for, as Lee himself pointed out, if the P.A.P. had won all nine of the seats which it contested it could have had more seats in the Federal Parliament than any other party, apart from the U.M.N.O.⁴⁶ While it was not opportune for the P.A.P. to state it as an aim, one may well ask whether the Singapore leadership did not hope in such a situation to achieve some form of coalition with the

44. Ibid.

45. Devan Nair was elected for the constituency of Bungsar, in suburban Kuala Lumpur. A further example of the P.A.P.'s aim of being a multi-racial party is shown in the fact that Nair is now able to address audiences in Mandarin. See Straits Times, 23 March 1964.

46. Straits Times, 23 March 1964. Lee's calculation was based on gaining nine seats in Malaya and combining them with the twelve his party already held from Singapore.

U.M.N.O., thus giving it a greater role in the determination of overall Malaysian policy.

By choosing to contest the April 1964 elections, Lee Kuan Yew must have recognized one major factor acting against the chances of his party's candidates. This was the Indonesian "Confrontation" policy to which so much reference was made by all parties. Since the Alliance leaders emphasized that the return of the Government was necessary to strengthen Malaysia's position in its dispute with Indonesia, discussion of economic policies became of secondary importance. Yet the P.A.P. appears to have hoped for at least partial success,⁴⁷ and in his reaction to the results Lee made no secret of his disappointment.⁴⁸ While he sent a sportsman-like telegram of congratulation to the Tengku,⁴⁹ he also indicated that the P.A.P.'s interest in the Malayan electorate was not diminished by the election results. At a press conference held after the results were announced Lee described them as the "best solution for this country at this stage." But he noted the problem faced by his party during the election campaign, when after the P.A.P. had recorded its support for the U.M.N.O. that party's leaders called for a vote indicating unity about the Alliance. He went on to say:

Every analysis I have made of the basic political situation in Malaysia remains undemolished.

The people have decided to back the Tengku and fight for Malaysia's survival.

All the other problems of economics and social change will come back to the fore later when Indonesian confrontation has been resolved or contained.

Between now and then we shall build up our organization and recruit able men in Malaya to help carry on the battle for a more just society.⁵⁰

In this task, Lee said, the P.A.P. would stay out of Sabah and Sarawak for the time being.⁵¹ This comment emphasizes the limited extent to which the Singapore Government has associated itself with the Borneo territories since the attainment of Malaysia. While there has been some discussion between Singapore representatives and interested groups from the Borneo territories aimed at increasing reciprocal trade, there has been no indication that the P.A.P. will attempt to match its Malayan activities by similar activities in Borneo. Quite apart from considerations of national security, which the P.A.P. has suggested must be taken into account in its present decision not to operate in Borneo, it is clear that Malaya offers a much better potential audience for future P.A.P. campaigns. Before Malaysia was formed Lee Kuan Yew was able to gain the cooperation of the Sabah and Sarawak leaders in furthering Singapore's policies. Without a significant increase in the P.A.P.'s parliamentary representation, it is a matter for speculation

47. See New York Times, 19 April 1964, Seth S. King reporting on the elections.

48. Straits Times, 27 April 1964.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

if Lee will again be able to gain Borneo support for pressures he wishes to exert at the Federal level.

The P.A.P.'s presence in Malaya and its intentions of continuing political activity on the mainland in the future cannot have aided in the re-establishment of mutual confidence between the Singapore and Malaysian leaders which Lee had spoken of as his party's chief aim when he was returned to power in September 1963. The Malayan elections have left the P.A.P. in a position of weakness at the Federal level, at least initially, from which it will require both skill and energy to emerge. If criticism of the Federal Alliance Government is to be pursued along economic policy lines by the P.A.P., there is obviously some risk of further endangering its rather tenuous relationship with the Alliance leadership. And this is not the only area of possible differences between the two groups. The implementation of the Common Market Agreement, a matter which has tended to be overshadowed by questions of international policy, could be a source of future disagreement. Singapore, perhaps amongst all the states of the Federation, most clearly combines political awareness with economic vulnerability. Any suggestion, moreover, that the economic consequences of "Confrontation" operating on a long-term basis are the concern of Singapore alone could throw antagonism between Singapore and Malaysian leadership into clear relief.

But these are matters for the future, and the P.A.P.'s lack of success in the Malayan elections should not obscure the very great success which that party achieved in Singapore. The years from 1961 to 1964 were ones in which there was a change from discussion of merger as an uncertain hope to its pursuit as an attainable goal. This change occurred when the aim of merger became associated with that of Malaysia, a fact which stresses how clearly that concept, with its measures to provide a counterbalance to Singapore, was linked with the resolution of the merger impasse. The influence of Singapore's political leaders in resolving that impasse was considerable and has been admitted in fairly explicit terms by Tengku Abdul Rahman. Whether Singapore played a part in suggesting the inclusion of the Borneo territories as a counterbalance must be begged in this survey through lack of evidence. By any assessment the successful merger of Singapore with Malaya was a personal triumph for Lee Kuan Yew, who presented his case to the Federation Prime Minister and then fought a battle of attrition with his opponents at home, never publicly admitting the possibility of defeat. In its negotiations with the Federal Government the Singapore leadership showed a firm grasp of the essential aims which it pursued; an ability to present its case convincingly; and a readiness to stand by its position even if this brought deadlock for a time. This was most pronounced over financial and economic matters where it knew its goals, and since it believed they were negotiable pursued them in the face of mounting Malayan criticism.

The Singapore Government's firmness in its negotiating was the more remarkable considering its internal position. Western press commentary on the Lee Kuan Yew Government has mellowed since it took office, so that there has been less publicity given to its methods of

government and less criticism of them. Over the period which has been described in this paper, the P.A.P. did not hesitate to make full use of the powers at its disposal to meet what it claimed were the attacks on its policies, motivated by Communist conspiracy. While we may point to the lack of trials which could test the guilt of those who were detained, and criticize the "undemocratic" way in which the P.A.P. used radio and television, cognizance must be given to the P.A.P.'s claim of connection between the policies of the Barisan Socialis and the ends desired by the Communists. In presenting its policies to the electorate the P.A.P. had many advantages. At the same time it could claim and show that its policy on merger with Malaya was a consistent one and, equally important in politics, a practical one too.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MATERIAL CONSULTED

The material noted in this bibliography consists of sources which have proven useful either for their direct bearing on the problem being considered, or for the background information which they contain. Material of marginal interest is excluded. Because of the recent nature of the period under review, very heavy reliance is placed upon newspaper sources, in particular the Singapore Straits Times. This has been consulted on a daily basis for the period 1959-1964. Secondary material in the form of journal articles, while sometimes enlightening, is principally valuable as a framework for more detailed study. The most significant gap in the material consulted is the absence of any detailed exposition of the Barisan Socialist's point of view. Reliance has had to be placed on newspaper reports and Legislative Assembly Debates for examples of Barisan Socialist's thinking.

1. Official Publications - Documents, Papers and Reports published by the Governments of Malaya, Singapore and the United Kingdom

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Great Britain and Ireland Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons (London).

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The Merger Plan (Singapore, 1961)

This pamphlet contains the text of the Heads of Agreement concluded between the Governments of Singapore and Malaya in November 1961 and contained in Singapore Command Paper 33 of 1961.

Papers on Financial Arrangements submitted by the Federation of Malaya and Singapore for consideration by the Inter-Governmental Committee and Related Documents (Singapore, n.d.) published by the Singapore Government Printer.

Parliamentary Debates: Dewan Ra'ayat (House of Representatives Malaya) Official Report (Kuala Lumpur).

Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak (The Cobbold Report) (London, 1962).

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Singapore Guide and Street Directory (Singapore, 1963)
The Singapore Guide contains a map of the Singapore Electoral Boundaries.

Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates - Official Reports. (Singapore)

2. Semi Official Publications

Malaysia in Brief (Kuala Lumpur, 1963) published by the Department of Information, Malaysia.

Towards Socialism (Singapore, 1962?) published by the Singapore Ministry of Culture in six volumes.

- Vol. 1. The Socialist Solution - speeches by Lee Kuan Yew.
- Vol. 2. Malayan Culture in the Making - address by S. Rajaratnam.
- Vol. 3. This is how your money is spent - speech by Goh Keng Swee.
- Vol. 4. The People's Plan.
- Vol. 5. The Battle for Merger - addresses by Lee Kuan Yew.
- Vol. 6. A Year of Decision - address by the Yang di Pertuan Negara of Singapore.

These six pamphlets were intended to reflect the essentials of the P.A.P. Government's policies on both internal and external matters. Of particular interest is volume 5 which contains the text of Lee Kuan Yew's radio addresses made between 13 September 1961 and 9 October 1961. In these addresses Lee urged the acceptance of merger with Malaya and traced the development of the P.A.P. and, in particular, the split which developed within it in 1961. Lee's approach was an extremely frank one in these broadcasts, and he did not hesitate to brand his opponents as Communists. The content is controversial but extremely important.

The Tasks Ahead: The P.A.P.'s Five Year Plan, Parts 1 and 2 (Singapore, n.d.).

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A/AC.109/Add.	1	-	18 July 1962.
A/AC.109/Add.	2	-	26 July 1962.
A/AC.109/Pet.	18	-	18 July 1962.
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Sarawak Tribune (Kuching).

Sunday Times (London).

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(b) Press Summaries:

Sarawak By the Week (Kuching).

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APPENDIX A

Educational Background of the P.A.P. Leadership

The following information on the educational background of the 1959-1963 P.A.P. Cabinet Ministers is extracted from Who's Who in Malaysia edited by J. Victor Morais. (Kuala Lumpur, 1963), and The Asia Who's Who, Third Edition published by Pan-Asia Newspaper Alliance (Hong Kong, 1960).

Lee Kuan Yew - Secondary education in English. Attended Raffles College (later became University of Malaya in Singapore) and the University of Cambridge. Profession - Lawyer. Cabinet Post - Prime Minister.

Toh Chin Chye - No details of secondary education. Attended Raffles College and took a Ph.D. from the University of London. Profession - University Lecturer. Cabinet Post - Deputy Prime Minister.

Goh Keng Swee - Secondary education in English. Attended Raffles College and took a Ph.D. from the University of London. Profession - Civil Servant. Cabinet Post - Minister of Finance.

S. Rajaratnam - No details of secondary education. Profession - Journalist. Cabinet Post - Minister of Culture.

Ong Pang Boon - Secondary education in both English and Chinese. Attended University of Malaya in Singapore. Profession - Politician. Cabinet Post - Minister for Home Affairs.

Yong Nyuk Lin - Secondary education in both English and Chinese. Attended Raffles College. Profession - Business, manager of an insurance firm. Cabinet Post - Minister for Education.

Tan Kia Gan - Education in both English and Chinese schools. Profession - aircraft engineer and trade unionist.

K. M. Byrne - Secondary education in English. Attended Raffles College and Oxford University. Profession - Lawyer. Cabinet Post - Minister for Law and Labour.

APPENDIX B

Party Strengths in the Singapore Legislative Assembly 1955-1963

1955 Election

Labour Front	10 seats
Progressives	4 seats
Democrats	2 seats
P.A.P.	3 seats*
Alliance	3 seats
Independents	2 seats

*the P.A.P. contested four seats and won three.

1959 Election

P.A.P.	43 seats
Singapore People's Alliance*	4 seats
U.M.N.O.	3 seats
Independent	1 seat

* formed largely from previous Labour Front.

1960 Defections from P.A.P.

Ong Eng Guan defected from the P.A.P. and took two other former P.A.P. members with him to form the United People's Party, thus reducing the Government majority to twenty-nine. (40 seats in a 51 seat Assembly).

1961 Defections from the P.A.P. and the Anson By-Election

David Marshall won the Anson By-election in July 1961 reducing the Government majority by one and the defection of thirteen P.A.P. members to the Barisan Socialis reduced the Government majority to two (26 seats in a 51 seat Assembly).

1962 Defection by Mrs. Hoe

Mrs. Hoe Puay Choo resigned from the P.A.P. in July 1962 and subsequently joined the Barisan Socialis. Thus from July 1962 the P.A.P., while the strongest party in the Legislative Assembly, did not have a clear majority over all parties. (25 seats in a 51 seat Assembly).

1963 Election

P.A.P.	37 seats
Barisan Socialis	13 seats
U.P.P.	1 seat

APPENDIX C

Singapore Election Results of 21 September 1963

Based on material published in Sunday Times (Singapore) 22 September 1963 and State of Singapore Government Gazette Extraordinary, Vol. V, No. 104, 24 September 1963.

In addition to listing the election results in this Appendix, an attempt has been made to classify the electorates as either "urban" or "rural". This has been done because of the importance which has been attributed to such a division in Singapore assessments of the September 1963 election results. In seeking to make such a classification, I have relied on the references made in comments by Singapore politicians and also on information kindly supplied by Mr. Edwin Lee, a fellow Graduate Student and Singapore Citizen. As a very loose generalization the "rural" electorates are ones which contain some areas of Chinese market gardening. As indicated in the text of the paper and based on the information contained in Preliminary Releases from the 1957 Singapore Census, the term "rural" electorate most aptly applies to those electorates falling within the former administrative unit of Jurong. A map of the Administrative areas used during the 1957 Singapore Census is at the front of this paper and a map indicating the Singapore Election Constituencies in 1963, and shaded to show the results of the September 1963 elections, appears on page 37. Some relevant material from the Preliminary Releases of the 1957 Singapore Census appears at the end of this Appendix.

Aljunied (16,152)

Suppiah Visva Lingam (P.A.P.)	7,745	Result 1959
Thio Kheng Lock (Barisan)	4,624	V. Lingam
Lim Koon Teck (Alliance)	1,681	(P.A.P.)
Woo Kong Seng (U.P.P.)	<u>1,165</u>	Maj. 697
Total votes cast	15,215	
Rejected votes	132	
Percentage voting	95.0	
Majority	3,121	"rural"

Anson (9,192)

Perumal Govindasamy (P.A.P.)	3,957	Result 1961
Chan Chong Ken (alias Tan Chong Kim) (Barisan)	3,123	Anson By-
A. K. Isaac (Alliance)	543	Election
D. S. Marshall (Ind.)	416	D. Marshall
V. Lingam (U.P.P.)	306	(W.P.)
Chiang Seok Kiong (W.P.)	<u>91</u>	Maj. 546
Total votes cast	8,436	
Rejected votes	70	
Percentage voting	92.5	
Majority	834	"urban"

Bras Basah (10,678)

Ho See Beng (P.A.P.)	4,926	Result 1959
Leon Kwan Fai (Barisan)	3,831	Mme Hoe Puay
Pang Cheng Luan (U.P.P.)	335	Choo (then
Wong Chiu Sen (alias Wong Chiu Tim) (Alliance)	304	P.A.P. now
Chua Chin Kiat (W.P.)	<u>114</u>	Barisan)
Total votes cast	9,510	Maj. 4,021
Rejected votes	91	
Percentage voting	89.8	
Majority	1,095	"urban"

Bukit Merah (12,225)

Lim Huan Boon (Barisan)	4,963	Result 1959
S. Ramaswamy (P.A.P.)	4,520	S. Ramaswamy
Tung Tao Chang (All.)	740	(P.A.P.)
Poon Weng Ying (U.P.P.)	1,129	Maj. 2,896
Ngoh Eng Kok (Ind.)	<u>732</u>	
Total votes	11,584	
Rejected votes	110	
Percentage voting	95.7	
Majority	443	"rural"

Bukit Panjang (12,997)

Lee Khoon Choy (P.A.P.)	4,940	Result 1959
Ong Liang Teng (Barisan)	5,679	Lee Khoon Choy
Loo Bah Chit (All.)	999	(P.A.P.)
Thuan Paik Phok (U.P.P.)	<u>607</u>	Maj. 3,658
Total votes	12,225	
Rejected votes	132	
Percentage voting	95.0	
Majority	739	"rural"

Bukit Timah (12,502)

Lee Tee Tong (Barisan)	6,173	Result 1959
Chor Yeok Eng. (P.A.P.)	4,982	Yaacob bin Mohd.
Ong Tiong Kuan. (U.P.P.)	<u>628</u>	(P.A.P.)
Total votes	11,783	Maj. 3,714
Rejected votes	152	
Percentage voting	95.4	
Majority	1,191	"rural"

Cairnhill (12,340)

Lim Kim San (P.A.P.)	7,749	Result 1959
Lim Ang Chuan (Barisan)	2,443	Lim Yen Hock
Lee Ah Siong (All.)	<u>1,467</u>	(S.P.A.)
Total votes	11,659	Maj. 2,355
Rejected votes	92	
Percentage voting	95.2	
Majority	5,306	"urban"

Changi (11,866)

Sim Boon Woo (P.A.P.)	4,808	Result 1959 Teo Hock Guan (P.A.P.) Maj. 662
Siek Shing Min (Barisan)	3,425	
Syed Esa Almenoar (Alliance)	1,975	
Abdullah bin Masood (U.P.P.)	935	
M. N. Yahya (Ind.)	<u>95</u>	
Total votes	11,238	
Rejected votes	105	
Percentage voting	95.5	
Majority	1,383	"rural"

Chua Chu Kang (8,198)

Chio Cheng Thun (Barisan)	3,753	Result 1959 Ong Chang Sam (then P.A.P., now Barisan) Maj. 1,973
Lim Kim Hian (P.A.P.)	2,429	
Sim Chit Giak (U.P.P.)	800	
Neo Guan Choo (Alliance)	396	
Goh Tong Liang (Ind.)	<u>345</u>	
Total votes	7,723	
Rejected votes	76	
Percentage voting	95.1	
Majority	1,324	"rural"

Crawford (10,949)

S. T. Bani (Barisan)	4,400	Result 1959 K. M. Byrne (P.A.P.) Maj. 4,633
K. M. Byrne (P.A.P.)	4,207	
Robert Hsieh (Alliance)	571	
Lan Tok Keong (U.P.P.)	1,032	
Wong Hong Toy (W.P.)	<u>81</u>	
Total votes	10,291	
Rejected votes	110	
Percentage voting	95.0	
Majority	193	"urban"

Delta (14,037)

Mme. Chan Choy Siong (P.A.P.)	5,417	Result 1959
Wee Toon Lip (Barisan)	5,354	Mme. Chan Choy
Cheng Chia Kuang (U.P.P.)	2,233	Siong (P.A.P.)
Wong Kiu Yu (Ind.)	<u>359</u>	Maj. 6,993
Total votes	13,363	
Rejected votes	112	
Percentage voting	95.9	
Majority	63	"urban"

Farrer Park (10,189)

S. R. Dhamarajoo (P.A.P.)	5,365	Result 1959
Lee Chin Siang (Barisan)	2,619	A. P. Rajah
A. P. Rajah (Alliance)	1,232	(Ind.)
Mme. Wee Kia Eng (U.P.P.)	<u>414</u>	Maj. 245
Total votes	9,630	
Rejected votes	74	
Percentage voting	95.2	
Majority	2,746	"urban"

Geylang East (16,014)

Ho Cheng Choon (P.A.P.)	7,165	Result 1959
Phua Soon Lian (Barisan)	5,389	Mohd. Ismail bin
Ng Cheng Chwee (Alliance)	1,467	Abdul
Tan Peng Sea (U.P.P.)	<u>1,134</u>	Rahman (P.A.P.)
Total votes	15,155	Maj. 1,378
Rejected votes	147	
Percentage voting	95.5	
Majority	1,776	"urban" (near Changi base)

Geylang Serai (15,302)

Rahmat bin Kenap (P.A.P.)	6,722	Result 1959 Abdul Hamid bin Haji Jumat (U.M.N.O.) Maj. 4,108
Ahmad bin Haji Taff (Alliance)	5,019	
Mohamed Taha Suhaimi (P.M.I.P.)	1,201	
Darus Shariff (Ind.)	<u>1,059</u>	
Total votes	14,001	
Rejected votes	423	
Percentage voting	94.2	
Majority	1,703	"urban"

Geylang West (15,386)

Yong Nyuk Lin (P.A.P.)	6,288	Result 1959 Yong Nyuk Lin (P.A.P.) Maj. 4,647
Un Hon Kun (Barisan)	5,670	
Mohamed bin Haji Ya'acob (Alliance)	914	
Kum Teng Hock (U.P.P.)	<u>1,541</u>	
Total votes	14,413	
Rejected votes	162	
Percentage voting	94.7	
Majority	618	"urban"

Havelock (15,159)

Miss Low Mian Gong (Barisan)	6,304	Result 1959 Peter Lau (P.A.P.) then, now Barisan) Maj. 5,685
Wong Chum Choi (P.A.P.)	4,157	
Ng Chee Sen (U.P.P.)	3,209	
Lim Ser Puan (Alliance)	<u>641</u>	
Total votes	14,311	
Rejected votes	176	
Percentage voting	95.5	
Majority	2,147	"urban"

Hong Lim (12,003)

Ong Eng Guan (U.P.P.)	5,066	Result 1959
Seah Mui Kok (P.A.P.)	3,789	Ong Eng Guan (P.A.P.)
Lim Chien Sen (Barisan)	2,344	Maj. 7,642
Sim Tai Guan (Alliance)	<u>191</u>	By-Election April
Total votes	11,390	1961
Rejected votes	73	Ong Eng Guan (Ind.)
Percentage voting	95.5	Maj. 4,927
Majority	1,277	"urban"

Jalan Besar (13,764)

Chan Chee Seng (P.A.P.)	6,686	Result 1959
Ng Ngeong Yew (Barisan)	5,172	Chan Chee Seng
Yong Wong Kit (U.P.P.)	<u>1,033</u>	(P.A.P.)
Total votes	12,891	Maj. 5,027
Rejected votes	201	
Percentage voting	95.1	
Majority	1,514	"urban"

Jalan Kayu (9,164)

Tan Cheng Tong (Barisan)	3,312	Result 1959
Teo Hup Teck (P.A.P.)	2,676	Tan Cheng Tong
M.P.D. Nair (Alliance)	1,057	(then P.A.P. -
Lui Boon Phor (U.P.P.)	1,146	now Barisan)
Ong Yu Thoh (Ind.)	<u>516</u>	Maj. 1,908
Total votes	8,707	
Rejected votes	61	
Percentage voting	95.6	
Majority	636	"urban"

Joo Chiat (14,966)

Dr. Fong Kim Heng (P.A.P.)	9,300	Result 1959
Leong Keng Seng (Barisan)	3,737	C. H. Koh (S.P.A.)
Mrs. Seow Peck Leng (Alliance)	<u>1,078</u>	Maj. 835
Total votes	14,115	
Rejected votes	99	
Percentage voting	94.9	
Majority	5,563	"urban"

Jurong (7,611)

Ong Shee Chua (alias Chia Thye Poh) (Barisan)	3,973	Result 1959
Ong Sou Chuan (P.A.P.)	2,268	Chor Yeok Eng
Soh U Loh (U.P.P.)	501	(P.A.P.)
Wong Tuck Leong (Alliance)	<u>371</u>	Maj. 3,177
Total votes	7,113	
Rejected votes	96	
Percentage voting	94.7	
Majority	1,705	"rural"

Kallang (16,974)

Buang Omar Junid (P.A.P.)	8,479	Result 1959
Philemon Oojitham (Barisan)	5,215	Buang Omar Junid
Mohd. Shariff bin Dollah (U.P.P.)	1,166	(P.A.P.)
Tan Hock Lim (Alliance)	969	Maj. 723
Tan Hai Tong (Ind.)	<u>411</u>	
Total votes	16,240	
Rejected votes	151	
Percentage voting	96.5	
Majority	3,264	"urban"

Kampong Glam (10,186)

S. Rajaratnam (P.A.P.)	4,313	Result 1959 Rajaratnam (P.A.P.) Maj. 4,577
Tan Jing Quec (Barisan)	4,093	
Harbans Singh (U.P.P.)	<u>1,224</u>	
Total votes	9,630	
Rejected votes	108	
Percentage voting	95.6	
Majority	220	"urban"

Kampong Kapor (11,672)

Mahmood bin Awang (P.A.P.)	4,554	Result 1959 G. Kandasamy (P.A.P.) Maj. 2,427
Lim Hock Thiam (Barisan)	4,155	
Chia Ban Wei (Alliance)	1,006	
Nalliah Karupiah (U.P.P.)	<u>1,143</u>	
Total votes	10,858	
Rejected votes	106	
Percentage voting	93.9	
Majority	399	"urban"

Kampong Kembangan (15,787)

Mohd. Areff bin Suradi (P.A.P.)	7,127	Result 1959 Mohd. Ali bin Alwi (U.M.N.O.) Maj. 244
Saleha bt. Mohamed Shah (P. Ra'ayat)	2,674	
Mohamed Ali bin Alwi (Alliance)	3,692	
Ibrahim bin Ja afar (U.P.P.)	914	
Dr. Mohamed Dali (P.M.I.P.)	<u>344</u>	
Total votes	14,751	
Rejected votes	163	
Percentage voting	94.4	
Majority	3,435	"rural"

Kreta Ayer (13,103)

Dr. Goh . Meng Swee (P.A.P.)	8,059	Result 1959 Dr. Goh (P.A.P.) Maj. 5,929
Peter Lau Por Tuck (Barisan)	3,646	
Loke Wan (U.P.P.)	<u>604</u>	
Total votes	12,309	
Rejected votes	166	
Percentage voting	95.2	
Majority	4,413	"urban"

Moulmein (10,670)

Madame Avada Dhanam Mrs. Devan Nair (P.A.P.)	5,856	Result 1959 Lin You Eng (then P.A.P., now Barisan) Maj. 369
Tam Wee Tiong (Barisan)	3,051	
Neo Hay Chan (U.P.P.)	575	
Koh Chiat Lim (Alliance)	542	
Soo Tho Siu Hee	<u>73</u>	
Total votes	10,097	
Rejected votes	79	
Percentage voting	95.3	
Majority	2,805	"urban"

Mountbatten (16,843)

Ng Yaon Chong (P.A.P.)	7,751	Result 1959 Mrs. Seon Peck Leng (S.P.A.) Maj. 888
Miss Fung Ying Chin (Barisan)	5,158	
Lee Kim Chuan (Alliance)	1,865	
Mrs. Felice Leon-Soh (Ind.)	<u>1,053</u>	
Total votes	15,827	
Rejected votes	142	
Percentage voting	94.8	
Majority	2,593	"urban"

Nee Soon (10,064)

Chan Sun Wing (Barisan)	4,914	Result 1959 Dr. Sheng Nam Chin (then P.A.P., now Barisan) Maj. 4,146
How Kang Yong (P.A.P.)	3,329	
Yeo Teo Bok (Alliance)	364	
Ngo Suk Hwa (Goh So Ming) (U.P.P.)	864	
Lim Siak Guan (Ind.)	<u>103</u>	
Total votes	9,574	
Rejected votes	97	
Percentage voting	96.0	
Majority	1,585	"rural"

Pasir Panjang (6,721)

Othman Wok (P.A.P.)	2,879	Result 1959 Tee Kim Leng (then P.A.P., now Barisan) Maj. 239
Tay Cheng Kang (Barisan)	1,887	
Ahmad bin Rahmat (Alliance)	1,351	
Yong Ah Kau (U.P.P.)	<u>238</u>	
Total votes	6,355	
Rejected votes	54	
Percentage voting	95.3	
Majority	992	"urban"

Paya Lebar (13,544)

Kow Kee Seng (Barisan)	6,152	Result 1959 Tan Kia Gan (P.A.P.) Maj. 2,322
Tan Kia Gan (P.A.P.)	5,402	
Goh Yeow Dek (Alliance)	415	
Yeo Keng Wee (U.P.P.)	<u>858</u>	
Total votes	12,827	
Rejected votes	119	
Percentage voting	95.0	
Majority	750	"rural"

Ponggol (10,294)

Ng Kah Ting (P.A.P.)	4,721	Result 1959 Ng Teng Kiang (P.A.P.) Maj. 417
Ko Chit Kiang (Barisan)	2,860	
Tan Jin Hong (Alliance)	1,320	
Joseph Lee Jiak Seck (U.P.P.)	<u>984</u>	
Total votes	9,885	
Rejected votes	59	
Percentage voting	96.5	
Majority	1,861	"rural"

Queenstown (16,123)

Jek Yuen Thong (P.A.P.)	8,165	Result 1959 Dr. Lee Siew Choh (then P.A.P. now Barisan) Maj. 1,569
Lee Ek Chong (Barisan)	5,589	
Lee Kee Loong (Alliance)	798	
Ng Ho (U.P.P.)	<u>909</u>	
Total votes	15,461	
Rejected votes	127	
Percentage voting	96.6	
Majority	2,576	"urban"

River Valley (10,532)

Lim Cheng Lock (P.A.P.)	5,597	Result 1959 Lim Cheng Lock (P.A.P.) Maj. 5
Goh Lam San (Barisan)	2,668	
Yap Pheng Geck (Alliance)	1,156	
Chung Kit Wong (U.P.P.)	<u>455</u>	
Total votes	9,876	
Rejected votes	104	
Percentage voting	94.7	
Majority	2,929	"urban"

Rochore (11,698)

Dr. Toh Chin Chye (P.A.P.)	5,015	Result 1959 Dr. Toh Chin Chye (P.A.P.) Maj. 5,283
Dr. Lee Siew Choh (Barisan)	4,926	
Pan Tiek Tai (U.P.P.)	<u>1,067</u>	
Total votes	11,008	
Rejected votes	109	
Percentage voting	95.0	
Majority	89	"urban"

Sembawang (9,329)

Tiong Eng Siong (P.A.P.)	3,745	Result 1959 Ahmad bin Ibrahim (P.A.P.) Maj. 2,750
Mme. Chen Poh Chang (Barisan)	3,591	
Pakri Apavoo (Alliance)	1,197	
Low Seng Wan (U.P.P.)	<u>348</u>	
Total votes	8,881	
Rejected votes	49	
Percentage voting	95.7	
Majority	154	"rural" (Naval dockyard workers)

Sepoy Lines (10,046)

Wee Toon Boon (P.A.P.)	4,907	Result 1959 Wee Toon Boon (P.A.P.) Maj. 1,532
Ong Chang Sam (Barisan)	3,147	
Goh Su Chiang (Alliance)	793	
Tan Choon Sing (U.P.P.)	<u>545</u>	
Total votes	9,392	
Rejected votes	81	
Percentage voting	94.2	
Majority	1,760	"urban"

Serangoon Gardens (8,765)

Raphael Alfred Gonzales (P.A.P.)	4,456	Result 1959 Leong Keng Seng (then P.A.P., now Barisan) Maj. 1,079
Ng Hui Sim (Barisan)	2,698	
Ng Teo Joo (U.P.P.)	736	
Choy Koh Wah (Alliance)	<u>455</u>	
Total votes	8,345	
Rejected votes	71	
Percentage voting	96.0	
Majority	1,758	"rural"

Siglap (15,915)

Rahim Ishak (P.A.P.)	9,342	Result 1959 Che Sahorah bint Ahmad (P.A.P.) Maj. 999
Tay Chek Yaw (Party Ra'ayat)	2,618	
Soo Ban Hoe (Alliance)	1,488	
Ong Jin Teck (U.P.P.)	1,365	
Koh Tee Kin (Ind.)	<u>225</u>	
Total votes	15,038	
Rejected votes	90	
Percentage voting	95.0	
Majority	6,724	"rural"

Southern Islands (5,236)

Ya'acob bin Mohamed (P.A.P.)	2,764	Result 1959 Ahmad Jabri bin Md Akib (U.M.N.O.) Maj. 1,373
Ahmad Jabri bin Mohammad Akib (All.)	<u>2,224</u>	
Total votes	4,988	
Rejected votes	60	
Percentage voting	96.4	
Majority	540	"rural"

Stamford (11,628)

Andrew Fong Sip Chee (P.A.P.)	5,781	Result 1959 Mme. Fung Yin Ching (then P.A.P., now Barisan) Maj. 1,562
Teo Hock Guan (Barisan)	3,719	
Lim Chung Min (U.P.P.)	771	
Lal Behari Singh (Alliance)	<u>582</u>	
Total votes	10,853	
Rejected votes	99	
Percentage voting	94.1	
Majority	2,062	"urban"

Tampines (13,137)

Poh Ber Liak (Barisan)	5,976	Result 1959 Goh Chen Chua (P.A.P.) Maj. 5,420
Goh Chew Chua (P.A.P.)	3,601	
Liam Tian Seng (U.P.P.)	2,130	
Lim Jew Kan (Alliance)	<u>656</u>	
Total votes	12,363	
Rejected votes	123	
Percentage voting	95.0	
Majority	2,375	"rural"

Tanglin (9,239)

Edmund William Barker (P.A.P.)	4,424	Result 1959 Thio Chan Bee (S.P.A.) Maj. 395
Tan Cheow Hock (Barisan)	1,997	
Thio Chan Bee (Alliance)	1,738	
Mme. Eng Chau Sam (U.P.P.)	336	
Ariffin bin Mohd Said (Ind.)	<u>166</u>	
Total votes	8,661	
Rejected votes	70	
Percentage voting	94.5	
Majority	2,427	"urban"

Tanjong Pagar (11,395)

Lee Kuan Yew (P.A.P.)	6,317	Result 1959
Ong Hock Siang (Barisan)	3,537	Lee Kuan Yew
Chng Boon Eng (Alliance)	393	(P.A.P.)
Lim Peng Kang (U.P.P.)	473	Maj. 4,512
	<hr/>	
Total votes	10,720	
Rejected votes	121	
Percentage voting	95.1	
Majority	2,780	"urban"

Telok Ayer (13,219)

Ong Pang Boon (P.A.P.)	5,390	Result 1959
Lam Chit Lee (Barisan)	4,987	Ong Pang Boon
Goh Hong Keng (U.P.P.)	1,484	(P.A.P.)
Wang Chung Kwang (Ind.)	385	Maj. 6,266
	<hr/>	
Total votes	12,246	
Rejected votes	152	
Percentage voting	93.7	
Majority	403	"urban" (dockworkers)

Telok Blangah (13,263)

Bernard Rodrigues (P.A.P.)	4,949	Result 1959
Jukri bin Parjo (Barisan)	4,327	John Mammen (P.A.P.)
Abdul Rahman (Alliance)	2,627	Maj. 1,662
Tan Swee Huat (U.P.P.)	525	
	<hr/>	
Total votes	12,428	
Rejected votes	123	
Percentage voting	94.6	
Majority	622	"urban" (dockworkers)

Thompson (11,336)

Koo Young (Barisan)	5,292	Result 1959 S.T. Bani (then P.A.P., now Barisan) Maj. 2,397
Leo Keng Fong (P.A.P.)	4,248	
Loo Kha Thiam (U.P.P.)	<u>1,223</u>	
Total votes	10,763	
Rejected votes	119	
Percentage voting	95.9	
Majority	1,044	"rural"

Tiong Bahru (12,534)

Lee Teck Him (P.A.P.)	5,731	Result 1959 Lee Teck Him (P.A.P.) Maj. 2,993
Soon Dit Woo (Barisan)	3,798	
Ng Teng Kian (U.P.P.)	1,088	
William Tan Ah Lek (Ind.)	777	
Tan Kok Siong (Alliance)	<u>508</u>	
Total votes	11,902	
Rejected votes	84	
Percentage voting	95.6	
Majority	1,933	"rural"

Toa Payoh (13,394)

Wong Soon Fong (Barisan)	6,083	Result 1959 Wong Soon Fong (then P.A.P., now Barisan) Maj. 6,193
Yip Sai Weng (P.A.P.)	4,276	
Goh Nee Kim (U.P.P.)	1,501	
Tan Chor Yong (U.D.P.)	<u>760</u>	
Total votes	12,620	
Rejected votes	152	
Percentage voting	95.3	
Majority	1,807	"rural"

Ulu Pandan (11,866)

Chow Chiok Hock (P.A.P.)	5,000	Result 1959
Johari bin Sonto (Party Ra'ayat)	2,967	Inche Mohd. bin
Anang bin H.A. Manan (Alliance)	1,729	Suradi (P.A.P.)
Ler Chin Tee (U.P.P.)	<u>1,450</u>	Maj. 1,320
Total votes	11,146	
Rejected votes	126	
Percentage voting	94.9	
Majority	2,033	"rural"

Upper Serangoon (12,433)

Sia Kah Hui (P.A.P.)	6,650	Result 1959
Chia Yang Loong (Barisan)	3,547	Chan Sun Wing
Phua Gek Boon (U.P.P.)	595	(then P.A.P.,
Wu Moh Chye (Alliance)	393	now Barisan)
Lim Choon Mong (Ind.)	<u>573</u>	Maj. 125
Total votes	11,758	
Rejected votes	95	
Percentage voting	95.3	
Majority	3,103	"urban"

Population Distribution Per Square Mile

by Administrative Areas - 1957

The figures are based on Preliminary Releases by the Singapore Census authorities contained in M. K. Sen, The Geographical Distribution of Population in Singapore - 1947 to 1957.

Area	%	Density of Persons per Square Mile
SINGAPORE	100	6,441
CITY	63.1	24,264
JURONG	3.5	849
KATANG	13.7	4,918
BUKIT PAJANG	4.3	1,728
SERANGOON	14.4	4,398
SOUTHERN ISLANDS	1.0	4,085

Percentage Racial Distribution of Population
by Administrative Areas - 1957

The percentages are based on Preliminary Releases by the Singapore Census authorities contained in M. K. Sen, The Geographical Distribution of Population in Singapore - 1947 to 1957.

Administrative Area	Chinese	Malaysians*	Indians	Other
CITY	77.9	11.0	9.1	2.0
JURONG	82.7	14.2	2.8	0.3
KATONG	62.1	27.5	7.5	2.9
SERANGOON	79.3	8.1	10.9	1.7
BUKIT PANJANG	76.0	12.9	10.1	1.0
SOUTHERN ISLANDS	25.4	69.2	4.0	1.4

* The term is used here because of the difficulty, for census purposes, of distinguishing between Malays from Singapore and Malaya and those of Malay race who have come to Singapore from one of the nearby Indonesian islands.

Percentage Population Distribution by Administrative Area
and Occupation - 1957

Occupational Group	Singapore	City	Jurong	Bukit Panjang	Serangoon	Katong	Southern Islands
AGRICULTURE	7.9	2.1	59.7	20.5	12.2	13.5	13.2
CLERICAL	10.4	10.7	1.3	5.5	10.3	14.1	4.5
COMMERCIAL	18.3	20.3	7.7	12.0	15.3	17.1	4.7
PRODUCTION	31.3	33.2	15.2	40.0	31.4	22.3	36.5
SERVICES	23.9	24.9	12.3	16.4	24.0	23.6	29.8
TRANSPORT	8.3	8.8	3.8	5.6	6.8	9.3	11.3

The percentages are based on Preliminary Releases by the Singapore Census authorities contained in M. K. Sen, The Geographical Distribution of Population in Singapore - 1947 to 1957.

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- Number 31 A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND SELECTED INDONESIAN WRITINGS ON GOVERNMENT IN THE CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY, by Daniel S. Lev. 1958. 58 pages. \$2.00.
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BANDUNG IN THE EARLY REVOLUTION, 1945-1946: A SURVEY IN THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION, by John R. W. Smail. July 1964. Approx. ~~100~~₁₆₈ pages. ~~\$2.50~~_{3.50}

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ASPECTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A SUMBAWAN VILLAGE (EASTERN INDONESIA), by Peter R. Goethals. 1961. 156 pages. \$3.00.

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THE NATIONAL STATUS OF THE CHINESE IN INDONESIA: 1900-1958, by Donald E. Willmott. Revised Edition, 1961. 152 pages. \$3.00.

THE DYNAMICS OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL CENTRAL AND WEST JAVA: A COMPARATIVE REPORT, by Selo Soemardjan. 1963. 40 pages. \$2.00.

THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN A SUNDANESE TOWN: A STUDY IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ACCOMMODATION, by Giok-Lan Tan. 1963. 314 pages. \$4.00.

D. Translation Series

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS A CULTURAL PROBLEM (Konfrontasi, September-October, 1954), by Soedjatmoko. 1958; Second Printing 1962. 28 pages. \$1.00.

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PAST AND FUTURE, by Mohammad Hatta. (An address delivered at Gadjah Mada University at Jogjakarta on November 27, 1956). 1960. 17 pages. \$0.50.

AN APPROACH TO INDONESIAN HISTORY: TOWARDS AN OPEN FUTURE, by Soedjatmoko. 1960. 22 pages. \$1.00.

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